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ABSTRACT

SERVICESCAPES: CRUISES AND THE PRODUCTION OF EXPERIENCE
Jesse Smith
Etienne Benson

“Servicescapes: Cruises and the Production of Experience” details the history of an experiential
product in the United States in the second half of the twentieth century. It introduces and uses the
analytical framework of the servicescape to trace the complex entanglement of infrastructural,
environmental, technical, atmospheric, and social elements that together produce a cruise
product. These elements include geography and climate; harbor and port development;
passenger terminal architecture and construction; ship design and operations; and hospitality
management, research, and training. I use this product to argue for greater scholarship on
services as an economic category with the history of technology, environmental history, and the
history of science. I offer this framework both as a model for capturing the material, discursive,
and cultural dimensions of seemingly intangible consumer products, and as a means of
understanding the production of serviced individuals in the later decades of the last century.
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Introduction: Building (an Argument for) the Servicescape

The Perfect Day is almost here. The Royal Caribbean cruise line anticipates that it
will complete a $250-million makeover of the company’s private Bahamian island by
December 2019. Branded “Perfect Day at Coco Cay,” the new complex includes the
Thrill Waterpark, with 13 slides and the largest wave pool in the Caribbean; a 450-foothigh hot air balloon ride; five dining facilities, including a swim-up bar; a 1,600-footlong zip line; Devil’s Peak, the tallest waterslide in North America; overwater cabanas;
and Ocean Lagoon, the biggest freshwater pool in the otherwise salty Caribbean Sea.
Perfect Day at Coco Cay is a cruise destination available only to those passengers on one
of the eleven Royal Caribbean cruise ships that visit the island. This was an important
quality for an enthusiastic reviewer from Travel + Leisure magazine. “One thing that sets
the water park apart from most others you may have visited is that there are fewer guests
than any other public water park you might find,” he wrote in May 2019. “Considering
only people on Royal Caribbean ships are allowed to enter, combined with the fact that
not all of those on board will visit the water park, and you’re setting yourself up for a fun
day with pretty short lines.”1
Perfect Day at Coco Cay is, as of 2019, the most recent effort among cruise lines
to provide passengers a highly managed vacation at sea. That it is reasonable for a cruise
line or any enterprise to design, construct, operate, and offer consumers a commercialized
“perfect day” is (I find) a wacky fact of contemporary life in so-called “post-industrial”
1

Tanner Saunders, "Royal Caribbean Just Reopened Their Private Island — and It Has the Largest
Waterslide in North America," May 7, 2019, https://www.travelandleisure.com/cruises/royal-caribbeanperfect-day-at-coco-cay-open.
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economies; that a cruise line offers such a product will be less surprising by the end of
this dissertation.
Royal Caribbean Cruise Lines (RCCL) is one of the biggest cruise companies in a
large and growing global industry. The cruise industry had earnings of more than $45
billion in 2018, an increase of 4.6 percent over 2017.2 Over the past decade, the global
number of cruise passengers has nearly doubled. The industry’s trade group, the Cruise
Lines International Association (CLIA), estimates that 30 million passengers will take a
cruise in 2019, an increase of 1.5 million from 2018 and an increase of 12.2 million since
2009. The industry association also anticipates the addition of 18 new ocean ships in
2019, raising the total number of CLIA-member ships to 272. According to CLIA,
emerging trends in cruising include the growing use of “smart tech” such as virtual
concierges, “conscious travel” that minimize impact on local communities, and a growing
number of “working nomads” who mix work and leisure and appreciate strong Internet
connections and “work-friendly cafes.” The trade group also anticipates the moment
when Generation Z outpaces Millennials as the largest consumer group, which may
happen by 2020. This is good news for cruise lines, according to the CLIA. “This
generation like the one before, prefers experiences over material items and is seeking out
travel,” it wrote in its 2019 Cruise Industry Trends & Industry Outlook report. “The
appeal of multiple destinations and unique experiences, such as music festivals at sea, is
attracting this new category of cruisers.”3

2

"2018 Worldwide Cruise Line Market Share," Cruise Market Watch,
https://cruisemarketwatch.com/market-share/.
3
“2019 Cruise Industry Trends & Industry Outlook," Cruise Lines International Association,
https://cruising.org/-/media/research-updates/research/clia-2019-state-of-the-industry-presentation-(1).pdf.
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The full-time, year-round cruise industry emerged in Miami, Florida in the 1960s
and ’70s, serving primarily U.S. passengers on cruises of the Caribbean. North American
passengers comprise nearly half of the world’s cruise passengers today, and the
Caribbean remains the most popular cruise destination in the world. More than a third of
the planet’s cruises visit the Caribbean, almost double the share of the second most
popular destination region, the Mediterranean.4 Royal Caribbean, Norwegian Cruise Line
Corporation, and the Carnival Corporation all began in Miami, and today these three
companies represent 72 percent of the industry’s earnings, and carry almost 80 percent of
the world’s cruise passengers.5
This dissertation is a history of the cruise as a commercialized leisure experience.
In the chapters that follow, I track the material, discursive, social, and atmospheric
elements that together defined and produced what is today recognized as a cruise
vacation. Though passenger ships have offered leisure travel since the late nineteenth
century, the current character of a cruise as a totalizing, predominantly ship-board
experience, was one that emerged much more recently. This dissertation, then, offers a
historical ontology of the cruise in the United States in the second half of the twentieth
century.6

4

“2019 Cruise Industry Trends.”
“2018 Worldwide Cruise Line Market Share.”
6
I am sensitive here to critiques “service economy” as a periodization, a criticism especially articulated by
sociologist Daniel Bell, whose analysis of a “post-industrial society” resisted characterizations of “service
society,” “information society,” or “knowledge society.” That said, I borrow Bell’s argument that this
society is, in part, characterized by a shift in dominance from the production of goods to services in a postindustrial economy. Bell points out that services were part of both industrialization (in the form of
transportation and utilities) and mass consumption and population growth (in the form of finance, real
estate, and insurance); Bell characterizes a third stage of services associated with rising incomes: health,
education, and personal services (such as restaurants, hotels, entertainment, and sports). Daniel Bell, The
Coming of the Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting, second edition (New York: Basic
Books, Inc., 1976). See also J.I. Gershuny, "Post-Industrial Society: They Myth of the Service Economy,"
Futures 9, no. 2 (April 1977): 103-114.
5

3

I use this history to argue for greater historical analysis of service products within
the history of technology, environmental history, and the history of science. The category
is a broad one, and at times its offerings are hard to bound and define. In one of the
earliest texts on services marketing, Cornell University marketing professor John
Rathmell’s 1974 Marketing in the Service Sector, Rathmell defines services as
“intangible products.”7 He divides services into two categories: consumer services and
nonconsumer services. The first, he argues, “contribute to the quality of life,” and include
cultural activities and travel. The second are those services that help industry, institutions,
and governments realize greater operational efficiencies by hiring specialized service
providers to handle particular activities.8
The intangibility of many service products, however, does not mean the category
defies description or division. Rathmell in fact included in his text a list of “major service
industries,” which he drew from the U.S. government’s 1965 Standard Industrial
Classification Manual. The categories and the industries represented the diverse range of
services available to individual consumers, industries, institutions, and governments.
These included communications (telephone, television broadcasting); consulting and
business facilitating (advertising, coal mining services, animal husbandry, and windowcleaners); educational (elementary schools, vocational schools, and libraries); financial
(Federal Reserve banks, investment companies); health (hospitals, rest homes, dental
laboratories); household operations (laundries, furniture repair, horticultural services);
housing (apartment buildings, hotels, trailer parks); insurance (life, fire, and health);
legal; personal (barber shops, funeral homes, watch repair); recreational (movie theatres,
7

John M. Rathmell, Marketing in the Service Sector (Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop Publishers, 1974), 3.
Rathmell cites as an example colleges that outsource food and dining services to a private company.
Rathmell, 4-5.
8
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bowling alleys, museums, zoos); transportation (railroad, automobile parking, airlines);
and miscellaneous (labor unions, religious organizations, and “services, not elsewhere
classified (ghost writers, weather forecasters, cloud seeding, etc.)”).9
Much of these categories and industries will be familiar to historians of
technology and environmental historians, as well as historians of science, medicine, and
health. Transportation, utilities, and communications, for example, have been rich areas
of study for historians of technology.10 Environmental historians have offered histories of
coal mining, animal husbandry, zoos, and horticulture (if not horticultural services).11 As
the 1965 categories above suggest, many of these industries can be grouped into clusters
that seem reasonable and reasonably aligned with the content focus of many historical
fields (beyond technology and environment, these include education, business, health,
and recreation). But by taking up such actors’ categories, scholars risk reproducing the
traditional character of those categories, even as some historians within those fields have
pushed back on the categories themselves.12
Building on the work of these fields, this dissertation argues for the utility of
services as an analytical category in two ways. First, such a category and emphasis would
9

Rathmell, 217-220.
See, for example, Wolfgang Schivelbusch, The Railway Journey: The Industrialization of Time and
Space in the 19th Century (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977); Thomas Hughes, Networks of
Power: Electrification in Western Society, 1880-1930 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983);
Janet Abbate, Inventing the Internet (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1999); and Ronald Kline, Consumers
in the Country: Technology and Social Change in Rural America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 2000).
11
See Thomas Andrews, Killing for Coal: America's Deadliest Labor War (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 2010); Andrew Isenberg, Mining California: An Ecological History (New York: Hill and
Wang, 2005); Harriet Ritvo, The Animal Estate: The English and Other Creatures in Victorian England
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989); Nigel Rothfels, Savages and Beasts: The Birth of the
Modern Zoo (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008); and Ted Steinberg, American Green: The
Obsessive Quest for the Perfect Lawn (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2006).
12
Within the history of technology, see David Edgerton, "Innovation, Technology, or History: What Is the
Historiography of Technology About?" Technology and Culture 51, no. 3 (July 2010): 680-697. Within
environmental history, see Paul S. Sutter, "The World with Us: The State of American Environmental
History," Journal of American History 100, no. 1 (June 2013): 94-119, and, especially, the responses.
10
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broaden inquiry within these historical fields. What would a history of window-washing
technology, for example, tell us about cultural expectations for clean windows and the
people who clean them? How might an environmental history of popular weather
forecasting help us understand the means by which people conceptualize and experience
the natural world on a daily basis?13 What might a history of commuting tell us about the
historical separation between the possession of material goods (say a privately owned
automobile) and the need to rely on public services (such as an unreliable bus that drops
passengers blocks from a place of employment)? These fields’ ability to unpack the
relationship between material, social, and cultural changes, as well as environmental
history’s attention to the importance of place, suggest they are useful approaches to better
understanding the seemingly intangible quality of service products.
Second, a service framework stands to produce useful comparative analyses
across historical subfields. Putting histories of transportation and communication in
conversation with histories of health, business, recreation, housing, pleasure, and
education stands to better illuminate the history and contours of an economy in which
services dominate and, more importantly, reveal the character of a serviced population
and the consequences of its production. In making this argument, I take up Steven
Shapin’s call for inquiry into the “invisible sciences” that undergird much of
contemporary life (at least in the United States and other nations with similar economic
profiles). Shapin critiques popular and academic reproductions of “science” that privilege
the “hard” sciences at the expense of the “soft,” largely human sciences such as
13

Several works within environmental history and anthropology approach service topics, though not
through the lens of services. See Peter Thorsheim, "The Corpse in the Garden: Burial, Health, and the
Environment in Nineteenth-Century London," Environmental History 16 (January 2011): 38-68 and
Nicholas Shapiro, "Attuning to the Chemosphere: Domestic Formaldehyde, Bodily Reasoning, and the
Chemical Sublime," Cultural Anthropology 30, no. 3 (August 2015): 368-393.
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psychology, sociology, anthropology, and economics. He uses the example of a
McDonald’s restaurant to identify the myriad “embedded” sciences that constitute this
seemingly non-scientific site: electric wires and refrigeration systems that have been
tested for efficiency, the development of standards for the safe storage and handling of
food, the analyses that generated caloric profiles of food products, the market research
that informed new menu options, and the statistical analysis used to identify new
restaurant locations. From the selection of music in shopping malls to the design of
algorithms for dating apps to the manufacture of food flavors, embedded sciences
produce “what it’s now like to be a person.”14 Implicit in Shapin’s description are also the
material technologies and environments that support and surround those persons. In other
words, the servicescapes.

Experiential Services and Servicescapes

Working within the category of services, this dissertation uses the mass-market
cruise to illuminate the history of a product particular to the United States in the late
twentieth century: the commercial experience. This is not to say that goods and services
have historically lack experiential dimensions, but rather that human experience came to
be seen as an area that could be made productive of value through the design,
development, and operation of increasingly complex experiential products.15 Marketing
14

Steven Shapin, "Invisible Science," The Hedgehog Review 18, no. 3 (Fall 2016): 44. See also Steven
Shapin, "The Sciences of Subjectivity," Social Studies of Science, 42, no. 2 (April 2012): 170-184.
15
The literature on commercial leisure is rich, though it has explored periods earlier than my own. See
Kathy Peiss, Cheap Amusements: Working Women and Leisure in Turn-of-the-Century New York
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986). Richard Butsch, ed., For Fun And Profit: The
Transformation of Leisure into Consumption (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990); David Nasaw,
Going Out: The Rise and Fall of Public Amusements (New York: Basic Books, 1993); and Mark
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researchers Robert Kwortnik and William Ross have defined such consumer products as
distinct from more traditional goods and services. “We conceptualize an experiential
product,” they write, “as fusing tangible (sensory) and intangible (symbolic) attributes
and co-produced by consumer and marketer to create an event that is pleasurable,
meaningful, and memorable. The experience is the product in a holistic sense. An
experiential product is sought for subjective, psychological reasons—‘fantasies, feelings,
and fun’... as opposed to objective, instrumental benefits.”16 And while a cruise
represents a particularly illuminating experiential product (Kwortnik elsewhere describes
cruises as “a prototypical experiential product...a combination floating resort hotel,
sightseeing vessel, gourmet restaurant, food court, nightclub, shopping center,
entertainment complex, and recreation facility”), other business and marketing experts
(both academic and lay) have increasingly argued that the makers and providers of goods
and services should better exploit the experiential dimensions and possibilities of their
products.17
Much of the literature on commercial experiences and experiential products
references the 1999 book The Experience Economy by management consultants B.
Joseph Pine and James Gilmore. In this book, Pine and Gilmore argued that experiences
represented a new category of economic offering, one distinct from the production of
commodities, goods, and services. Their work was intended to help businesses learn how

Gottdiener, The Theming of America: Dreams, Visions, and Commercial Spaces (Boulder: Westview Press,
1997).
16
Robert J. Kwortnik Jr. and William T. Ross Jr., "The Role of Positive Emotions in Experiential
Decisions," International Journal of Research in Marketing, 24 no. 4 (December 2007): 325-326.
“Fantasies, feelings, and fun” is quoted from Hirschman, Elizabeth C., and Morris B. Holbrook. “Hedonic
Consumption: Emerging Concepts, Methods and Propositions,” Journal of Marketing 46, no. 3 (July 1982):
92–101.
17
Robert J. Kwortnik, “Shipscape Influence on the Leisure Cruise Experience,” International Journal of
Culture, Tourism, and Hospitality Research 2, no. 4 (2008): 293.
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to differentiate their products by staging personal, sensorial, and memorable experiences
and avoid the commoditization that had occurred in commodities, goods, and services.
The goal was to facilitate economic expansion by identifying a new economic base,
similar to the emergence of services alongside a shift in manufacturing from the United
States to other nations. Though Pine and Gilmore described particularly experiential
products and spaces such as Disney World, they argued that any good or service could be
made experiential. The same coffee beans, for example, could be a commodity sold by a
harvester, a good sold by a grocery store, or a service offered by a diner. These same
beans could also be made into an experience. “Serve that same coffee in a five-star
restaurant or espresso bar, where the ordering, creation, and consumption of the cup
embodies a heightened ambience or sense of theatre,” Pine and Gilmore wrote, “and
consumers gladly pay anywhere from $2 to $5 for each cup.”18
Pine and Gilmore’s Experience Economy represented a popular recognition of
experiential marketing, but business interests had been exploring the experiential
dimensions of goods and services for several decades by the time their book appeared. In
the late 1960s and early ’70s, as the Miami-based cruise industry was emerging, business
researchers grew increasingly attentive to the competitive possibilities of experience. In a
key 1973 article that marketing scholars later cited as one of the first explorations of the
topic, Northwestern marketing professor Philip Kotler argued for “Atmospherics as a
Marketing Tool.”19 Suggesting a pivot in consumption behavior (and preempting by
almost thirty years Pine and Gilmore’s claim that “goods and services are no longer

18

And this was in 1999! B. Joseph Pine II and James H. Gilmore, The Experience Economy: Work is
Theatre and Every Business a Stage (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1999), 1.
19
Philip Kotler, “Atmospherics as a Marketing Tool,” Journal of Retailing 49, no. 4 (Winter 1973-1974):
48-64.
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enough”), Kotler wrote, “The tangible product—a pair of shoes, a refrigerator, a haircut,
or a meal—is only a small part of the total consumption package. It includes the services,
warranties, packaging, advertising, financing, pleasantries, images, and other features that
accompany the product.”20 Kotler’s explicit focus was the atmosphere that surrounded
retail goods and commercial services, which he defined as “the effort to design buying
environments to produce specific emotional effects in the buyer that enhance his purchase
probability.”21 He listed several examples of what he considered successful uses of
atmospheric marketing. These included the creation of mock living room displays in
furniture stores, the “organized chaos” of antique shops, and the staging of model homes
in new residential developments. Kolter described a new shoe chain whose stores were
designed to look like a Victorian club to capture the shift in footwear management “from
a utilitarian concept to a pleasure concept,” and also a “bargain basement” clothing store
where employees deliberately tossed products on a counter to create a sense of chaos and
urgency among shoppers. Of airlines he wrote, the “personnel are chosen to create
confidence or distraction. The pilots are tall, handsome, and experienced-looking. The
stewardesses are attractive and sometimes coquettish. Even their costuming has become a
part of the atmospheric event.”22
Kolter argued that consumers experienced atmosphere via four of the five senses
— sight, sound, smell, and touch — and he described atmospheres in sensory ways. “The
typical atmosphere of a funeral parlor is subdued, quiet, and orderly,” he wrote, “The

20

Pine and Gilmore. Kotler, 48.
Kolter, 50.
22
Kolter, 59. For an analysis of the labor Kolter references here, see Arlie Russell Hochschild, The
Managed Heart: Commercialization of Human Feeling (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983).
21
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typical atmosphere of a discotheque is bright, noisy, loud, and rough.”23 My analysis of
the cruise product builds on such an approach, and also extends it. While the interests
behind cruising were attentive to atmosphere, equally important was the infrastructure
that allowed increasingly larger ships to enter otherwise shallow harbors, the techniques
by which cruise lines loaded and unloaded passengers, and the emotional labor of frontof-the-house employees who served cruise ship passengers.
To capture this complex system that enacts the experiential cruise product, I
introduce a new conceptual framework for the history of technology and environmental
history: the servicescape. I borrow the terminology from the field of marketing, and more
specifically, services marketing, though my own aims differ from those of marketing and
business scholars. The concept of a servicescape was first described by Mary Jo Bitner in
1992. Drawing on environmental psychology, marketing, organizational behavior, human
factors, ergonomics, and architecture, Bitner argued that the concept was “a first step
toward integrating theories and empirical findings from diverse disciplines into a
framework that describes how the built environment (i.e., the manmade, physical
surroundings as opposed to the natural or social environment) … affects both consumers
and employees in service organizations.”24 Bitner’s original analysis included a
“typology of service organizations” based on the source of the service action and the
complexity of the associated servicescapes. The sources of service action included
customers themselves (in self-service circumstances), interactions between employees
and customers, and employees alone. Servicescapes, according to Bitner, could also be
classified as either lean — in the case of an ATM machine or a hot dog stand — or
23

Kolter, 51.
Mary Jo Bitner, “Servicescapes: The Impact of Physical Surroundings on Customers and Employees,”
Journal of Marketing 56, no 2. (April 1992): 58.
24
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elaborate — as with hotels, restaurants, banks, and schools. “An example,” Bitner wrote,
“is a hospital with its many floors, rooms, sophisticated equipment, and complex
variability in functions performed within the physical facility.”25
Bitner identified three dimensions contributing to the production of a
servicescape: ambient conditions, which included music; spatial layout and functionality,
which could refer to the organization of furniture in a service space; and signs, symbols,
and artifacts, such as white tablecloths in upscale restaurants. According to Bitner,
servicescape was a framework for understanding the interrelated impact of those
dimensions. “Rather than a single element,” she wrote, “it is ultimately the total
configuration of environmental dimensions that defines the servicescape.”26
Bitner developed the concept of servicescape as a call for new theoretical and
empirical research on the influence of physical settings on consumer behavior. Her own
and allied fields heeded her call. As of June 24, 2019, her piece has been cited nearly
8,000 times, in publications as diverse as the Journal of Retailing, the Journal of Applied
Psychology, the Annals of Tourism Research, and the Journal of Service Marketing.27
Her broader goal as a marketing researcher was to spur research that would “facilitate
achievement of organizational as well as marketing goals.”28 In other words, Bitner
wanted to help service industries attract and satisfy customers, operate efficiently, and
increase employee retention and productivity.
My use of servicescape is not intended to reproduce or support those goals.
Instead, I borrow the framework’s emphasis on service and, more significantly, its

25

Bitner, 59.
Bitner, 67.
27
Google Scholar search results, June 24, 2019.
28
Bitner, 57.
26
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understanding of the “total configuration” of elements that produce those services. And
that configuration, this dissertation reveals, includes the immediate spatial dimensions of
a consumer environment, but also the environmental, infrastructural, and interpersonal
services that surround and operate it.
In doing so, this dissertation contributes to long-standing interest in the
development of complex systems within the history of technology, especially, but also in
environmental history and science and technology studies (STS). Work in the first field,
the history of technology, began largely with Thomas Hughes’ study of electricity
network and his concept of Large Technical Systems.29 Other framings of sociotechnical
systems, from STS and anthropology, include Actor-Network Theory, assemblages, and
infrastructure.30
Work at the intersection of technology and the environment includes Martin
Melosi’s long history of urban sanitary infrastructure.31 Others, however, have pushed
back on rigid demarcations between technology and the environment, or culture and
nature, in analyses of complex systems. Historian Sara Pritchard, for example, has argued
for an envirotechnical framework that seeks to overcome a bifurcation between the
natural and the humanmade.32 Anthropologist Ashley Carse’s study of the Panama Canal

29

Hughes, Networks of Power; Thomas P. Hughes, “The Evolution of Large Technological Systems,” in
The Social Construction of Technological Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and History of
Technology, eds. Thomas P. Hughes, Wiebe E. Bijker, and Trevor J. Pinch (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press,
1987), 51-82.
30
See Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2005); Jane Bennet, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology (Durham: Duke
University Press, 2010); Susan Leigh Star, “The Ethnography of Infrastructure,” American Behavioral
Scientist 43, no. 3 (1999): 377-391; Brian Larkin, “The Politics and Poetics of Infrastructure,” Annual
Review of Anthropology 42, no. 1 (2013): 327-347.
31
Martin Melosi, The Sanitary City: Urban Infrastructure in America from Colonial Times to the Present
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000).
32
Sara Pritchard, Confluence: The Nature of Technology and the Remaking of the Rhône (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2011). See also Sara Pritchard and Thomas Zeller, "The Nature of
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and the conceptual expansion of the canal’s infrastructure to include the surrounding
watershed further elaborated the entanglement of socio-technical systems and non-human
nature in the provision of environmental services (water) for traditionally infrastructural
goals (the movement of goods within global trade).33
The work described above provided rich and varied histories and social studies of
diverse systems. But the product of those systems has often reproduced the traditional
subjects of historical analyses of technology, science, and the environment. These include
energy production and distribution, transportation, trade, water provision, and food
production. In doing so, they have extracted from a broader category of “services” those
activities that most closely align with the subfield’s pre-existing and longstanding objects
of analysis. To borrow from Bitners’ 1992 service organization typology, the history of
technology, environmental history, and STS have taken up as objects of analysis utilities,
telephones, insurance, health clinics, and hospitals, but not hotels, restaurants, hot dogs
stands, dry cleaners, Golf Lands, or Surf ‘n Splash water parks. I argue that a
servicescape framework and its built-in emphasis on the product of a particular set of
systems enlarges the range of objects subject to the same kind of nuanced analysis cited
above, objects that are not immediately recognizable as either technological,
environmental, or scientific. These objects are no less material than electricity grids or
canal watersheds, and in fact constitute much of what has come to be seen as the
desirable rewards for labor in so-called post-industrial economies of the twentieth and
twenty-first centuries.
Industrialization" in The Illusory Boundary: Environment and Technology in History, eds. Martin Reuss
and Stephen H. Cutcliff (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2010), 69-100.
33
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The design and creation of consumer atmospheres and experiential products is
both technical and spatial, yet the process is understudied in the history of technology and
environmental history. Within the former field, Emily Thompson has revealed how new
acoustic technologies in the first decades of the twentieth century reduced the explicit
role of place and space in aural experiences.34 Examining a more recent period,
anthropologist Natasha Dow Schüll’s study of machine gambling located addiction in the
relationship between casino interior layout, ergonomic design, human bodies, and
machine programming.35 But such examples are few. Historians of technology have
instead tended to instead to examine the experience of technology, and not the technical
production of experience itself.36
Environmental historians have shown greater interest in the production of
atmospheres and experiences, much of it focused on outdoor recreation. David Louter’s
study of road-building in and around three Washington national parks across the 20th
century, for example, reveals how changing attitudes about the automobile informed the
placement of roads in these parks, with the goal of producing a particular encounter with
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nature.37 Neil Maher’s history of the work of the Civilian Conservation Corps linked
ideas of environmental and human health through the construction of recreational
facilities such as campgrounds and hiking trails.38 Other work on the environmental
history of tourism has explored how particular regions are framed, environmentally and
culturally, to generate economic activity.39 Emphasizing service and particular
experiential services, however, provides a broader frame for understanding the
environmental, technical, and interpersonal elements that together produce an
experiential economic product.

Outline of the Dissertation

In articulating the history of a particular servicescape, this dissertation presents
several historical threads that coalesce as the cruise product in the 1970s and ’80s.
Individually, each chapter offers the longer history of a particular dimension of the cruise
product; collectively, they describe a cruise servicescape that is environmental,
geographical, infrastructural, technological, atmospheric, and interpersonal.
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Chapter One is a history of the development of port and harbor facilities in
Miami. This history begins in 1894, when the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers sent a
surveyor to the settlement where the Miami River met Biscayne Bay to evaluate the
area’s economic potential and assess the suitability of federal deepening of the region’s
waterways. It continues with the incorporation of Miami and railroad magnate Henry
Flagler’s early construction of waterfront infrastructure on the shores of Biscayne Bay.
Soon after the city’s founding, local interests began advocating for even deeper
infrastructure in the shallow bay. Early arguments for deeper harbor facilities drew on the
perceived agricultural promise of the watery Everglades to Miami’s west. Though
drainage ultimately proved difficult and the glades of southern Florida never became an
economic hinterland, the city’s rapid growth as a tourist destination justified further
expansion of port and harbor facilities in order to support Miami’s great material
consumption. Throughout much of the first half of the twentieth century, local business
and political interests also debated the character and location of port facilities. The city’s
tourist economy, the emergence of Miami-based cruising, and competition for cruise
ships from Fort Lauderdale led the city in the 1960s to build a new port on a human-made
island in the middle of Biscayne Bay, with separate facilities for cargo and passenger
business.
The design and construction of those passenger facilities is the subject of Chapter
Two. Historically, passenger and cruise ships in Miami and other U.S. cities shared port
facilities with cargo ships (especially since many passenger ships also carried cargo).
Miami’s passenger terminal was the world’s first dedicated to the cruise industry. It was
built for two reasons: First, boosters of the emerging cruise industry believed that
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dedicated passenger facilities whose atmospheres and experiences were more aligned
with a recreational product were necessary to entice passengers to purchase an unfamiliar
leisure experience. I offer a comparative analysis with similar efforts to build dedicated
cruise passenger facilities in New York City to underscore this point. The second reason
for the construction of a dedicated passenger terminal was the development of
containerization in cargo shipping. This new technology of global trade required great
expanses of land to secure economies of scale; as a result, new cargo ports appeared, and
downtown finger piers that could serve both cargo and passenger trades became obsolete.
Chapter Two traces the emergence of these concerns over the late 1950s and through the
1960s in Miami and New York, and documents how they led Miami to hire Canadian
architect John Andrews to design the passenger terminal. It also considers how these
concerns influenced Andrews’ design.
The dissertation’s third chapter moves from this interface between land and ship
to passenger ships themselves. Chapter Three provides a history of cruising from the late
nineteenth century through the 1960s. And though I build this history, in part, from the
robust enthusiast literature on passenger and cruise ships in this period, I draw from a
range of shipbuilding journals and popular media to detail the material means by which
ships were increasingly positioned for warm-weather cruising in contrast to transoceanic
transportation. Early ship lines transitioned to part-time cruising by offering greater onboard activities and amenities (in addition, of course, to adopting different itineraries). A
series of geopolitical and technological events, however, drove greater change in
passenger ships. The first were immigration restrictions in the United States following
World War I. This reduced passenger ship lines’ significant business in immigration
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transportation, and led these lines to develop new tourist class cabins and amenities to
lure more leisure travelers, primarily from the United States. This chapter also details the
emergence of “dual-purpose” ships built for both transportation and cruising. The designs
and techniques these ships used to transition across these functions reveal key distinctions
between the two economic products, especially cruising’s character as a single-class
operation in which all passengers had access to the entire ship. Chapter Three also offers
early examples of full-time, Miami-based cruising and describes the character of that
emerging product. The chapter concludes with the anticipation and appearance of air
travel, which led struggling ship lines to pivot more forcefully to cruising. These efforts
were meant to legitimize, naturalize, and make appealing ships’ transition from
transportation technologies to floating resort hotels.
As these new hotels catered to U.S. customers, ship lines turned to the U.S. hotel
and hospitality industry for inspiration and operations. The history of that industry is the
subject of Chapter Four. While hotels unsurprisingly figure largely in that history, I
emphasize the development of hospitality education and research programs across a
variety of sites and publications. These include Cornell University, which established the
first formal college-level training program in hotel management, but also the U.S.
Department of Commerce and industry periodicals. Supported by independent and chain
hotels, these efforts developed and defined a particular character of hospitality service
that could be scaled and offered to large numbers. Ongoing efforts to define a research
agenda within hotel and hospitality programs, and the appearance after World War II of
disciplinary research publications within the field, reveal efforts to develop systematized,
standardized service products that could be economically operated and offered, but in
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ways that seemed attentive to personal and idiosyncratic wants and needs. Miami “hotel
men” were some of the earliest founders of cruise lines in the city, and even international
companies later added hotel departments in their transition to cruising.
The final chapter of the dissertation examines the ships that were repurposed and
built in the 1970s and early ’80s for the three large Miami-based cruise lines: Royal
Caribbean, Norwegian, and Carnival. The cruise lines’ design decisions and their choices
of on-board activities and amenities across this period reveal that the character of a cruise
shifted rather quickly in this period. Whereas these lines and others initially operated and
advertised cruises as enjoyable ways to visit multiple Caribbean ports, their ships,
activities, and marketing materials together shifted the definition of a cruise to the
shipboard experience itself. Cruise lines’ success in redefining the character of a cruise is
demonstrated by the appearance of new cruise destinations designed and operated by the
cruise lines themselves, most recently Royal Caribbean’s Perfect Day at Coco Cay.
Though clearly these are not shipboard experiences, these new private ports expanded the
companies’ control over the cruise vacation experience. A particular servicescape was
complete.
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Chapter One: The Port of Miami: Engineering an Infrastructure for Consumption
and Cruising

The land on which the settlers lived was a rock ridge, a rim of rock with the sea on one
side and the watery expanse of the Everglades on the other. The land was a mere
backdrop for the action which took place on the water. — Helen Muir, Miami, U.S.A.1

Miami owes its success to water. American Indians and early white settlers
moved on the water. They ate the fish that swam in the clear water of Biscayne Bay, the
turtles that laid eggs on the shoreline, and the birds that flew above both. Two bodies of
water matter to the land that would eventually be the city of Miami. The Miami River is a
four-mile-long flow that runs east from the Everglades and into Biscayne Bay. The bay,
which separates mainland Miami from the Miami Beach peninsula, is a shallow body
with an average depth of six feet. Until the early twentieth century, both were clear and
abundant with life.
The river and the bay awed Ralph Middleton Munroe, one of the earliest white
settlers in the area, when he first saw them in 1877. In his memoirs, Munroe described
the river as “a beautiful clear-water stream, its banks lined with towering coco-palms and
mangroves.”2 Of the bay he wrote, “No sea-lover could look unmoved on the blue rollers
of the Gulf Stream and the crystal-clear waters of the Reef, of every delicate shade of
blue and green, and tinged with every color of the spectrum from the fantastically rich
growths on the bottom, visible to the last detail through this incredibly translucent
1
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medium...Drifting over the Florida Reef on a quiet day one may note all the details of its
tropical luxuriance twenty feet below, and feels himself afloat on a sort of liquid light,
rather than water, so limpid and brilliant is it.”3
Munroe was equally amazed by the plentiful food in the sea, on the land, and in
the wetlands that blurred the boundary between the two. Seminole Indians traveled down
the Miami River from the Everglades to trade deer, bear, turkey, tortoises, squash, and
sweet potatoes. Fish were abundant, and so were green turtles — they were one of the
few local resources that could be exported to market, live, via Key West.4 Even though
the area where the Miami River met Biscayne Bay was one of the most isolated in the
country before the arrival of the railroad in 1896, the climate and environment provided a
decent life for southeast Florida’s early white settlers. As Monroe described, “[E]ven the
basic problems of the homesteader — food and clothing — were much simplified by the
bountiful fish and game, and by the warmth which permitted clothes to be reduced to the
minimum of decency.”5
The lifestyle Munroe described was not long for this world. Scant clothing would
always be found in and around Miami, but the views and foods that settlers like Munroe
enjoyed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries would change or outright
disappear. In 1894, the federal government turned its attention to the sparse populations,
blue waters, and tropical plants in and around Miami. That year Congress directed the
Army Corps of Engineers to study the existing and possible entrances into Biscayne Bay
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from the Atlantic Ocean.6 It was the first of many studies that the Corps, the city of
Miami, and private firms would make of Miami’s harbor infrastructure and port business
over the next six decades.
In this chapter, I track the surveys, conversations, and debates over Miami’s
maritime facilities between 1894 and 1961, when the city and Army Corps began work
on a new port of Miami on a human-made island in the middle of Biscayne Bay. I
identify the influence of climate, tourism, and, later, cruising on the discussions and
decisions that led to a new port with dedicated facilities for cruise ships and their
passengers. The sudden and rapid growth of a new, year-round, full-time, Miami-based
cruise industry in the late 1960s and ’70s followed closely the construction and opening
of these facilities. This chapter, and the one that follows, is a history of those facilities.
The chapter proceeds in two parts. The first, covering the period from 1894 to the
1930s, follows efforts to deepen Miami’s harbor (which includes the entrance to
Biscayne Bay, a main channel, and a turning basin). In the second, I examine debates
from the late 1920s through the late 1950s over new port facilities: the docks, wharves,
warehouses, and transportation facilities that served freight and passenger ships. The
earliest maritime developments in Miami’s harbor increased the depth of its harbor, but
as the city grew and traffic increased, focus shifted to the horizontal space available on
land to move and store cargo, and to handle a growing number of ships. In each case,
climate and the area’s tourism economy influenced the arguments and decisions made by
private interests, city agencies, Miami politicians, the Army Corps of Engineers, and
6
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Congress. By the late 1950s, all acknowledged that business in the port of Miami was
almost exclusively grounded in an import trade that fulfilled the needs of both residents
and visitors to an economy grounded in tourism. This recognition, and the early signs of
cruising’s potential, would also support the decision to invest in facilities for an unproven
industry.7

The Army Corps in Miami

Few tourists visited southeastern Florida in 1894, when the Corps of Engineers
sent Major Thomas H. Handbury to study the bay and consider its potential as a harbor.
Organized by Congress in March 1799, the Corps was originally established to handle the
engineering work for the U.S. military; three years later, the U.S. Military Academy at
West Point opened as the country’s first engineering school. By 1824, the need for
trained engineers on civilian programs led Congress to expand the Corps’ mission to
include civilian work.8 The 1894 survey, then, was a typical Corps project by that time,
and Handbury was a quintessential Corps engineer. An 1865 graduate of the U.S.
7
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Military Academy at West Point, Handbury had served as the superintendent for river and
harbor projects in Washington and Oregon, and oversaw work on the Ohio and Kentucky
rivers before becoming the superintending engineer for river and harbor projects in
Florida in 1894.9 Handbury’s goal, like that of the many Corps engineers who would
follow him, was to determine whether the area’s current and potential maritime business
warranted federal assistance in overcoming the shallowness of the wide bay that
separated Miami from deeper ocean water.
Handbury believed it did. In his report, he described for his Washington superiors
an untapped and growing source of tropical resources. “The country in the vicinity is as
yet but sparsely populated,” he wrote. “A few thriving settlements are growing up on the
borders of the bay. The rich hummock land in the vicinity is being cleared of its dense
natural growth and devoted to raising vegetables, which come to maturity and are shipped
to the Northern markets in midwinter. Bananas, cocoanuts, pineapples, oranges, limes,
lemons, and the ordinary tropical fruits flourish here.”10
Handbury described a bay 36 miles long, covering 216 square miles, with average
low-water depths of six to 10 feet. Several streams flowed eastward from the Everglades
into the bay. The largest of these, the Miami River, was blocked four miles upstream by a
series of falls over a ridge that held back the waters of the Everglades. Handbury argued
that excavating through the falls could drain this swampy land and open it for
development — a point that foreshadowed later efforts to drain the Everglades, and one

9

George W. Cullum, Biographical Register of the Officers and Graduates of the U.S. Military Academy at
West Point, New York, Supplement, Volume 4, 1890-1900 (Cambridge: Riverside Press, 1901), 150.
10
U.S. Congress, House, “Report of the Secretary of War; Being Part of the Messages and Documents
Communicated to the Two House of Congress at the Beginning of the First Session of the Fifty-Fourth
Congress,” 54th Cong., 1st sess., 1895, H. Doc. 2, 1569.

25

that likely suggested to Handbury a greater agricultural potential for southeastern
Florida.11
Some historians argue that wealthy and politically connected railroad owner
Henry Flagler spurred Congressional interest in Biscayne Bay development.12 Flagler
was at the time extending his railroad down the east coast of Florida and, according to
this argument, was looking to secure rail and shipping connections at Miami. But the site
was already familiar to the federal government, which had operated a fort there in the
mid-nineteenth century. It is likely that the U.S. Congress was also interested in
developing Biscayne Bay because of its proximity to the Spanish colony of Cuba. But
whether for commercial or military purposes, Handbury was interested in possible
entrances into shallow Biscayne Bay. The engineer described three natural cuts between
the islands and shoals that separated the bay from the Atlantic Ocean. The first and most
northern, Norris Cut, separated a long peninsula (today Miami Beach) from Virginia Key.
This cut was closest to the mouth of Miami River, and Handbury estimated that its sandy
bottom could be dredged to a depth of six feet without the need to blast rock. The second
entrance, Bear Cut, was one and a half miles south; it separated Virginia Key from the
island today known as Key Biscayne; this entrance, Handbury believed, could be dug to
eight feet without blasting. And just below Cape Florida, on the southern end of Key
Biscayne, three narrow channels in underwater shoals offered 10 to 12 foot entrances into
the bay. Handbury, however, argued that the exposed nature of these channels, along with
the area’s lightweight sand and frequent storms, meant any improvements here would
likely fill. “Permanent works, such as training dikes or jetties,” Handbury wrote, “would
11
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be impracticable, as their costs would be out of proportion to the benefits to be derived
from them.”13
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(Figure 1: 1900 map of Biscayne Bay with Miami to the West, and Key Biscayne and Virginia Key to
the east, beneath the peninsula that would become Miami Beach. From U.S. Congress, House,
“Examination of Biscayne Bay Florida,” 56th Congress, 1st session, H. doc. 662)
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This casual cost-benefit calculation captures Handbury’s cautiousness about
overstating the commercial potential of harbor improvements in and around Biscayne
Bay. Handbury ultimately recommended Bear Cut as being the most reasonable entrance
into the bay, based on the estimated cost of that work and the prospect for easiest
movement into and out of the bay. He did not believe that larger ships from New York,
Key West, or the Gulf of Mexico ports would stop in Biscayne Bay. He envisioned
instead “light-draft” vessels trading the area’s pineapples, tomatoes, limes, alligator
hides, coconuts, jellies, sponges, and fish with the Florida Keys, the Bahamas, and West
Indies islands.14
Biscayne Bay may have been too shallow for Handbury to expect the large ships
of New York and Key West to stop there, but Miami’s land, water, and climate suggested
to the engineer that the area could develop as a leisure destination. “The winter climate of
Biscayne Bay is mild and salubrious,” he wrote, “and can not be excelled by any to which
our people resort for health-giving air and exercise during the winter months.” He
continued, “The scenery is delightful, and the winds and waters fulfill all requisites for
pleasure-sailing and light-draft vessels. As soon as better facilities are provided for
reaching the locality there is no doubt but it will become the most popular of our winter
resorts and the headquarters for pleasure cruises from this country among the adjacent
islands.”15
Handbury noted that winter yachts were already visiting Biscayne Bay in winter.
This recreational business, and the area’s light trade, led Handbury to recommend that the
Corps further investigate improvements to the Bear Cut entrance to Biscayne Bay.
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At the time Handbury surveyed the bay, most movement to and from Miami
happened across the water. The Corps engineer noted that overland mail from Lake
Worth, sixty miles to the north, came via a two-mule cart; the journey took two days,
each way. Instead of making the long, slow trip by land, most people and goods traveled
to and from Miami by schooners from Key West, where larger ships connected them to
ports to the north. In 1896, overland travel became easier and faster with the arrival of the
Florida East Coast Railway (FEC) from Palm Beach, 80 miles to the north of Miami.
This was the work of Henry Flagler, a former Standard Oil partner who had built resort
hotels in St. Augustine and Palm Beach, and who also constructed railroads to connect
them to the north. Flagler’s extension to Miami was more than an expansion of his
existing hotel and transportation network. As early as 1891, Flagler had expressed
interest in extending his railroad to Key West, the closest deep-water port to Central and
South America, and to the Panama Canal, then under construction.16
The first train arrived in Miami on April 15, 1896. New residents came with it. In
one year, the population of the area grew from 408 to more than 1,500. In July, 344
residents voted to incorporate as a city; they gave their new city the name of the river
than ran through it. That same year, Miami had its first newspaper, school, and bank.
Flagler organized a street system and paved its roads. He donated land for churches and
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municipal buildings, established a municipal waterworks system, and created the Miami
Electric Light and Power Company.17
Flagler also built a large hotel for tourists who arrived by the FEC railroad, just as
he had in St. Augustine and Palm Beach. The Royal Palm sat on fifteen acres where the
Miami River entered Biscayne Bay. The luxury hotel had 450 rooms with hot water, an
ice plant, laundry, and elevators. It included a heated pool and slides flushed with water.
Visitors to the Royal Palm enjoyed a casino, ballroom, tennis courts, ballfields, a golf
course, flower conservatory, and an artificial rockery with pools full of fish.18
Flagler’s railroad, hotel, and services helped Miami grow, but both he and the city
continued to look to the sea. Flagler was the first to undertake significant efforts to
deepen the water in and around Miami. Before the railroad came, early white settlers had
built small wharves and landings along the Miami River and Biscayne Bay.19 In 1895 and
1896, Flagler dredged a nine-foot channel from the Miami River south to Cape Florida, at
the bottom of Key Biscayne.20 He deposited some of the spoils of this dredging just south
of the mouth of the river. This spoil island would form the basis for the human-made
Brickell Key, today a small island of luxury condo towers, but at the time of this work,
local residents complained about Flagler’s impact on the bay. In his memoirs, Ralph
17
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Munroe acknowledged that Flagler’s railroad and harbor improvements meant “life on
the Bay is now more comfortable, food more varied, [and] society that of the traveling
world.”21 But he also lamented the way spoil islands and pilings degraded the views
across Biscayne Bay.
Flagler’s early dredging opened Miami to deeper boats, but it was quickly deemed
insufficient for the new and growing city. In October 1896, an anonymous writer for the
city’s young newspaper, the Miami Metropolis, noted of “Beautiful Biscayne Bay” that
yachts drawing nine feet of water could ply the bay, but that the body’s shallowness
prevented larger ocean-going vessels from entering. Writing five months after the arrival
of the railroad, he noted that “there are good grounds for believing that in the very near
future an appropriation will be made by the general government to deepen the channel to
fifteen feet.”22 The author did not identify the grounds for such a belief, but the statement
may have reflected Flagler’s own interest in a deeper Biscayne Bay: Flagler had donated
the land for the newspaper’s building, and its first editor was his former lawyer.23
In 1897, Flagler moved the FEC terminal and docks to a new bayside facility
north of the mouth of the Miami River. He dug a 500-foot-wide, 12-foot-deep basin in
front of this new railyard and ship terminal; Flagler also deepened the channel to Cape
Florida to twelve feet.24 That same year, he launched a steamship service from Miami to
Key West.25 And his newly created Florida East Coast Steamship Company ordered the
construction of a new passenger ship, the Miami, which offered passenger service to
Nassau in the Bahamas.
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Despite his investment in deepening the channel to Cape Florida in 1897, Flagler
was already eyeing a cut across the closer Miami Beach peninsula as his preferred ocean
entrance to Biscayne Bay. Up to this point, Flagler, through his railroad, had made all
harbor improvements in and around Miami; he now looked to the U.S. government for
assistance. In 1899 and 1900, an Army Corps team surveyed the bay to identify the most
desirable site for an 18-foot channel and harbor. The team noted that Biscayne Bay
presented two natural challenges to development. The first was shallow rock, just below
the surface of the water. The second was drifting sand: “the protection of the sea end of
the entrance channel,” the team reported, “involves one of the most difficult marine
engineering problems, viz, the formation of a harbor on a sandy coast.”26
Comparing Bears Cut, Norris Cut, and the Cape Florida entrance to the bay, the
Corps team determined that a 300-foot-wide cut across the Miami Beach peninsula above
Norris Cut represented “the most feasible” route.27 This proposed entrance would provide
the shortest and straightest route between the ocean and Miami’s existing mainland port
facilities, and the need for less rock excavation at the site made this entrance the cheapest
to construct.28 It also offered the safest offshore conditions and the most promise for
future deepening to 24 feet. More important, this cut was closest to open-water depths of
24 feet; as such, it would require shorter jetties than entrances at Bear or Cape Florida,
and would therefore interfere less with the littoral currents that flowed parallel to the
shoreline.
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This Corps team, however, did not recommend that the federal government
undertake such improvements at the time. Echoing Handbury’s skepticism over Miami’s
commercial prospects, the team did not believe that Miami would benefit from the
anticipated growth in trade between the United States and Central and South America, or
from the trade across the Panama Canal, then under construction. They argued that
Miami offered no advantage over the more centrally located ports along the Gulf of
Mexico or more northerly Atlantic coast. Miami was also not a strategic site for exports
to Caribbean islands. Most U.S. exports to those islands were lumber, cattle, and
manufactured goods. The most economical way to ship these goods was by long water
and short rail routes; Miami offered short water and long rail connections between the
islands and most of the United States.29
The 1900 Corps survey included testimony from representatives of the Florida
East Coast Railway, who (not surprisingly) were more sanguine about the potential for
increased commerce in a deeper Miami harbor. They argued that current freight trade
with Key West, Havana, and Nassau was limited by the size of boats able to enter
Biscayne. The FEC representatives also suggested that the area in and around Miami was
poised to become a significant exporter of natural resources such as pine and cypress,
clay and limestone, fish and cattle, phosphates and turpentine, and ramie — a potential
substitute for cotton and flax. The FEC railroad would also be able to whisk perishable
oranges, lemons, limes, bananas, mangoes, and pineapples from Cuba and Puerto Rico to
northern markets.30
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Despite the Army Corps’ recommendation, Congress and the FEC entered into a
partnership to deepen Miami’s harbor. J.R. Parrot, president of all of Flagler’s
companies, appeared before the Rivers and Harbors Commission of Congress in
Washington and offered to dredge an 18-foot channel across Biscayne Bay, from the
FEC’s mainland facilities to Miami Beach, if the government would cut a channel across
Miami Beach.31 Congress agreed. The River and Harbor Act of July 25, 1902,
appropriated $50,000 toward the creation of an 18-foot-deep channel 4,000 feet north of
Norris Cut, across the Miami Beach peninsula. This was contingent on the FEC entering
a contract to construct a basin adjacent to the Miami terminal, the channel 18 feet deep
and 100 feet wide across Biscayne Bay, and a refuge basin at the end of this channel, just
inside the entrance to the bay. The appropriation further stipulated that any commercial
vessels using the cut, channel, and basins would be permitted to use the FEC’s mainland
wharves and warehouses.32
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(Figure 2: 1903 map, “Showing proposed 18 foot channel from the city of Miami to the Atlantic
Ocean.” From U.S. War Department, “Annual Reports of War Department for the Fiscal Year
Ended June 30, 1903.”)
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The FEC went to work quickly, as the agreement stipulated that the government
would not begin its portion of the project until the railroad dug a preliminary channel
across the bay. In 1903, the FEC dredged a route 10 feet deep and 60 feet wide across
Biscayne Bay. The next year, the Corps hired a private contractor to begin cutting across
the Miami Beach peninsula. The contractor immediately faced the environmental
challenges the 1900 Corps survey team anticipated. The amount of rock turned out to be
greater than expected. More significant were erosion and shifting sands. In describing
progress on the cut in 1905, the Corps reported that waves were already eroding its
seaward sides. The eroded sand had reduced the eight-foot entrance to three feet.33 Two
years later, in 1907, the Corps noted that the contractor, P. Sandford Ross, had removed
92.4 cubic yards of sand and 2,298.8 cubic yards of rock over the past year, but to little
effect. “No permanent result was accomplished,” the Corps reported, “as the channel
filled almost as fast as dredged.”34
Drifting sand and erosion would continue to challenge the project for the next two
decades. Over that period, the scope of the project grew, both in response to those
challenges and to real and anticipated growth in Miami’s port traffic. In 1907, Congress
enlarged the target width of the channel from 60 feet to 100.35 But even that was deemed
too narrow. In the Corps’ annual report for 1909, Captain George R. Spalding argued that
a 100-foot channel would only be safe for small, light vessels; Spalding suggested that
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such a channel would “be little, if any, better than the present existing channel around
Cape Florida.”36
The next year, Congress directed the Corps to study the possibility of a channel
20 feet deep, 300 feet wide across the Miami Beach peninsula, and 150 feet wide across
Biscayne Bay. From March 4 to June 3, 1911, Corps surveyors observed the ebb and
flood tides moving through the Miami Beach cut. They concluded that the sand filling the
channel was coming from the ocean, not from the bay; the team recommended an
extension of jetties into the ocean. They also recommended widening the channel, as
water in the narrow channel attained “a very considerable velocity” that made navigation
dangerous.37
The nature of Miami’s port business had also changed since the Corps advised
against the proposed 300-foot-wide Miami Beach channel ten years earlier. In the report
of the survey, Spalding argued that the Corps’ earlier skepticism about Miami’s trade
potential had been proven false by an increase in port trade from 18,000 tons to more
than 200,000. He also noted that the State of Florida’s efforts to drain the Everglades to
the west of Miami promised further increases in trade into and out of Miami. “The
drainage canals, all navigable for launches and lighters, will give to practically every
farmer a transportation line to the port,” he wrote, “and unless the entire plan of the State
is to be a gigantic failure, the port of Miami will be supplied with sufficient freight in the
sugar, rice, fruits, and vegetables to be raised on this rich land to make a lucrative trade
for coasting vessels.”38 In a letter reprinted in the report, the Miami Board of Trade
doubled down on the promise of the Everglades, arguing that when drainage is complete
36
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in 18 months, “this section will see the greatest influx of actual settlers ever known in the
history of the United States.”39
The real and potential trade encouraged Congress to adopt the Corp’s
recommendations for deeper harbor facilities. (Even as underwater currents and materials
continued to thwart progress; in 1912, sand reduced the entrance from a depth of 18 feet
to seven.40) On July 25, 1912, Congress approved a channel 300-feet-wide, 20-feet deep,
and extended jetties. It also accepted that department’s recommendation that federal
government work be contingent on assurances that “local interests” would build and
operate “suitable wharves” on Miami’s bayfront, with connections to the railroad.41 In
1915, the city of Miami assumed the FEC’s portion of the bay project. (The FEC had
since extended its railroad from Miami to Key West, and turned its attention to that city’s
deeper port). By 1918, the city had dredged a 100-foot wide, 18-foot deep channel
straight across the bay.42 In 1923, the 20-feet-deep cut opened.43
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(Figure 3: 1918 map showing municipal docks in Miami, the municipal channel parallel to the
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Over the next 12 years, the Corps would recommend and Congress would
authorize three additional enlargements of Miami’s harbor. The first was an even deeper
and wider channel across the bay. In 1922, the Corps considered a proposal for a 25-footdeep channel, and agreed that current and projected traffic in and out of the port of Miami
warranted the greater depth. In its report on the port, the Board of Engineers for Rivers
and Harbors noted that exports in fruit, vegetables, sugar, and lumber were growing. The
Board also emphasized the increasing number of vacationers and passengers attracted to
Miami’s climate. The city at the time had 35,000 residents, with 50,000 “transients” in
winter. These two growing industries, distinct in quality but linked by climate, justified to
the Board the need for a deeper harbor entrance. “This portion is not a manufacturing
district, and it is doubtful if it ever will be,” the Board wrote, “but it is a very productive
agricultural center and, due to its climatic conditions, very attractive to winter tourists, so
that the passenger movement is far beyond any other section of the State or of any other
State in proportion to population and transportation facilities.44 Miami’s infrastructure
was bursting with tourists. And the annual influx of passengers coincided with the annual
peak of agricultural production. A deeper harbor promised to end this clogging of tourists
and tomatoes. With 25 feet of water, Corps Major William Lemen argued, “The many
thousands of tourists from all over the eastern section of the United States, seeking the
climatic benefits of these parts, will not be afforded relief from the congested
transportation facilities now used.”45
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(Figure 4: This 1922 map of Biscayne Bay shows the new residential islands built north of the Miami
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Tourism and agriculture justified deepening, though prospects for the former
industry were more certain than those of the latter. In the same report of the Corps’ 1922
survey, engineer Colonel Spencer Cosby approvingly described Miami as “progressive,
growing fast, and brimming with energy and ambition.” But at the same time, Cosby
tempered expectations for the agricultural potential of the Everglades. “It is upon
anticipated future production rather than upon present production that Miami bases its
claims for the need of deeper water,” Cosby wrote. He continued, “How much of its
expectations will be realized and how soon it is, of course, impossible to say;
development work is still actively going on and the reclamation of the Everglades is
opening up extensive new territory. There are, however, problems yet to be solved
connected with its development; even the raising of sugar cane is still in the experimental
stage.”46
Nevertheless, the Corps recommended deepening the entrance to Biscayne Bay,
and the channel across it, so long as Miami enlarged a turning basin along its waterfront.
Congress agreed to the project.
As Crosby noted, increased agricultural exports were a possibility, and not a
proven fact. Studies of actual port traffic revealed that most of the cargo moving through
the port of Miami at this time were imports for local consumption. Between 1917 and
1921, the port averaged 86,088 tons of imports per year, with only 14,836 tons of
exports.47 The bulk of these imports (mainly oil products, lumber, and food) were
consumed locally and supported the growing resident and tourist populations. The Corps,
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Congress, and Miami, however, held out hope that the Everglades would be successfully
drained. In a 1925 study of Miami’s port traffic by the Corps, the agency noted that
recent flooding in the Everglades had damaged sugarcane crops, but that “[w]hen
drainage operations have progressed to the point where the cultivation of the Everglades
may be undertaken with reasonable assurance that overflow will not occur, the extensive
cultivation of these fertile areas will undoubtedly follow rapidly.” In the meantime, the
Corps pointed out, Miami’s growing population and popularity as a winter resort were the
basis for a “successful” port business.48
Enlarging Miami’s harbor facilities filled the immediate needs of the growing city
and the tourism on which it depended. But the tension between the port’s proven
character as an infrastructure for local consumption, and its potential as a site for export
or transshipment, would continue to animate discussions of further harbor and port
development. In 1930, Congress authorized further widening the channel across
Biscayne Bay from 200 to 300 feet. Just two years later, business interests in the city
pushed for an even greater depth, and deployed trade, tourism, and cruising in their
argument. In February 1932, the Greater Miami Port Association sent the chairman of the
House Rivers and Harbor Committee an appeal for a federal deepening of the channel
from 25 to 35 feet and the construction of a 35-foot-deep turning basin where the
government’s cut met Biscayne Bay. (This entrance would come to be known as
Government Cut, the name it retains today). This association of local business interests
argued that a deeper channel and turning basin would encourage greater trade. Miami, it
noted, was a rapidly growing city able to locally absorb a greater volume of cargo; the
draining of the Everglades then underway promised a boom in agricultural production for
48
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export; and the city’s proximity to Latin America made it a logical shipping point for
U.S. manufacturers. The Association also framed harbor improvements as a matter of
national security. It argued that increased traffic in the Panama Canal and growing
exports of fuel and food from Latin America meant the Caribbean Sea would be a pivotal
space in the next war: “Through control of this section,” the group promised, “we can
either starve or aid the nations involved.”49
A deeper harbor would also increase the flow of passengers into and out of
Miami. The Association described this as beneficial to the passengers themselves: a
deeper channel would allow steamships travelling between Latin America and New York
City to stop in Miami, saving time for those travelers to and from the U.S. south and
west. But the group also recognized the benefit of more leisure travelers for the city. In
the winter of 1931-1932, of the 86 cruises stopping in Nassau, most were too large to stop
in Miami; no foreign cruises to Havana could enter Miami’s harbor. Had they been able
to dock in the city, the Association argued, they would have spent money on food, fuel,
repairs, laundry, and hotel rooms.50
Such an argument drew on a subtropical climate and leisure infrastructure unique
within the United States. “Passenger steamers,” the group argued, “could well afford to
offer among their inducements to ocean travel a day ashore amid the tropical fairyland

49

Greater Miami Port Association, “Port Greater Miami ‘On Biscayne Bay’: Only Combined AIR and SEA
WORLD PORT in U.S.,” February 1932, 32. Folder “Port of Miami, Pamphlets,” HistoryMiami.
50
In making its case to the federal government, the Association noted that in January 1932 the House and
Senate both passed an amendment to the 1902 Rivers and Harbors Act that expanded the definition of
“commerce” to “include the use of waterways by seasonal passenger craft, yachts, house boats, fishing
boats, and other similar water craft whether or not operated for hire.” I suspect that this is a category
distinct from the passenger trade, suggesting a distinction between transportation and pleasure, even as both
were now included as “commerce” for the purposes of analyzing and recommending federal harbor
improvements. Ibid., 11.

45

that all America has joined in building here in the Greater Miami area.”51 The
Association suggested that such a fairyland would also attract business from the south. “It
is well to remember that the Latin American loves to mix his work and pleasure,” the
group wrote. “For that reason the manufacturers of North Europe maintain their South
American sales agents at the pleasure resorts around the Mediterranean. Miami, alone of
American cities, can compete along the same lines, under practically identical conditions.
Beauty, climate, sports, social privileges are already provided under the most enticing
environment and at the only point in North America within air competition with the
Riviera.”52
This argument for improved harbor facilities deployed climate, geography, and a
robust leisure economy — as well as sweeping, superficial characterizations of the
businesspeople Miami hoped to attract.
The discussion of passenger shipping in the Association’s request reflects the
fluid distinctions between cargo trade, passenger transportation, and cruising in this
period. Many ships performed two or more functions. The group reported that lines such
as Cunard, the Royal Mail Steam Packet, the Pacific Steam & Navigation Company, and
the United Fruit Line had sent letters expressing interest in stopping at a deeper Miami
port; the Association did not distinguish between these lines, which offered passenger,
cargo, and mail services. The group, of course, recognized that a deeper harbor would
serve distinct industries such as agriculture, manufacturing, construction, and hospitality,
but it would do so through ships that served multiple functions. The emphasis here was
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on improvements that would serve all ships, and not on distinct or separate port facilities
that would support each function.
The Association described a harbor and port that could serve multiple functions
and industries. But it could generate a new one, too. This report includes one of the
earliest descriptions of a year-round, Miami-based cruise industry. The Association
argued that idle U.S. ships built for trade and war could be used for pleasure in South
Florida. The year before, in 1931, the U.S. Shipping Board possessed 230 idle boats. The
federal government had established the Board in 1916 to enlarge the nation’s naval fleet
and better compete with European ships in national and international trade. Deployed for
military use when the United States entered World War I in 1917, the end of the war and
the drop in international shipping due to the Depression meant the Board had a significant
number of unused ships on its hands in the early 1930s.53 According to the Association,
“These ships, now lying idle and deteriorating, represent an enormous investment by the
people of this country.” It continued:
Several of them could be used year round for passenger cruise service, with
Miami as the base port to the enchanting and historical isles of the West Indies,
Panama, Central and South America and Pacific. These cruises, operating both
winter and summer from Miami, which is one of America’s really great show
places and near the new Everglades National Park, would draw thousands of
American citizens from the great middle west. This would benefit the trunk line
railroads, gasoline dealers, hotels and restaurants enroute; to say nothing of
turning a present Shipping Board loss into a profit. The additional income spent
by American citizens on such tours, instead of being sunk in questionable foreign
securities, would increase the income of the people enroute who are having to
help raise the taxes to pay for the boats that are now lying idle and which were
built on borrowed money included in the Public Debt.54
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Miami’s increasing consumption via the Port encouraged Congress three years
later Congress to approve deepening the main channel from 25 to 30 feet. In a 1936
survey of the port of Miami’s economic activity, the Army Corps of Engineers listed the
goods coming into Miami harbor: petroleum, cement, lumber, canned foods, fresh fruit,
dairy products, flour, sugar, animal feed, and paper, all immediately or very soon put to
use by the residents of Miami and the people who vacationed there. “The predominance
of coastwise receipts over shipments, in the ratio of approximately 5 to 1,” the Corps
explained, “is accounted for by the fact that Miami is primarily a resort city rather than a
manufacturing center.”55
The Corps was also attentive to the potential of cruising. The harbor’s greater
depth would permit larger ships carrying goods to enter Miami, but it would also
welcome more passengers and more cruises. “In the past,” the Corps noted, “Miami has
been a port of call for many ‘cruise’ ships.” Greater depths, it continued, “will now
permit the entry of other ‘cruise’ vessels which were formerly unable to call at the port
because of excessive draft.”56

From Harbor Depth to Port Breadth

Miami is too young to have figured in the founding of the Nation, and has but few historic
shrines and traditions. While the City may become increasingly important as a
manufacturing and distributing center as the back country is developed, its growth and

55

U.S. Army Corp of Engineers and United States Shipping Board, “Port Series No. 8: The Ports of
Jacksonville, Fernandina, Miami, Key West, Tampa, and South Boca Grande Florida, Part 2: Ports of
Miami and Tampa Florida,” 1936, 84.
56
Ibid., 85.

48

present popularity as a resort is due primarily to the energy and hospitality of its citizens,
its salutary climate, and its advantageous setting on the fringe of the tropics. — Orville J.
Sweeting, Miami and Dade County (1941) 57

From the time Army Corps engineer Thomas Handbury survey Biscayne Bay in
1894 until Congress approved a 30-foot channel in 1935, physical depth dominated
conversations about development of Miami’s harbor infrastructure. But once the city had
secured an entrance through the Miami Beach peninsula, a channel across the bay, and a
turning basin at its waterfront, the city began to consider the port facilities it on land to
serve deeper-draft ships, and more of them.
The earliest port facilities in Miami were privately owned. By the early 1910s, the
city had four wharves along Biscayne Bay and the Miami River, owned by the Florida
East Coast Railway, the Van Steamship Co., and a private individual.58 But on April 4,
1911, residents of Miami voted, 221-151, for a measure that allowed the city to purchase
or condemn downtown bayfront land for public wharves and docks.59 As described
above, Congress’ approval for a 20-foot-deep channel in 1912 was contingent on local
interests building terminal facilities with railroad connections on land, and an adjacent
turning basin for ships in the bay. By 1925, Miami had two municipal piers serving cargo
and passengers in downtown Miami.60 But it was already looking for more space. And as
Flagler had thirty years before, it looked to the bay.
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Such efforts caused alarm for some. In 1926, former Miami mayor E.G. Sewell
reached out to the city’s residents in a four-page broadsheet printed and distributed by a
group called the Voters and Taxpayers Protective League of Miami and Dade County.
“Fellow citizens,” he wrote, “a direct catastrophe faces you...THIS CITY IS
THREATENED WITH IRREVOCABLE RUIN AND DISASTER.”61 The catastrophe,
according to Sewell, was a plan to build an island and new port in the middle of Biscayne
Bay, between Miami and Miami Beach, along the main channel across the bay.
The proposal for a human-made island in Biscayne Bay was one of four plans
Sewell described in his letter. Two of these plans, the Orr plan and the Cotton plan, called
for a new island in the middle of the bay; the only difference was that the Orr plan called
for an island 900 feet wider than that proposed by the Cotton plan. The other two plans,
the Sewell plan and the Waldeck plan, proposed new port facilities on filled land at a
bend in the automobile causeway to Miami Beach, just opposite the existing port on the
mainland.
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(Figure 5: An illustration of the proposed port facilities at the causeway bend, looking west toward
Miami Beach from mainland Miami. From Voters and Taxpayers Protective League of Miami and
Dade County, “Facts of Miami’s Harbor Development,” 1926, “Port of Miami, Pamphlets,” folder,
HistoryMiami Archives and Research Center.)
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(Figure 6: Illustration of the proposed port facilities on a new island in the middle of Biscayne Bay,
looking west toward Miami Beach from mainland Miami. From Voters and Taxpayers Protective
League of Miami and Dade County, “Facts of Miami’s Harbor Development,” 1926, “Port of Miami,
Pamphlets,” folder, HistoryMiami Archives and Research Center.)
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Sewell acknowledged that Miami needed new port facilities. He wrote that the
city required a larger basin for vessels at anchor, new docks for loading and unloading
ships, and warehouses to store their cargo. His opposition to the Orr and Cotton plans
was based on two arguments. The first was that port facilities in the middle of the bay
would destroy views across the water and could impact tourism. “There is no spectacle in
America more inspiring than the sunrise over Biscayne Bay,” Sewell enthused, “no sight
more beautiful than the pale gold of dawn tinting the rigging of her anchored yachts
turning her surface into a rippling sea of molten metal.” He told his readers that tourism
represented 85% of the area’s economy, and that tourists’ impressions of the city and its
waters should therefore influence how the city used the bay. “Whether or not we care to
conserve the beauty of Biscayne Bay for ourselves,” he argued, “we must do so if we are
to keep our City attractive enough to draw the tourist trade.”62 Sewell was describing here
not an untouched natural vista, but rather a landscape seemingly improved by the
presence of luxury leisure vessels. According to this logic, the aesthetic value of Miami’s
landscape was ground in both its tropical character and the tourist infrastructure that
produced the region’s economic value.63
Sewell’s second argument was that the plans for a port in the middle in the bay
were too large for the size and nature of Miami’s port business. The dock and storage
space proposed in the smaller Sewell and Waldeck plans, he suggested, were more
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appropriate for a city of Miami’s size and economic character. Echoing the Corps’
observations, Sewell noted that the city was not close to the raw material needed for a
manufacturing city. “Miami,” he wrote, “will never be a heavy shipping port.”64
Despite the fears of Sewell and the Voters and Taxpayers Protective League, the
city was unable to muster support for any of the proposals for new port facilities. But the
discussion over new facilities would continue for the next three decades. In the 1930s, a
new site was proposed: Virginia Key, at the east end of Biscayne Bay, and south of
Miami Beach. In 1937, Miami requested funding from the federal Public Works
Administration to build a new port on the key. In its multiple appeals to the PWA (a New
Deal effort to create employment in large construction and engineering projects), Miami
described a new port with commercial docks for freight and passenger ships, yacht
anchorage, and public parks and beaches. Smaller U.S.-based ships would continue to use
the existing mainland facilities, but this new port would serve deeper foreign lines and
cruise ships.65 In the previous year, 22 foreign cruise ships had enquired about stopping
in Miami during the 1937-38 winter. Seven were coming for two-day stays. These
included the Norwegian ship Stella Polaris, sailing between New York and Haiti; the
German ship General von Steuben, sailing between Bremerhaven, Germany, and
Bermuda; and the British Arandora Star, which planned to carry passengers from
Southampton to the Bahamas.66
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(Figure 7: Illustration of proposed port facilities on Virginia Key. From Propeller Club of the United
States, Miami, “Greater Miami Port Plan,” May 20, 1938)

The harbor’s depth prevented other passenger ships from stopping in Miami. In its
appeal to the PWA, the city wrote that in 1931, the Cunard liner Caledonin and its 800
passengers traveled to Miami, but never entered the port. The ship had a twenty-five-foot
draft, and the harbormaster believed the ship could run aground.67 Miami-bound
passengers of other ships sometimes had to disembark at the deeper Port Everglades, at
Fort Lauderdale, 23 miles to the north; this, according to the city, had “resulted in some
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criticism and complaint” from passengers who preferred Miami to its smaller and quieter
neighbor.68
In its request for federal support for new port facilities, the city also tried to
calculate the economic benefits of passengers by converting them into freight tonnage at
a ratio of one to five. According to this calculation, in 1926, the 39,000 passengers
coming through the port of Miami equaled a value of $194,000, or about 10 percent of
the total freight value of the port that year. In 1936, 161,000 passengers equaled
$804,000, or 43 percent of total freight value that year. In deciding whether to improve
the port, the city argued, passengers were nearly as economically valuable as freight.69
In 1937, Congress directed the Corps of Engineers to conduct another survey to
determine whether the government should support Miami’s plan for new port facilities on
Virginia Key. In his report of the survey, Corps engineer Colonel Lewis H. Watkins
agreed that the city was in “urgent need” of new port facilities.70 It did not have enough
dock space or warehouses. And because of the high value of bayfront real estate, there
was little opportunity for private port development around the existing facilities. Miami’s
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problem wasn’t vertical depth, as it had been in the early part of the twentieth century,
but horizontal space.
And imports, rather than exports, continued to move across what limited port
space Miami did have. Watkins’ analysis of the port traffic further solidified the site’s
identity as a consuming port serving local communities and the tourism that sustained
them. “The primary activities of Miami and [its] vicinity” he wrote, “are those of
providing food, clothing, comfort, and health and recreation for its permanent population
and for its greatly increased winter population. It has few industries.”71 Watkins argued,
however, that the needs of growing permanent and winter populations justified the need
for larger port facilities in Miami. He noted that Port Everglades, at 35-feet, could accept
many of the ships that could not enter Miami, but the cost of transporting all that food
and clothing, as well as the materials to construct buildings and roads, was high. And
transporting passengers from Port Everglades was a “nuisance.”72
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(Figure 8: 1939 map of proposed port facilities on Virginia Key, with the proposal for facilities on the
spoil islands south of the causeway noted. From U.S. Congress, House, “Miami Harbor, Fla.,” 1939,
H. doc. 470, 76th Congress, 1st sess.)
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The city had requested that the Army Corps dredge a channel from the entrance of
the Bay to a turning basin at Virginia Key, and to use the product of this dredging to fill
the marshy edges of the island. Watkins considered this plan alongside the earlier Orr
plan for an island in the middle of Biscayne Bay. He determined that the Orr plan could
meet the city’s need for slips, warehouses, open storage, and private development.
Watkins also believe that at this island, port facilities could be extended “almost
indefinitely.”73 Most important, development in the middle of Biscayne Bay would be
less expensive than at Virginia Key.
Watkins did note that local opposition to the Orr plan was now based on fears of
gridlock in downtown Miami. Trucks, trains, and automobiles using a port in the middle
of the bay would need to pass through downtown Miami. A port at Virginia Key, in
contrast, would connect to the mainland via a new causeway south of the city’s
downtown. Watkins ultimately recommended that the Corps support either the Orr or
Virginia Key plan, but only up to the cost of the Orr plan, with local interests responsible
for the difference. And he thought the decision over the site should be left to those
interests.
Before Congress could act on the recommendation, the City of Miami amended
its plan for the Virginia Key port to include facilities for air and seaplanes. In 1941, on
the cusp of the United States’ entry into World War II, the city now argued for the
strategic importance of Miami and air and sea facilities on Virginia Key. It pointed out
that Miami was the closest city to U.S. bases in Central and South America. Biscayne
Bay was so large that an anchorage basin could be expanded almost indefinitely to
provide shelter for naval vessels. The city also framed its tourism industry as an
73
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infrastructure for war: Since the city’s population doubled in winter, it had significant
housing for troops and “proven experience to handle such man volume by rail, highway
and airway.”74
The Corps agreed with Miami’s arguments, but Secretary of War Henry Stimson
initially did not. Miami’s plan, he wrote the Senate chairman of the commerce
committee, was not “essential” to the war effort and would consume significant amounts
of manpower, materials, and equipment.75 Despite Stimson’s comments, in March 1945
Congress approved a 30-foot-deep approach channel to Virginia Key and an equally deep
turning basin, with the fill to be used to expand the island, on the condition that the city
build ship- and airport facilities.76 But Miami never offered assurances that it would, so
the Corps never completed its part of the work. In a 1949 engineering and economic
analysis, the Knappen Engineering Company identified several factors that led Miami to
abandon the Virginia Key site that it had spent 10 years defending, and to which it had
already built a causeway for automobiles. “While previously many public officers and
semi-public organizations had expressed approval of this project and practically no
dissent had been recorded,” the company wrote, “substantial opposition was now
disclosed and several previous supporters of the project began to express doubt about
it.”77 The lack of a railway connection was now deemed a problem, and the use of “car
floats” to carry rail cars across the bay was not considered a viable solution. The prospect
of increasingly larger airplanes also suggested that the proposed runways would soon be
too short to accommodate new planes. And then, again, there was tourism to consider.
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Knappen wrote that local interests were concerned that planes flying low over Miami and
Miami Beach would be both a nuisance and a danger. The company also characterized a
fear that the “filling in of so much of Biscayne Bay would diminish one of the region’s
greatest assets, would spoil the view from the southern Miami waterfront, would depress
real estate values and reduce the attraction of tourists.”78
The city may have abandoned the Virginia Key plan, but it did not retreat from
efforts to build new port facilities. Knappen was one of several private engineering and
economic consultants hired to study Miami’s port and offer recommendations for what
new facilities should include, and where they should be located. At this same moment,
the port’s identity as receiving port for freight intended for local consumption solidified.
In a 1948 analysis, the Army Corps again noted the city’s lack of a hinterland and
industry, the competition from nearby ports in Fort Lauderdale and Tampa, and the fact
that the Everglades were not turning out to be the subtropical agricultural paradise once
predicted. Yet the Corps also described Miami as “one of the nation’s favorite winter
playgrounds.”79 The proposals that followed all accounted for the role of the port in
supporting local tourism and encouraging and enabling passenger ships to use the port.
More significantly, they reflected an increasing interest in cruises.
Knappen argued that the port’s main problem wasn’t its location, but rather its
physical organization. The engineering company believed that current port congestion
could be alleviated with a new pier providing storage space and new railroad
configurations that confined switching to the port site itself. Knappen proposed that the
city could acquire adjacent, private port facilities should future port business necessitate
78
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additional space. Deeper slips could also accommodate the larger passenger ships
sometimes used for cruises. Knappen argued that the port should actually solicit that
business. It noted that United States law prohibited foreign-built ships from carrying
passengers from one U.S. city to another. But, Knappen wrote, “Cruises or other
passenger service between Miami and foreign ports are, of course, permitted and this type
of service should be encouraged...Part of the promotional effort of the port might well be
directed to the expansion of passenger service.”80
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(Figure 9: Harbor and port facilities in October 1949. From Knappen Tippets Abbett Engineering
Co., “Preliminary Survey of the Port of Miami Florida,” October 1949).
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As with earlier plans, the Knappen plan failed to gain much public support.81 Six
years later, in 1955, the city hired the firm Mott of Washington and Associates to conduct
yet another survey of the port. In its report, the firm congratulated Miami on its “portmindedness” but acknowledged that the city’s facilities were inadequate both in size and
condition.82 Like Knappen, Mott recommended that the city repair and expand its existing
municipal port facilities for cargo shipping. It argued that the facilities should be as close
as possible to the downtown businesses that used the port, and that bridges to island port
facilities added unnecessary costs to any proposal for such a site.
The Mott plan to keep port facilities at the existing site gained no more traction
than the Knappen proposal, in part because of complaints from the owners of property
near the port, and also because of the cost of fixing and expanding the facilities.83 In
1956, Miami’s Department of Engineering estimated that repairs to the existing port
facilities, and expansion into adjacent property, would cost more than $50 million. Based
on these cost estimates, the Miami City Commission abandoned any efforts to develop
the existing port and turned back toward the bay.84 It revived the Orr plan, since renamed
the Dodge Island plan for the large spoil island that would be filled and expanded for the
new port.
The same year, the city hired the First Research Corporation to conduct an
economic survey of the port’s business. The company based its work on the assumption
that the new port would be built on and around Dodge Island. Its goal was to recommend
81
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how big that island should be, and what should go on it. The emerging Miami-based
cruise industry was a key consideration for First. The company noted that air travel had
reduced the number of passengers arriving to Miami from 66,000 in 1938 to just 2,530 in
1947. But in 1948, that number jumped to 39,000. “The new development,” First noted,
“was not on a recuperation of the old type of traffic lost to the airplanes, but rather on the
creation of a new traffic movement consisting of pleasure cruises.”85
The economic consulting company was bullish on the prospects of the cruise
industry. It was especially confident that Miami could figure largely in that industry. First
projected that Miami could see 80,000 to 100,000 passengers in 1960, and anywhere
from 130,000 to 200,000 by 1965. But First also acknowledge that investment in cruise
facilities was a gamble. “This maximum figure should be regarded only as a rough
estimate,” First wrote, “inasmuch as there is no past history on which to base it.”86
In 1958, the Army Corps entertained Miami’s request for harbor improvements.
These included widening the entrance channel into the bay, extending the existing turning
basin close to Miami, and dredging a new turning basin at the east end of the channel.
The Corps would deposit the material from dredging on Dodge Island and the other spoil
islands to the east.87 The agency conducted yet another survey of the Miami harbor and
its port traffic. In his report on that survey, Army Corps Colonel Paul Troxler described a
port dominated by imports for local consumption. As examiners before him noted, the
city had no significant manufacturing. The agricultural exports were small. And the
dominant industry was tourism. “The climatic and recreational advantages of the area
85
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have long attracted winter visitors in constantly increasing numbers;” he wrote, “these in
turn have required serving activities — hotels, apartment houses, catering, wholesale and
retail merchandising, generation of electricity, and so forth. The present population is
largely concerned with and supported directly or indirectly by such serving activities.”88
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(Figure 10: Approved plans for harbor deepening and new port facilities on filled spoil islands along
the Dodge Islands. From U.S. Congress, Senate, “Miami Harbor, Fla.,” 1958, S. doc. 71, 85th
Congress, 2nd sess.)
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The port of Miami was the material infrastructure supporting those service
activities. And the Corps believe that function warranted federal support for development
of new harbor and port facilities. Congress agreed. In the Rivers and Harbor Act of July
14, 1960, it struck the Virginia Key proposal from the Miami harbor project and
approved the expansion of harbor facilities on and around Dodge Island.
The following year, Ewin Engineering predicted that with the proposed new
cruise ship facilities in a new port of Miami, the city could become “the winter cruise
ship center of the world.”89 Plans for the terminal would undergo significant changes over
the next few years, and its design would become as contested as the choice of a site for
new port facilities. But Ewin’s prediction was close. And Miami would indeed become
the cruise ship center of the world — not just in winter, but all year long.
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Chapter Two: Atmospheric Interfaces: Easing the Path to the Sea

On May 12, 1967, three architects boarded the MS Sunward in Miami for a threeday cruise to the Bahamas. The three architects — Ed Galanyk, Ned Baldwin, and Ian
Morton — were part of a Toronto firm led by John Andrews. Dade County
commissioners had recently selected Andrews to design a cruise ship terminal on
Miami’s new port in Biscayne Bay. For Galanyk, Baldwin, and Morton, this leisure
cruise was a research trip.
Galanyk, Baldwin, and Morton were sharp observers of the cruise itself, but they
were most interested in the processes for loading and unloading the ship at the beginning
and end of the trip. Embarkation struck them as a straightforward and pleasant start to the
cruise. Passengers trickled to the ship over the course of four hours. They checked-in
with ticket agents and chose the first or second seating for dinner. Passengers carried
their baggage on board, or hired a porter to carry it for them. The architects observed that
passengers then explored the ship, listened to a band, or sipped fruit juice, since U.S. law
prohibited the sale of alcohol while the ship was in port.1
Disembarkation was a different story — a “ridiculous drama,” according to the
architects. The night before the Sunward returned to Miami, the ship’s staff instructed
passengers to be packed and awake by 6 a.m. the following day. That morning,
passengers attached tags with the initial of their last names to their baggage and then
handed it over to their cabin stewards, who took the baggage to the Sunward’s hold. Then
the passengers did nothing. “If one reasoned the thing through,” the architects wrote in a
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report on the experience, “one could see that it was perfectly possible to return to ones
(sic) stateroom and sleep some more, but no one did and most stood in dark corridors
near the gangway just waiting.”2
The ship docked two hours later, and a U.S. Immigration officer boarded the ship
to clear passengers. Nobody was allowed to leave the ship until they had all been
processed. This took an hour, with passengers crowding together after they were cleared.
“Although passengers may return to their cabins or wait elsewhere on the ship,” the
architects observed, “the herd instinct somehow dictates on all cruises that they must
congregate on one square foot of space near the ship exit.”3
Meanwhile, ship stewards unloaded passengers’ baggage onto the dock.
Longshore workers carried these bags 250 feet to alphabetized benches. Once the
workers had organized all the baggage and Immigration had cleared the entire Sunward,
passengers were released to find their baggage and proceeded through Customs
inspections. By the time passengers cleared Customs and carried their baggage to a car
(or hired a porter to carry it), their luggage had been handled five times.
John Andrews’ architects described this disembarkation process as “incredibly
archaic.”4 “The problem,” they argued, was how and where baggage was handled,
moved, and inspected.5 “The entire process consumed about five hours,” Andrews later
wrote in a reflection on the terminal. “There the passengers sat, after a happy, romantic
voyage, sweltering in the Florida heat without anything to drink, and then fighting to find
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their bags, pushing and shoving through Customs for five miserable, hot, irritating
hours.”6
Though they didn’t use the word in their summaries of the trip, Andrews and his
architects’ concern for emotion, bodily experience, and wasted time in a hot port building
was a concern for atmosphere. As Philip Kolter argued in 1973, atmosphere was
experienced largely through the senses and informed customers decision to buy a product
or service. He described a causal change that reflected a particular understanding of
atmosphere in consumer spaces at the time. According to Kolter: “(1) the purchase object
is nested in a space characterized by certain sensory qualities. These sensory qualities
may be intrinsic to the space or may be designed into the space by the seller. (2) Each
buyer perceives only certain qualities of this space. His perception is subject to selective
attention, distortion, and retention. (3) The perceived qualities of the atmosphere can
effect the person’s information and affective state. (4) The buyer’s modified information
and affective state may increase his purchase probability.”7
The architects interest in the experience of the terminal and the atmosphere that
would produce it informed the firm’s design for the Miami passenger terminal. When it
opened in 1968, the terminal was the world’s first dedicated to cruise ships. This chapter
is a history of the Miami passenger terminal, a facility that helped the city quickly
become the world cruise capital; it also includes the history of contemporaneous efforts
to build passenger ship facilities in New York City. There, city officials, business
interests, labor organizations, ship lines, and the Port Authority of New York and New
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Jersey argued that new dedicated passenger facilities could help slow the decline in
transatlantic passenger shipping and grow the city’s existing cruise business.
This chapter uses these history make three related arguments. The first is that
cruise passenger terminals that emerged in the 1960s and ’70s owed as much to changes
in freight shipping technologies as to public officials’ and ship owners’ goals of growing
the nascent cruise industry. Across the 1960s, the sudden and rapid adoption of freight
containerization rendered obsolete the dual-purpose finger piers of Miami and New York,
with long open buildings that could handle passenger traffic and the movement of
breakbulk cargo. New shipping methods, whether “roll on/roll off” trailers (RORO) or
“lift on/lift off” (LOLO) containers, required new port infrastructures and, more
important, far greater space to store and transfer those containers than was available in
Miami’s mainland port or on Manhattan’s Hudson River piers. This drove a separation in
port facilities according to activity. Historians have explored how transformations in
freight shipping technologies reorganized port geographies and distribution networks in
the 1960s and ’70s.8 Ample space and easy access to highways helped new container port
facilities in Oakland, California and Elizabeth, New Jersey seize freight business from
San Francisco and New York City. Cargo handling dominated in almost every U.S. port
at this time. And with the uptake of containerization came a flurry of new port studies,
port handbooks, and new port operational recommendations, all of which focused
exclusively on cargo, as the decline of oceanic transportation seemed to mark the end of

8

For an economic and technological history of the shipping container, see Marc Levinson, The Box: How
the Shipping Container Made the World Smaller and the World Economy Bigger, 2nd ed. (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2016). Alexander Klose offers a cultural history of containerization as a
principle transcending cargo shipping in Klose, The Container Principle: How a Box Changes the Way We
Think (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2009). See also Brian J. Cudahy, Box Boats: How Container Ships
Changed the World (New York: Fordham University Press, 2006).

72

ports as sites for the movement of both freight and humans.9 In a 1980 edited collection
from the National Research Council’s Committee on Urban Waterfront Lands, three MIT
professors noted that passenger movement through ports had fallen since World War II;
“the only exceptions,” they wrote, “are cruise ships and some ferry services, neither of
which have a significant impact on urban waterfront property.”10 But this chapter argues
those transformations also influenced port passenger activity by encouraging the design
and construction of dedicated passenger terminals at the moment cruising was eclipsing
transportation as the primary function of passenger ships. In doing so, this chapter reveals
two key shifts within an existing servicescape: a division within a relatively unified
system that served both cargo and passengers, and the early moments in the emergence of
a new servicescape producing commercial experiences instead of transportation.
The second argument is that the terminal proved to be a critical technology
facilitating the successful transformation of a service technology into an experiential
product. In their respective efforts to attract new customers to the relatively new cruise
product, both Miami and New York strove to improve the experience of disembarkation.
Designers and port officials in these cities strove to overcome the conditions that ship
passengers had encountered for decades when using ships for transportation. Both cities
had uncomfortable port facilities that mixed passenger and cargo activity. Even in those
spaces where passenger activity dominated, the tedious process of unloading and
9
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organizing baggage entangled passengers and longshore workers. Customs inspection
was tedious. The people who designed and promoted new passenger facilities believed
that selling customers on new cruise products required terminals that made passengers’
transition between ship and shore a more comfortable and pleasant experience. The rapid
increase in Miami-based cruising that followed the opening of the city’s passenger
terminal suggests that such an interface was instrumental in stimulating consumption of
the cruise ship product.
In their arguments, explanations, designs, and criticisms, the actors behind
Miami’s passenger terminal all expressed concern for the atmosphere of the site. This
concern forms the basis of the chapters’ third argument: transformation of a service
technology into an experiential product stimulated new interest in atmosphere where
none had existed before. This is not to say that the previous passenger facilities in Miami
and New York lacked atmosphere; as criticism below reveals, advocates of new
passenger terminals were highly sensitive to the atmospheres of those spaces. But across
the 1950s and ’60s, public officials, engineers, and architects who built Miami’s
passenger terminal were increasingly concerned with staging an atmosphere they
believed was appropriate to the leisure cruise experience. The first efforts to replace barebones cruise passenger facilities that shared space with cargo business were concerned
primarily with architectural design, but backers, architects, and a small parade of
consulting firms became increasingly concerned with the experience of those spaces
across this period.
This chapter, then, contributes to growing interest in “atmosphere” (largely
among social scientists and philosophers) by historicizing the emergence of a particular
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concern for atmosphere. Writing on the ubiquity of such concerns in contemporary life,
philosopher Genot Böhme argues, “Talk about atmospheres plays a part today in interior
design, town planning, advertising and all fields related to the art of the stage set — that
is, the creation of backgrounds in radio, film and television. In general, it can be said that
atmospheres are involved wherever something is being staged, wherever design is a
factor — and that now means: almost everywhere.”11 In a survey of philosophical,
political, and anthropological literature on the subject, Bille, Bjerregaard, and Sorensen
acknowledge the ontological indeterminacy of atmosphere, but argue that “though
atmosphere may be vague as a conceptual occurrence and as an experience, atmospheres
are by no means weak cultural phenomena.”12 Historicizing the appearance of a specific
concern for atmosphere responds to their call for “deeper academic elaboration [of
staging atmospheres] as it draws attention to the social and political manipulations of
people’s experience of their world, beyond the realm of the individual.”13 Atmosphere
was the approach by which public officials, terminal designers, and port operators hoped
to encourage passengers to get on board with cruising. Techniques such as smooth
passenger and baggage flows, air-conditioning, sweeping views, and comfortable seats
(as well as Miami’s existing second-nature atmosphere of warm weather, palm trees, and
hotels) were the means by which they achieved it.

The First Proposals
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When Galanyk, Baldwin, and Morton took their May 1967 cruise, they departed
from a transit shed on the port of Miami’s new human-made island in Biscayne Bay, then
under construction. They grumbled about the baggage and Customs inspection process,
but the disembarkation process was even worse for passengers on those ships stuck using
the city’s existing mainland piers. Visiting that port in 1964, a reporter for the Miami
Herald, Charles Whited, described the terminals there as “odoriferous relics of another
era.” “The place is alive,” he wrote, “with jostling baggage handlers, tough-minded
businessmen, stevedores and ships’ masters with salty verbs, Customs agents, pilots,
tourists in sunglasses and flaming sport shirts, strange flags and foreign tongues.” The
reporter noted that the Peninsular and Occidental Steamship Co.’s “antiquated terminal,
with its fading wall murals and ranks of soiled overstuffed chairs, is typical of the
scenery.” Whited and the port officials he interviewed offered such criticism because
they believed improved passenger facilities were key to growing the city’s young but
busy cruise industry. The new Port of Miami was willing to cede petroleum and other
“dirty” bulk cargo to Port Everglades, 25 miles to the north, but it wanted to fight for
cruise ships. “The eyes of Miami business people,” Whited wrote, “are fixed more
enviously upon the fat ocean liners that now steam into Port Everglades, spilling 2,000 or
more passengers at a time onto Fort Lauderdale stores.”14
The first call for a dedicated passenger terminal came in 1955. That year, Miami
commissioners retained management consultants Mott of Washington and Associates to
survey the port and offer recommendations for improvement. Mott identified cruising as
a distinct port activity different from the movement of freight and one that warranted new
types of facilities. The firm recommended separating freight and passenger business. It
14
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proposed maintaining cargo business at the existing port site and building a cruise
terminal on Watson Island, at a bend in the causeway that connects Miami and Miami
Beach. The firm recommended for Watson Island a modest terminal that was
“architecturally unique, but simple and informal in style.” This terminal should have
amenities such as car rentals, a restaurant, a gift shop, and a drug store. It described a
landscaped island with a marina for private yachts and boating clubs. For Mott,
architectural style, plants, and facility amenities were elements that produced atmosphere.
“Passenger traffic at Miami,” the firm wrote in its report, “ought to be placed on a more
unique, distinctive, travel-atmosphere basis than is the case at the present time. There is
no reason why the glamor should be in Nassau, Havana, or Trinidad.”15
This sensitivity to the experience of ship passengers and the image of the cruise
facility is perhaps unsurprising given the city’s explicit goal of attracting more leisure
passengers. But Mott was not just responding to the shift in passenger shipping from
transportation to leisure. The appearance of dedicated passenger facilities also reflected a
separation of port facilities in this period according to activity. Changes in freight
shipping and handling necessitated new facilities with plenty of space. Facilities that
could handle both cargo and passengers no longer made sense in a new world of
containers and cruise ships. “No recent development in transportation holds as great
promise to shippers, traders, and consumers alike,” Mott argued, “as the trailer ship kind
of operation.”16 Mott proposed the city build a separate trailer ship facility north of its
existing port, with docking space for three ships that would load RORO trailers through
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their sterns. It also recommended new rail connections, facilities for ship repair, and more
storage space. Relocating passenger activity to Watson Island would free space in and
around the existing port to build facilities to support cargo handling.

(Figure 11: A model of a roll on/roll off “Modern Pier,” from Mott of Washington and Associates,
“Miami’s Marine Destiny — Today’s Decisions,” by George Fox Mott, September 1955, 123, MiamiDade Port Authority Collection, Miami-Dade Public Library)

An economic research firm joined Mott’s recommendation for separate cargo and
passenger facilities in a new port of Miami. In 1956, the city hired the First Research
Corporation to conduct an economic survey of the port. The firm saw promise in the
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emergence of “a new traffic movement consisting of pleasure cruises.”17 First pointed out
that transoceanic passenger liners often converted to cruising during the slower winter
months, but most of these Caribbean-bound ships departed from New York. The firm
argued that Miami had the opportunity to seize and grow this business, if it was willing to
invest in the facilities necessary to nurture it. The future of cruising, First wrote, “will be
greatly affected by the facilities to be provided. Up to now the public has not had at its
disposal the more pleasant and luxurious facilities, both at the port and in the vessels,
usually demanded for this type of operation. If at a later date such high class facilities
become available their effect on the volume of this trade may be quite significant.”18
First assumed that Watson Island would be the site for passenger facilities. Mott
had offered design suggestions for a cruise terminal on Watson, but First was more
specific about the requirements for a terminal there. Ships then cruising — such as the
Eastern line’s S.S. Florida, S.S. Evangeline, and S.S. Queen of Nassau — were carrying
between 400 and 600 passengers. First recommended that the cruise terminal should have
Customs, Immigration, and baggage facilities capable of handling 1,000 passengers
simultaneously and a garage for 300 cars. The firm also anticipated additional ships
within 10 years, and proposed berthing space for four passenger ships alongside 2,000
feet of the island’s edge.19
Miami officials ultimately chose to consolidate all port facilities on Dodge Island.
Speaking at an Army Corps hearing in 1957, Miami City Manager E.A. Evans testified
that a separate site for passenger ships would require the duplication of many port
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facilities. But the idea of dedicated passenger facilities persisted. In early 1957, the city
of Miami hired Ewin Engineering of Mobile, Alabama, to develop a comprehensive
master plan for the new port of Miami on Dodge Island. Ewin’s proposal reflected
primary attention to architectural design and the transformations then underway in cargo
handling. “The development of a new port in the front yard of Miami and Miami beach,”
Ewin wrote, “required that the installation be a design of functional beauty, of operational
cleanliness, economic efficiency, easy accessibility so that it could become the winter
cruise ship center of the world, while at the same time, these port facilities would attract
freight shippers using ultramodern methods and ships designed for increased speed of
material handling.”20 To serve those different functions, Ewin divided the port into three
areas according to “operational usage.” One was a Maritime Office Center with 72,400
square feet of air-conditioned office space. The second area was dedicated to cargo
handling. This included 500,000 square feet of sheds for loading, unloading, and storing
cargo; wharves for RORO trailers and LOLO containers; and 75 acres of storage for
those containers.21 The firm recognized that cargo handling was undergoing rapid change
at the time, with no clear sense of what technological changes would succeed, if any. “All
of the different needs of every ship operator that are apt to arise within the foreseeable
future have been studied and evaluated,” the firm wrote, “and safeguards have been taken
to keep the layout of the new Port of Miami flexible enough to handle any type of vessel
or cargo.”22
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But Ewin was confident that, regardless of changes in cargo handling, the port
needed dedicated passenger facilities to nurture the cruise industry. Ewin proposed to
build in the port’s third operational area a two-story, 1,000-foot-long passenger terminal
with berths for three ships. Passengers would use the second level, which would have
Customs facilities, restrooms, waiting rooms, and a snack bar. The engineering firm
proposed using the passenger terminal ground floor for the cargo that 80 percent of
passenger ships using the port of Miami carried. Longshore workers would unload
baggage on this level and transmit it up to passengers waiting on the second floor.23

(Figure 12: A model of Ewin Engineering’s initial proposal for facilities on the new port of Miami,
Ewin Engineering, Port of Miami Engineering Report, May 15, 1961)

23
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The passenger terminal was to be the first building built on the new port, after
Ewin filled the island and constructed a connection to the mainland. The firm scheduled
terminal construction for late 1963 through early 1965.24 But three developments
complicated that schedule and, ultimately, the firm’s plan for the terminal. The first two
were financial. A delay in bonds pushed construction of the port’s bridge to the mainland
by a year.25 And in 1963, the federal government offered funding for construction of the
office building as part of John F. Kennedy’s accelerated public works program.26 Both
projects delayed construction of the passenger terminal. But a more significant influence
on the fate of terminal was the surprising growth in cruising across this period. Ewin had
projected 200,000 cruise passengers arriving at the port of Miami in 1965; by 1963, the
old port facilities were struggling to handle nearly 300,000.27
Port and public officials were alarmed that Ewin’s proposed terminal was too
small for Miami’s growing cruise business. In May 1965, the firm (newly renamed David
Volkert and Associates) unveiled new plans for a larger passenger terminal. The new
facility had berthing space for five ships; a passenger concourse connected these berths to
a three-level, air-conditioned terminal building. The ground floor of the terminal would
be used for ship service and light cargo; the second had direct vehicular access and space
for ticket sales, Customs inspections, and baggage handling; the top level would include a
cocktail lounge, restaurant, and observation deck.28
Volkert divided the passenger level into a waiting room and two separate
“embark/debark modules.” Volkert explored multiple concepts for organizing baggage
24
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and Customs inspections in these modules. One, for example, had baggage coming up
from the ground floor by a motorized vehicle and distributed on a baggage claim counter;
passengers would claim their baggage and then proceed to one of the Customs
inspections counters that surrounded the room. Volkert, however, worried about
congestion between the baggage claim counter and inspections counters.29 The firm
settled on a plan with two possible configurations, based on whether passengers were
departing or arriving. In the debark configuration, passengers collected their baggage
from mobile bag claim transporters spread across the space and organized according to a
two-letter code system; mobile Customs inspection counters ringed the room. In the
embark configuration, the Customs counters were clustered and mobile baggage pallet
transporters carried passengers’ luggage from the curb to the ship.

29
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(Figure 13: Embarkation configuration of Volkert’s 1965 passenger terminal proposal. In Box 12,
Roll 2, John Andrews fonds, 1964-1973, Canadian Architectural Archives, University of Calgary
Library)
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(Figure 14: Disembarkation configuration of Volkert’s 1965 passenger terminal proposal. In Box 12,
Roll 2, John Andrews fonds, 1964-1973, Canadian Architectural Archives, University of Calgary
Library)
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(Figure 15: Baggage transporters from Volkert’s 1965 passenger terminal proposal. In Box 12, Roll
2, John Andrews fonds, 1964-1973, Canadian Architectural Archives, University of Calgary Library)

The building’s exterior design also reflected greater interest in its aesthetics; a
reporter for the Miami Herald described it as “a huge concrete and glass structure
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resembling the top of a bread loaf, its roof colored gold.”30 But the gold bread loaf top
proved unpopular. The local chapter of the American Institute of Architects offered to
review the design for the county, and found it “inconsistent” with the design of the port’s
transit sheds and office buildings. Dan Paul, a member of the Metro Seaport Advisory
Committee, offered more pointed criticism of all the buildings. He described the transit
buildings as “chicken shed architecture,” and said the proposed passenger terminal
looked like “a converted airplane hangar.”31
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(Figure 16: Aerial view of Volkert’s 1965 passenger terminal proposal. In Box 12, Roll 2, John
Andrews fonds, 1964-1973, Canadian Architectural Archives, University of Calgary Library)
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In response to the criticism, Dade County commissioners in late 1966 hired
Frederic R. Harris Consulting Engineers of New York to conduct a two-stage review of
Volkert’s proposal for the passenger terminal. The first was a review of the terminal’s
economic and functional feasibility, as well as its architecture. After reviewing Volkert’s
design, Harris found that the proposed terminal was financially and functionally sound.
The firm then retained architect Romaldo Giurgola to evaluate the external design of the
terminal. Giurgola was a member of the “Philadelphia School” of architects and, at the
time, chair of the School of Architecture at Columbia University. Giurgola argued that
the Volkert proposed passenger terminal did not “live up to its aesthetic potential.”32 He
recommended that the County select a new architect to redesign the passenger terminal in
collaboration with Volkert. But Harris warned the County to move quickly or risk ceding
more cruise traffic to Port Everglades. “It would seem essential in order to prevent
further, and possibly critical, erosion of the desirable future cruise passenger market,”
Harris wrote, “to construct an appropriate Port Miami Passenger Terminal as soon as
possible.”33

New York’s Efforts

Throughout the 1960s, as Miami was debating proposals for its passenger
terminal, New York maintained its position as the busiest passenger port in the world.
But public officials and ship lines were worried. International air travel was siphoning
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passengers from the ship lines: Between 1960 and 1965, the number of transatlantic ship
passengers arriving in New York fell from 321,000 to 251,000 while the number of
arriving cruise passengers rose from 125,000 to 192,000. Passenger totals were nearly
identical in 1960 and 1965 (446,000 and 443,000, respectively), but it was clear that
cruising was a growing share of New York’s maritime passenger activity.34
City and Authority officials hoped to grow this business by improving ship
passengers’ experience in port facilities. In 1966, the city had 10 piers with 21 berths for
passenger ships, all on Manhattan's Hudson River waterfront between Canal and West
57th streets; four of the piers also served cargo ships.35 These piers provided operational
space for passenger ships, but not much else. The editorial board of the New York Times
lamented that “The finest passenger vessels afloat — the United States, the Cunard
Queens, the France, the proudest ships flying the flags of Italy, the Scandinavian and
other countries — embark and discharge their passengers now at gloomy, cavernous,
obsolete piers, admirably equipped with every inconvenience.”36 That year, New York
mayor John Lindsay asked the Port Authority to study the city’s passenger terminal
operations and develop recommendations for “modern, efficient and attractive” terminal
facilities on the Hudson River waterfront.37
In its report to the mayor, the port authority offered criticism of the atmosphere
and experience on the city’s existing facilities and argued they were inadequate for the
passenger ship industry “in its increasingly important role of providing ‘vacation” rather
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than simply ‘transportation.’”38 Echoing the criticism of the Times editorial board, the
Authority described the pier sheds as “bleak and unattractive.” Their interiors were large
cavernous spaces open to the roof, dotted with numerous column. And the buildings were
uncomfortable. They had no seats, and were neither cooled in summer nor heated in the
winter; in the colder months, Customs agents sometimes allowed small children to warm
up in their small but heated office.39
The buildings’ discomforts might have been tolerable if passengers did not need
to spend so much time in them. This was especially true during disembarkation. Like
John Andrews’ architects in Miami, the authors of the report described a smooth
embarkation process: Passengers boarded over the course of several hours, and baggage
was organized on the ship. But disembarkation was a different matter, one “vastly more
complicated and completely unsatisfactory,” according to the Authority. The morning of
an arrival, longshore workers used conveyor belts to unload baggage from the ship. The
workers then organized the baggage, by class, according to the passengers’ last name; not
surprisingly, this organizing scheme meant baggage was unevenly distributed across the
space, since it tended to pile at the more common initials. Once Immigration officials
cleared passengers, these new arrivals left the ship for the pier, where they jostled with
longshore workers trying to organize the baggage, having no place to sit or any
designated waiting area. When Customs agents could finally begin inspections, the
discomfort continued. Here, the Authority explicitly invoked atmosphere, though as a
critique. “The examination of baggage on the floor of the pier is far below any acceptable
standard,” the Authority argued. “The sight of someone who has spent days or even
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weeks in the luxurious atmosphere of a ship, down on hands and knees, unlocking and
opening baggage on the cold, damp floor of the pier presents a paradox that does not
require further elaboration.”40
Once passengers cleared Customs, they faced “chaos” as they spilled out onto
Manhattan’s dense streets. Cabs and cars double- and tripled-parked along the pier’s
curb. Some passengers had to walk as far as 1,000 feet down the pier to hail a cab, and
then return to claim their baggage. None of the piers had parking space for cars, so all
passengers and baggage funneled into the pier-street interface to find a car — a process
that frequently produced congestion. The report included drawings of the pier buildings,
Customs inspection process, and street traffic to further illustrate the dismal experience
of arriving in New York by ship. “The whole process by which the arriving passenger
moves from the interior of the ship to the vehicle which will take him from the pier,” the
authors wrote, “is a long, exhausting, tiring, and uncomfortable procedure which rarely
takes less than an hour and more usually involves a period of several hours.”41
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(Figure 17: Illustration of New York City ship passenger facilities, 1967. The Port of New York
Authority, A Plan for a New Consolidated Passenger Ship Terminal on the Port of New York, New
York, 1967, 6, 10. Box 44, Textual Box 44, Folder MPT-6 Briefs-Programmes-By Laws, John
Andrews fonds, 1964-1973, Canadian Architectural Archives, University of Calgary Library)
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(Figure 18: Illustration of Customs inspection in New York City ship passenger facilities, 1967. The
Port of New York Authority, A Plan for a New Consolidated Passenger Ship Terminal on the Port of
New York, New York, 1967, 6, 10. Box 44, Textual Box 44, Folder MPT-6 Briefs-Programmes-By
Laws, John Andrews fonds, 1964-1973, Canadian Architectural Archives, University of Calgary
Library)

The one bright spot among the city’s ship passenger facilities was Pier 40. The
city (and not the Port Authority) built the pier in 1963 to entice the Holland America Line
to transfer its passenger and freight operations from Hoboken, New Jersey, to Manhattan.
Unlike the city’s other finger piers, the facility here was an 800-foot, two-level square
that could berth four ships on its south, west, and north sides. As with many of the city’s
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other facilities, Pier 40 handled both cargo (on its first floor) and passengers (on its
second). And like those other facilities, the passenger spaces was a large open space, or
“baggage hall,” as the report authors described it. Customs inspection here was similar to
the process at the other piers, but it happened on tables, and not the pier floor. Perhaps
more important, Pier 40 offered visitor parking on its roof. The authors argued that this
pier was the city’s best for handling passengers, even if it could not handle the largest
passenger ships.42
As in Miami, proposals for new dedicated passenger facilities reflected both the
desire to grow a distinct leisure industry and recognition of changes in cargo handling.
The first was near-disappearance of transatlantic “combination ships” that carried both
cargo and passengers. While five lines had run 10 combination ships into and out of New
York in 1960, making 88 trips to the city and carrying a total of 10,000 passengers, only
one such ship was running by 1965. The disappearance of these ships did not have a
significant impact on passenger traffic, but it did eliminate the need to berth them. By the
nature of their business, combination ships required longer berth time than did passenger
ships. Those 10 ships in 1960 stayed in port for five to 10 days each, for a total of 500
berth days. But the city no longer had to account for those long stays by the time it was
considering passenger facilities in 1967.43
More consequential to the separation of cargo and passenger facilities than the
disappearance of combination ships was the appearance of containerization. Its champion
was Malcolm McLean. On April 26, 1956, McLean’s first containership, the Ideal-X, left
Newark, New Jersey for Houston with 58 aluminum truck bodies. The Port of New York
42
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Authority was eager to support McLean’s system. Between 1958 and 1962, the agency
transformed marshland near Elizabeth, New Jersey into the world’s first container port.
New York City handled 75 percent of the Port of New York’s cargo in 1960, but in 1962,
almost all cargo to the port passed through the new Port Elizabeth. Just three years later,
the Port Authority added five piers and 65 acres of paved storage space in response to the
rapid growth in containerization and the increasingly central role of Port Elizabeth within
the larger Port of New York.44
Port Elizabeth supplanted Manhattan and Brooklyn ports as the main cargo entry
into the region for two reasons: it had space, and it offered easy access to highways.
Containerizeration’s economics of scales encouraged bigger but more expensive ships.
To reduce the cost of operating these vessels, ship lines and port officials worked to
reduce their time spent in port. Longshore workers unloaded a traditional breakbulk ship
over the course of several days, but loading and unloading early containerships took just
18 to 36 hours. And while breakbulk cargo could trickle off a pier over the course of
those several days, a container port required space to store and transfer the containers that
swiftly moved on and off new containerships. A traditional breakbulk ship required just a
few acres of pier and terminal space, but early port experts estimated that a containership
required anywhere from 12 to 30 acres of space for storage and sorting.45
The shift in cargo handling from Manhattan and Brooklyn to New Jersey was
sudden and dramatic, especially for the city’s longshore workers. Longshore hirings in
Manhattan fell from 1.4 million labor days in 1963-64 to less than million in 1967-68,
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and further to 350,000 in 1970-71.46 Economic historian Marc Levinson argues that
containerization and the system it represented was also a significant force behind the
disappearance of jobs in port-related industries in New York City, such as trucking,
distribution, wholesaling, and manufacturing. Between 1964 and 1976, the city lost
70,000 wholesaling jobs even as wholesaling employment rose 32 percent nationally
across the same period; between 1967 and 1976, a third of the city’s manufacturing jobs
disappeared.47
New York City’s passenger business in this period represented just a fraction of
this labor. A management consultant hired by the port authority estimated that passenger
ship operations employed 6,000 in 1965: 1,000 office workers, 2,000 longshore workers,
and 3,000 who worked in ship maintenance, piloting, supplies, and fueling, representing
$30 million in wages. More significant was the broader economic impact of this
particular industry. The consultant estimated that ship passengers spent 430,000 nights in
New York City hotels in 1965, and spent anywhere from $50 to $150 per day during their
stays. It further calculated that this spending represented $137 million in direct economic
contribution to the city (including labor wages). Using a multiplier of two, based on the
estimate that every passenger ship dollar represented two additional dollars of indirect
spending, the consultant calculated that the annual direct and indirect economic impact of
passenger ship operations in the Port of New York was more than $400 million. The Port
Authority acknowledged that the “complexity” of passenger ship operations made such
calculations difficult. But even an estimate of $400 million offered a good argument for
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investing in new passenger ship facilities in a city facing plummeting employment in port
and port-related industries.48
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(Figure 19: Illustration of proposed New York City passenger terminal, 1967. The Port of New York
Authority, A Plan for a New Consolidated Passenger Ship Terminal on the Port of New York, New
York, 1967, 6, 10. Box 44, Textual Box 44, Folder MPT-6 Briefs-Programmes-By Laws, John
Andrews fonds, 1964-1973, Canadian Architectural Archives, University of Calgary Library)
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The port authority offered ambitious plans for a new ship terminal designed to
give passengers a more pleasant experience as they arrived to and departed from New
York City. The Authority recommended a six-berth, three-pier facility between west 46th
and 50th streets in Manhattan. Each 1,000-foot pier would have a five-level terminal,
with ship services on the ground floor, vehicular traffic on the second, baggage sorting
and Customs inspection on the third, passenger waiting lounges on the fourth, and
parking on top. The Authority identified several goals for the new terminal, among them
to connect passengers with visitors as quickly as possible, provide loading space for cars
and taxis as close as possible to the site of Customs inspection, and offer sufficient shortand long-term parking. But its main goal was to improve the experience of the Customs
inspection. “The basic concept of the new passenger ship terminal centers on an efficient
and attractive system for sorting and processing baggage through Customs,” the authors
of the report wrote. “The balance of the terminal passenger’s facilities,” they continued,
“should be related to and developed around the Customs inspection.”49
One part of that system was to keep passengers out of the baggage-sorting frenzy;
arriving passengers would disembark directly to the terminal’s climate-controlled fourth
level, where they could watch workers sort baggage below. To speed that work, the
Authority worked with Chicago-based consulting firm A.T. Kearney and Company to
develop a new “baggage processing plan.” Under this plan, baggage would be sorted by
individual declaration, and not according to last name initial. This relied on an
identification scheme that used three codes — color, letter, and number — to provide a
unique tag for every piece of baggage in a single customs declaration; for example, a red
49
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“B-7” tag. The system was scalable according to ship size: a single color tag using 20
letters and 10 numbers could generate 200 possible combinations, while six colors
offered 1,200 combinations. Stewards would distribute these tags to passengers the night
before the ship arrived in New York, and, when possible, baggage would be organized on
board according to color (which reflected the passenger’s class). In port the next
morning, longshore workers would use carts to take the baggage to the places on the
terminal floor that corresponded to the baggage tags. Passengers would observe the
process from above and called a dispatcher when all their baggage had arrived; the
dispatcher then instructed a longshore worker to bring the baggage to a Customs area
while the passenger descended to the third level to meet their baggage. In the Customs
area, conveyor belts, “similar to, but larger than, the ‘supermarket’ type of Customs
counters in use at Kennedy International Airport,” would carry baggage past a Customs
agent in the center. An agent with a cash register at the end would collect duties. The
Authority had tested this sorting system on two arriving ships the year before, and found
the sorting “proceeded very rapidly and with no difficulty whatsoever.”50
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(Figure 20: Illustration of proposed baggage handling and Customs inspection facilities in the
proposed New York City passenger terminal, 1967. The Port of New York Authority, A Plan for a
New Consolidated Passenger Ship Terminal on the Port of New York, New York, 1967, 6, 10. Box 44,
Textual Box 44, Folder MPT-6 Briefs-Programmes-By Laws, John Andrews fonds, 1964-1973,
Canadian Architectural Archives, University of Calgary Library)

Architects in Miami

While New York was developing plans for its own passenger terminal, Miami
was choosing an architect for its facility. Giurgola recommended three architects for the
job; Thomas Vreeland, then the chairman of the University of New Mexico School of
Architecture and a former colleague of Giurgola’s at the University of Pennsylvania;
Robert Venturi, another former colleague of Giurgola’s but then a Yale architecture
professor; and John Andrews, an architect and design critic at the University of Toronto.
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A selection committee made up of Giurgola, former Miami City Commissioner Sidney
Aronovitz, Port Director Irvin Stephens, Miami Marine Council President Ray Greene,
and George Reed, the president of the local chapter of the American Institute of
Architects, interviewed the three in March 1967.51
The selection committee chose Andrews. The 33-year-old Australia-born but
Toronto-based architect had never designed a seaport terminal. But neither had Vreeland
or Venturi. Giurgola argued that was not unusual. “In America such buildings have
always been relegated to minor roles in the building of a seaport,” he told the Miami
Herald. Andrews’ most notable works to date were educational facilities: the main
academic building for the new University of Toronto Scarborough campus in 1963, a
nearby primary school in 1965, and student housing for Ontario’s Guelph University that
same year. In each, Andrews demonstrated a concern for the circulation of people, as
well as an interest in repeating basic units as the foundation of his design. He would bring
such concerns and interests to bear on the Miami passenger terminal.52
Andrews also likely convinced the committee and Dade County that he could
work quickly and within the $4.85-million already budgeted for the terminal.53 The delay
in building the passenger terminal was increasingly worrying Miami businesspeople and
public officials.54 According to the Harris consultants, the port of Miami had already lost
passenger business to Port Everglades, and it risked losing more without new passenger
facilities and operations. They described a “long-time disenchantment” with the Miami
port among ship operators and agents, but argued that the appeal of Miami as a tourist
51
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center still meant it could become the country’s busiest year-round passenger port if it
acted quickly on the passenger terminal. This urgency on the part of Miami business
interests, public officials, and the Harris consultants reflected the speed with which the
cruise industry was growing in this period. As the consultants pointed out, despite ship
operators’ frustrations with the port of Miami, cruise passenger numbers there rose from
150,000 in 1961 to 260,000 in 1965.55 Port Director Stephens was anxious to have the
passenger terminal open by the 1968-69 winter cruise season.56 Andrews believed his
firm’s experience delivering his past work was central to his selection. “I was quite aware
that the other two architects on the short list were noted for their design capability,” he
later wrote. “We emphasized the organization of our firm and its ability to produce a
building on time with the budget, using critical path method and cost control.”57
Andrews’ linear repeating design would permit construction to proceed node-by-node (as
it had at Andrews’ Scarborough project), meaning the first nodes would be operational
before the entire structure was finished.
Though Harris had approved the functional design of the second Volkert terminal,
Andrews started from scratch.58 One of the firm’s first steps was to send three of its
architects on a cruise out of Miami. After reading their report, Andrews later wrote, “It
because immediately obvious that disembarkation was the critical problem to be solved if
cruising was to retain its euphoria after the cruise.”59 And like the Port of Authority of
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New York, which was proposing its own passenger ship terminal around the same time,
Andrews believed that the key to retaining passengers’ euphoria was to provide waiting
space for disembarking passengers and to reunite them with their luggage as painlessly as
possible.60
Armed with “a constant supply of beer,” Andrews and his team worked quickly to
develop a design concept by the summer of 1967.61 Their solution to the problem of
disembarkation was a 2,500-foot series of five two-story nodes, or points of embarkation
and disembarkation. Each diamond-shaped node contained air-conditioned waiting
lounges on the second floor, with large windows offering sweeping views of downtown
Miami, Biscayne Bay, and Miami Beach. Elevated conduits connected the nodes and had
six staircases that led to baggage and Customs inspection areas on the ground floor. Each
node would serve a single ship, giving the facility the capacity to load and unload up to
five ships. Disembarking passengers could wait in the lounges or along the conduits
while their baggage was unloaded from the ship and organized into one of six areas on
the ground floor, according to the deck level and position (fore or aft) of the passengers’
cabin.
Andrews’ design offered two significant differences from the Volkert proposal.
Baggage was not moved from the ground floor to passengers on the second level. Instead,
passengers moved down to their baggage via one of six stairways. More significant was
the division of the terminal into five nodes. Volkert’s most recent design had also
included five nodes, but passengers moving through those nodes would all funnel to a
60
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single centralized terminal that could handle multiple embarkations and disembarkations
simultaneously. But, according to Andrews, the narrowness of Miami’s ship channel and
the availability of port pilots who guided ships in the harbor meant that cruise ships could
only dock at 30-minute intervals. Andrews argued that the terminal did not need a single
centralized terminal. “If the customs and immigration operation could be revamped and
split up to handle ships individually, the nature of the problem would be altered and
partially resolved, he later wrote. “There did not have to be one large collection system to
handle all ships at once; there could be separate collection points.”62 Andrews’ terminal,
in a sense, was a group of five small terminals that could function independently of one
another.
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(Figure 21: Illustration of John Andrews’ plan for a node and baggage claim area for the port of
Miami passenger terminal. The line represents passengers disembarking from a cruise ship and
distributing themselves across the passenger concourse to one of six staircases.)

Andrews’ proposal was successful. The Harris firm wrote Stephens that the plans
seemed to meet the operational criteria for passenger ships.63 Giurgola weighed in, too,
writing that he was “quite excited by the potentials offered by dividing the arrivals of the
passengers into several lounges, thus breaking the scale of the long terminal.” He also
complimented Andrews on the terminal’s ability to keep people moving but always in
sight of their baggage.64 The Dade County Commission approved, too, and signed off on
the plans in the summer of 1967.
Construction crews began laying the foundation for the new passenger terminal in
November 1967, and excitement over the prospect of Miami’s cruise business built over
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the next year. That summer, Stephens visited 21 shipping companies in 10 countries to
promote the new port of Miami. “The people over there are very knowledgeable about
this area,” he told a reporter on his return. “They know that Miami is the place to operate
from. We have the hotels and the airline connections.”65 When another reporter visited
Stephens in his office that summer, the port director swept his hand slowly over a map of
the Caribbean from the Gulf of Mexico, down the eastern coast of Central America,
across the top of South America, and up over the Windward and Leeward islands to
Miami. “In my opinion,” Stephens told the reporter, “it is the leading cruising area of the
world, and Miami is the siphon for cruise shipping into it.”66 Increasing cruise activity in
Miami bolstered Stephens’ claims. Passenger numbers rose 31% in the port’s 1967-68
fiscal year.67 Norwegian-Caribbean Lines announced that a new ship, the Starward,
would join the Sunward early in 1969. And the company’s managing agent Ted Arison
(who would go on to found Carnival Cruise Line) said Norwegian would add three more
ships by 1973.68
The dedication of the terminal’s first two nodes on December 29, 1968, came
with a sense that Miami had something new and special in its passenger terminal. The
chairman of the Federal Maritime Commission visited and congratulated the county on
building what he called the world’s first “human oriented” port terminal. It was, he
argued, “the only facility that the departing or incoming passenger can use which is free
of traffic jams, has comfortable accommodations for access to and departure from
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passenger ships, and, miracle of miracles, [had] provision for parking.”69 Multiple
reporters described the terminal as a clear departure from previous passenger port
facilities. “Notorious for their unpleasant odor and atmosphere,” a writer for the Miamian
magazine argued, “most seaports around the world provide the passenger little inkling of
the luxury that awaits them on the berthside cruise ships. The new Port of Miami hopes to
change all that, making the passenger’s on-shore experience a prelude of things to come
in a seaside garden.”70 For a Miami Herald reporter, the new terminal and its “space age
look” represented a decisive break from a physically uncomfortable past.
“Traditionalists,” she wrote, “who nostalgically recall waits on grimy railroad platforms
with the small and swirl of diesel exhausts or walks up weather-beaten gangplanks to the
rhythm of the curses of stevedores loading cargo on the wharves and the slip-slap of
waves against the pilings — will be resigned to the new terminal.” Those “modern-day
Americans accustomed to jet travel and convenience,” however, would be “right at home
in the Port of Miami’s new $5 million cruise terminal.”71
The construction of a suitable cruise terminal atmosphere, then, relied as much on
what was excluded as what was included. Separating passengers from grime, diesel
smells, and swearing dock workers, as the Herald noted, was “meant to ease paths to
sea.”72 Andrews’ plan for moving passengers and baggage contributed to that ease. His
system reduced disembarkation time from five hours to less than one.73 Reviewing the
facility for Architectural Forum, architect and critic Peter Blake wrote “the Miami
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Passenger Terminal is a kind of machine, designed to facilitate and express patterns of
movement.”74 Andrews’ terminal, Blake gushed, reflected “some of the most searching
re-examination of passenger and baggage movement since somebody invented the
gangplank.”75
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(Figure 22: The completed passenger terminal at the port of Miami, with five cruise ships berthed.
From Port of Miami 1969 Annual Report)
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Miami vs. New York

Miami’s passenger terminals helped the city become the world’s top cruise port in
1973. New York, perhaps, never stood a chance. When the Port of New York Authority
revealed plans for a new consolidated ship passenger terminal in 1967, it acknowledged
potential competition from Florida cruise ports, including Miami. But the agency pointed
out that the New York and Florida ports were offering very different cruise products.
Cruises out of New York were all at least a week in length, and some ships offered 10 to
18-day trips to the Caribbean, 30 to 45-day trips around the Mediterranean, 45 to 50-day
cruises to South America, and a few 70 to 95-day round-the world cruises.76 Miami, in
contrast, was offering shorter three- or four-day cruises, “a service which is not
considered competitive with New York-based cruises,” according to the Authority. “The
Florida market,” it continued, “lies primarily in the short cruises in connection with a trip
to Florida, as part of a Florida vacation rather than a vacation in itself.”77
New York City Mayor John Lindsay, ship lines, and civic organizations reacted
positively to the design and proposed operations of the new ship passenger facilities. But
they balked at the $76.5-million price tag. The following year, the Authority released a
revised plan for a $60-million, six-berth, four-level terminal on piers 86, 88 and 90.
Updated passenger numbers added to public officials’ concerns. Those numbers revealed
upticks in cruise passengers from 368,000 in 1966 to 408,000 in 1967, but also a “serious
decline” in transatlantic passengers. “In earlier projections,” the Authority wrote, “it had
been expected that over the next ten years a continuing decrease in trans-Atlantic
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passenger volumes would be balanced by an increase in cruise traffic. Actually the
decrease in trans-Atlantic volumes has been more abrupt than expected, resulting in a
continuing decrease from year to year in the total figures.”78
Construction of a dedicated ship passenger terminal in New York Ship didn’t
begin for three more years. Appeals for public hearings on the proposed terminal and on
the arrangement between the city and the Authority, through which the city would issue
bonds to fund construction and the Authority would repay those bonds though lease
payments, delayed the project.79 So did shipping lines, which protested the Authority’s
plan to partially fund those payments with a tax of $15 to $20 on every passenger.80
While these various interests debated the organization and cost of the terminal, Florida
crept up on New York. “The New York winter cruise market,” a reporter for the New
York Times wrote in February 1970, “has been slugglish in contrast to Florida’s booming
business.” The reporter cited southern ship line representatives who argued that Northern
passengers were attracted to Florida’s “instant warm weather,” and that seven-day cruises
from south Florida could visit as many islands as a 11- or 12-day cruise from New York,
with cost savings in the shorter cruise fare exceeding the cost of airfare.81
But New York, as the Times reporter noted, was still the largest and most
profitable passenger market in the country, and cruise earnings were higher there than in
Florida ports. So the city pushed ahead with its terminal, and in 1971, the port authority
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began construction on a pared-down, $36-million terminal on piers 88, 90, and 92.82 In an
attempt to offer improved interim facilities, the Authority also painted and installed new
lighting on Pier 86, and hired five college students to serve as “Golden Girls.” Their job,
according to the Times, was to help passengers transition from “the cotton batting of
shipboard life to the trauma of a New York arrival.” The reporter’s description of the
Golden Girls work suggests they were not altogether successful. “The girls generated a
lot of cheery public relations warmth as they went about their chores,” he wrote, “but not
enough to dispel the damp chill of the unheated shed or the anger of older people, who
for want of better arrangements had to endure the awkward knee bends of opening their
baggage for Customs inspection of the oil-spattered deck of the pier.”83
The rapidly increasing competition from Miami for ship passengers seemed to
increase the criticism of the atmosphere and experience in New York’s existing passenger
terminals. In April 1973, a Times reporter visited the port of Miami, offering both praise
for that city’s passenger facilities and familiar jabs at New York’s. “Any ship passenger
out of New York who has struggled with traffic, the serious question of where to leave
your automobile while out to sea, the antique piers — cold and windy in winter, hot and
sticky in summer — and the generally ugly, physically uncomfortable waterfront of New
York,” he wrote, “must watch the Miami cruise passengers board and disembark in
unbelieving envy...and hope that the new passenger ocean terminal built out into the
North River by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey will be as comfortable
and convenient as Miami’s.”84
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But back home in New York, public officials and ship lines were increasingly
worried that even a comfortable and convenient new terminal might not be enough to
salvage the city’s ship passenger business. That business faced multiple challenges in the
early 1970s. By 1974, the wide variety of cruise lengths available from the city had
diminished; whereas once the city saw cruises ranging from one-week to months-long,
only the shortest and longest itineraries were now operating, putting many of the city’s
cruise products in greater competition with those available in Miami. The 1973-74 OPEC
oil embargo also hit New York lines and their long routes to the Caribbean. The cost fuel
oil rose 300 percent in 1974. Lines responded by slowing their speeds and shuffling
itineraries to visit ports closer to one another. Finally, New York ships faced higher labor
costs than Florida ports. The cost of turning a cruise ship in New York was $19,000; in
Port Everglades, the costs were less than $11,000.85 “We’re Johnny-come-latelys when it
comes to cruise business,” the director of marine terminals for the Port Authority,
Anthony Tozzoli, admitted to the Times. “We’ve got to catch up with Florida.”86
The dedication of New York’s new passenger terminal in November 1974 was far
more subdued than the dedication of Miami’s six years earlier. “After 20 years of
planning,” the Times wrote in its coverage of the event, “New York opened a gleaming
new passenger gateway to the high seas yesterday, in the hope that it is not too late to
reverse a relentless loss of travelers to the jet airliner and to ports in warmer climates.”
The new three-pier, three-level terminal certainly represented a clear break from the
former facilities that so many public officials, ship lines, passengers, and reporters
bemoaned. The climate-control terminal had automated gangways for passengers and
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conveyor systems for unloading baggage from ships; large expanses of glass offered wide
views of the Hudson River. Speaking at the dedication, New York City Mayor Abraham
Beame offered hope that the new terminal could help preserve the city’s position as “one
of the greatest ports in the world.” But others were skeptical. The Times described “a
sense of uncertainty at the dedication ceremonies suggesting that perhaps it may have
come too late.” Charles Dickson, a vice president of the Cunard Line, told the reporter the
terminal was indeed 20 years too late, but, still, “It’s better late than never.”87
In its first year, the new New York City passenger terminal serviced 500,000
passengers on 310 cruises, but this business did not generate enough revenue to cover the
terminal’s operating expenses let alone its debt payment. Marine terminal director
Tozzoli told the Times that the Authority was actively working to lure foreign cruise
ships to the port. He said the agency was also open to “sprucing up” the one-year-old
terminal, possibly with “flowers and plants and some wall decorations to minimize the
stark functionalism of the terminal.” Tozzoli communicated to the newspaper’s readers
the mix of optimism and resignation that surrounded New York’s passenger facilities for
the past decade, telling the paper, “we are at rock bottom now and the only way for us to
go is up.”88
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In June 1968, just a few months before the dedication of passenger terminal, Dade
commissioners hired an engineering consulting firm to develop a master plan for the port
that include a survey the new port’s existing passenger and cargo business, projections of
future business in each, and recommendations on how the county should finance any
further port development.89
The firm, New York-based Tippets-Abbett-McCarthy-Stratton, released its master
plan for development at the new port of Miami that winter. Forecasting port business
through 1995, Tippets was quite bullish about the port’s future. In terms of cargo, the
firm described a port that was almost entirely importing for local consumption by a
growing residential population and a robust tourist industry. About half of the port’s
imports at this time consisted of newsprint, construction iron and steel, lumber, glass,
ceramics, meat, bananas, and alcohol. “Because of its strategic location in an area which
relies heavily on tourist trade,” Tippets reminded readers of the plan, “the New Port
restricts cargo to such clean products as manufactured goods, foodstuffs, and lumber.”90
Tippets predicted that increases in the population, tourism, and per capita incomes in and
around Miami would drive an increase in foreign imports by 5.2 percent each year
through the early 1970s, and then 4 percent annually through 1995. And the firm
predicted that much of that tonnage would come in containers. Tippets estimated that by
1975, 40 percent of cargo moving through the port of Miami would be containerized,
either in RORO trailers or LOLO containers. The firm predicted that more than half of
the port’s cargo would be containerized by 1995. Its master plan called for modest
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increases to the port’s berthing space for break-bulk ships, but also the creation of 800
feet of berthing space for LOLO containerships, an increase in RORO berths from four to
six or eight, and the construction of a consolidation shed where Miami’s few exports
could be loaded onto RORO trailers.
Tippets envisioned an even rosier future for Miami’s cruise business, especially
with the opening of new port facilities and the possibility that the Army Corps of
Engineers might deepen Miami’s harbor to 35 feet. The firm attributed the recent increase
in Miami-based cruising to the rise of combined air/sea packages, the growing popularity
of group travel, and the industry’s efforts to attract a younger market. It argued that
Miami’s cruise passenger numbers could rise from 407,000 in 1970 to 700,000 by 1980,
with more than 1.3 million cruise passengers passing through the port of Miami by 1995.
Tippets suggested that the port expand its passenger facilities beyond the five berths
designed by Andrews, which were capable of handling 400,000 passengers each year.
The firm recommended that the port plan to build as many as nine additional cruise ship
berths across this period.
Tippets encouraged the port to maintain its focus on general cargo and passenger
business, given the port’s location and the character of the area’s existing economic
strength in tourism. The firm also recommended that the port continue to maintain a
separation between two such “substantially different types of operations.”91 And of the
two types, Tippets predicted, cruising would be the more lucrative. According to the U.S.
Maritime Administration, one ton of general cargo generated $17 in local income through
wages, ship supplies and repairs, crew expenditures, and related services such as
insurance. Tippets argued that the efficiencies of containerization would reduce this rate
91
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to $12 per cargo ton. The port, then, stood to generate $65 million through general cargo
traffic between 1969 and 1995. Tippets estimated that Miami cruise passengers, in
contrast, each generated $33 in local income. The firm argued that longer cruise
itineraries would require greater provisioning that could raise this rate to $39 per
passenger, with passengers on ferries to the Bahamas producing $18 each, and passengers
stopping over in Miami producing $17. Tippets’ forecast estimated that cruise passengers
would generate $370 million in economic benefits across its survey period, more than
five times the amount generated by general cargo traffic.92
Tippets’ projections for Miami’s cruise business may have seemed overly
optimistic, but they turned out to be too conservative. Construction on Andrews’ full
five-node terminal finished in January 1970. Tippets projected that 400,000 cruise
passengers would pass through the port that year; 569,000 did.93 The Port built two
additional passenger terminals in 1972 to accommodate 13 ships cruising in and out of
Miami, and two more across the rest of the decade as the number of lines, ships, and
passengers continued to far exceed the projections Tibbets made in its 25-year master
plan. By 1976, more than a million cruise passengers were using the Port of Miami,
numbers Tippets had projected for 1990. Two years later, the port unveiled an updated
master plan, Operation 2000, that accounted for the dramatic rise in both cruise
passengers and cargo. The plan included a ninth passenger terminal to be completed by
1979, and a projection of 3.9 million passengers moving through the Port of Miami in
2000. The port included in its annual report for that year a photograph of 10 cruise ships
berthed at Andrews’ five-node terminal, and at newer terminals to the east and west. The
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photograph, according to the Port, “illustrates a scene that has become a frequent problem
at Dodge Island — the Ports’ berthing areas jammed to capacity with a larger portion of
the world’s finest cruise ships.”94

(Figure 23: Charts of projected (green) and actual (red) growth in cruise ship passengers and cargo
at the port of Miami, 1978. From Port of Miami, 1978 Annual Report)

94

The Port of Miami 1978 Annual Report, 7.

120

(Figure 24: Ten cruise ships berthed at the port of Miami, 1978. From Port of Miami, 1978 Annual
Report)
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Chapter Three: “Determined Gayety”: Transforming Technologies of
Transportation into Technologies of Experience

In December 1968, the Miami Herald published a special section on the opening
of the city’s new Dodge Island port. The section included profiles of the port’s director
and the pilots who guided ships into the harbor, projections of the infrastructure’s
economic impact, and articles about the future of containerization and cruising in the port
of Miami.
The special section also included a full-page advertisement from Norwegian
Caribbean Lines, which used the dedication of new port infrastructure to promote its two
cruise ships as something different in the world of travel and leisure. “[T]he cruise ships
here are new, beautiful, safe, and fun to be on,” Norwegian promised readers. “They are
the right size for tying up at most ports of call. They offer every amenity of a deluxe
resort hotel.”1 Those amenities included double beds, air conditioning, two swimming
pools, and entertainment from Guy Lombardo, Henny Youngman, and Charo. As a
separate travel brochure teased potential passengers, a Norwegian cruise ship was a
“floating Palace of Fun.”2
It may be initially unsurprising that a young cruise line promoted its ships as new,
beautiful, safe, and fun. But the choice to frame a “cruise” according to those qualities is
the result of specific historical circumstances that extend back to the late nineteenth
century. Nearly coinciding as it did with the opening of Miami’s new cruise passenger
1
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terminal, the arrival of Norwegian’s cruise ships symbolized for the city, its tourism
interests, and ship owners a significant commitment to a full-time, year-round cruise
industry. This chapter recounts the emergence of that industry in the 1960s and ’70s by
examining the material and discursive means by which passenger ships were
appropriated, repurposed, and later purpose-built for warm-weather Caribbean cruising.
Passenger ships had offered “cruises” since the late nineteenth century. Later, changes to
U.S. immigration policy, a growing middle class, and increased interest in international
travel spurred transoceanic ship lines to reconfigure their vessels for a new tourist class.
The interwar years through the post-World War II period also saw the emergence of dualpurpose ships designed to provide both seasonal transportation and off-season cruising. In
the 1950s, competition from airlines for transoceanic transportation had the most
significant impact on passenger shipping, as ship lines struggled to generate revenue from
their large capital investments and new operators envisioned economic opportunities in
running older, small ships in full-time cruising.
This chapter describes several trends in the transformation of passenger ships
from transportation technologies into technologies of leisure. First, ship lines pivoted to
seasonal or year-round cruising by manipulating the experiential dimensions of their
vessels. They offered larger intermediate passenger accommodations, private bathrooms
in all (or nearly all) cabins, air conditioning, more organized activities and entertainment,
and single-class operations. Second, ship lines increasingly borrowed the operations and
metaphor of land-based hotels as they attempted to enact a new consumer experience
related to but clearly distinct from transportation. Finally, smaller, slower, and older ships
more successfully made the transition than the faster, larger transoceanic lines that
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captured speed records and the public’s imagination in the first half of the twentieth
century. These smaller ships did not have the high fixed costs of the larger liners, could
more easily enter shallow warm-climate ports, and, due to their age, were more often
available to be repurposed as cruise ships.
This chapter also makes two contributions to this dissertation’s larger arguments
about the emergence of experiential products in a globalized, so-called “post-industrial”
economy. First, it reveals a long and intensifying interest among ship owners and
operations in passenger experience. The chapter describes the transformations ship
owners made as they attempted to attract passengers to older ships and, later, to compete
with airlines. The full-time cruise lines that emerged in Miami in the 1950s and ’60
realized this vision of ships as entertaining, active destinations themselves. But rather
than offer a teleological account that culminates in that industry, I offer here the history
of those transformations as a process of negotiation influenced by broader geopolitical
events, economic transformation, and technological change.
Second, this chapter approaches these transformations as a form of production
akin to but distinct from agricultural, industrial, service, and domestic production.
Though sensitive to the dangers of periodization according to a seemingly dominant
economic activity (especially a periodization that, as David Edgerton has argued, is
typically grounded in relative shares of employment), I nonetheless identify mass market
cruise ships as a technology explicitly productive of consumer experience and, therefore,
a means by which human experience was increasingly made productive of value in
advanced capitalist economies in the last third of the twentieth century.3
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This approach shifts focus from the environmental and climatic specificity of
South Florida (and New York City) of the previous chapters to the technological
specificity of individual ships in the production of consumer experiential products.
Environmental and technological histories of twentieth-century production have tended to
identify industrializing impulses in the production of mass goods and focus on the
processes and techniques of material standardization that strip goods of their individual
particularities.4 This is not to say that ship owners and ship operations were uninterested
in the efficiencies associated with standardization; rather, they negotiated those
imperatives with the particularities of individual vessels and a belief in differentiation as
the basis for the promotion of cruising and the enactment of a distinct experiential
product. That product embodied the tension between uniformity and idiosyncrasy
characteristic of all experiential products, from theme parks to coffee shops.
And while some historians have been attentive to the role of consumers and users
in the design and ultimate function of consumer technologies, their focus has been objectoriented production and consumption that reproduces a distinction between that object
and its meaning or use.5 More recent business management literature on experiential
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products, in contrast, approaches this category of products as an entanglement between
consumers and material goods, spaces, and services. This chapter historicizes that
entanglement and its naturalization.6

Early Cruising

Maritime historians and passenger ship enthusiasts tend to identify the origins of
“cruises” in round-trip tours whose primary purpose was pleasure travel and not point-topoint transportation. These histories often locate the start of these tours aboard
steamships traveling on one- and two-month tours of the Mediterranean in the 1840s, and
later, on shorter trips among the British Isles and Scandinavia. These coastwise steamers
were small, yacht-like ships with few amenities or entertainment available for passengers.
An early vessel purpose-built for northern cruising was the Scottish North Company’s St.
Sunniva (1887), which offered 10-day tours of the Norwegian coast. The ship had space
for 142 passengers in two- and four-berth cabins, and included men’s and women’s
smoking rooms, a dining room with six large communal tables, and a piano which
passengers could play themselves.7
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On the other side of the Atlantic, steamships began offering service from the U.S.
coast (primarily from New York City) to Mexico, the Bahamas, and Cuba in the late
nineteenth century. Catherine Cocks argues that changing understanding of human health
(particularly the germ theory of disease), faster and more comfortable transportation
technologies, and waning fears of the impact of tropical climates on white travelers,
together with the establishment of hotels and the promotion of tourism boosters,
contributed to the popularity of Caribbean travel in this period.8 Though offering
transportation to sunny, warm-weather ports, the purpose of these round-trip cruises was
leisure, and the elective nature of the trip was not lost on some passengers. In her
recollection of a 1901 round-trip cruise out of New York, with stops in Haiti, Puerto
Rico, Martinique, and ports, Ida Starr described the painful experience of seasickness as
her ship sailed south. In the first few days of the cruise, she wrote, “I had had enough
already. I made up my mind to one thing. I should give up my ticket at Nassau and go
home alone by rail through Florida.” Starr felt no better the next morning, and refused to
look out her cabin window. “I had not only drawn the lattice-screen to keep out the
water—for the ports were leaking badly—but had even fixed up a curtain with some
towels, so that I might not see the storm-vexed sea without,” she wrote. “I simply lay
there wondering why, why, why, I had ever come?”9 Another traveler, William Thomas
Corlett, asked a similar question of fellow passengers aboard a 1908 cruise from New
York to the Caribbean. Corlett spent his days at sea admiring the surface of the water, the
spray of the ship, and even seaweed; at night he identified constellations in the sky above.
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But few of his fellow passengers shared these interests, leading Corlett to wonder why
they came. “The wonderful mysteries which surrounded us passed unheeded...by a very
large number, who buried themselves in books covered with printers' ink, or more
apathetically whiled away the time with cards,” Corlett wrote. “It has often occurred to
me as strange that more people do not prefer to enjoy luxurious loafing at home, instead
of subjecting themselves to the many annoyances of travel, when apparently they derive
so little from it.”10
European and Caribbean cruises of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries attracted wealthy passengers with both the money and time to slowly explore
Norwegian fjords or sunny tropical islands. These ships operated as single-class vessels.
This further distinguished cruises from the transoceanic trips that carried larger and more
diverse passenger loads. Ship lines that offered transportation (in contrast to leisure
cruises) included a variety of accommodation to meet the demand for transoceanic
movement across economic classes and to fill the wide range of unique spaces generated
by the particular engineering and architecture of a large ship.
Intercompany agreements among ship lines solidified these class divisions aboard
transatlantic liners. Beginning in the late nineteenth century, these cartels (known as
conferences) helped ship lines from the United States, Britain, and continental Europe
collectively negotiate the tricky particularities of transoceanic passenger shipping. It was
a business with high fixed costs: the expense of running a ship from Liverpool to New
York was the same whether the ship was full or nearly empty. But passenger demand,
especially among European immigrants to the United States, fluctuated annually and
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seasonally in response to economic conditions, employment cycles, and holidays. Eager
to avoid constant and aggressive rate reductions in competitive attempts to attract
passengers, ship lines offering North Atlantic transit entered into self-governing
conference agreements that regulated the passenger business. These conferences set
quotas for passengers traveling in steerage and compensation rates for a ship that sailed
under quota. The conferences also set minimum rates, and not quotas, for first- and
second-class accommodations. Ship lines reasoned that first- and second-class passengers
were less sensitive to price and more concerned with the quality of their accommodations
and the speed of the ship — two areas of greater differentiation across ships, and
therefore two areas in which ship lines could compete with one another.11
Early in the twentieth century, second-class passengers assumed an increasingly
important part of a ship lines’ business. In the years before World War I, second-class
accommodations on transatlantic ships had the highest utilization rates of all classes. The
intermediate price point of second-class cabins attracted both middle-class U.S. tourists
and the segment of European migrants who could afford to pay more than steerage rates.
These groups also tended to move in opposite directions: U.S. tourists traveled east in
spring and back home in fall, while European migrants traveling to the United States for
work typically sailed west in spring, when work was most available, and back home in
fall as work opportunities waned and the Christmas holidays approached. These patterns
helped fill second-class cabins across the year; as a result, ships built in this period
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devoted more space to what Drew Keeling has described as a “multi-purpose second
cabin.”12
This intermediate class became even more valuable for ship lines after World War
I. Before the war, European immigrants traveling to the United States in steerage
accommodations generated the bulk of ship lines’ revenues. But when the U.S. severely
restricted immigration through the 1921 Emergency Quota Law (which limited annual
immigration from a country to three percent of that country’s representation in the 1910
census) and even further through the 1924 Johnson-Reed Act (which further reduced the
annual limit to two percent based on the 1890 census), passenger ship lines turned to
middle-class tourists, primarily from the United States, to replace the business lost from
strict U.S. immigration limits. Led by the British Cunard Line and France’s French Line,
passenger lines developed a new class, tourist third class (later called tourist class), with
upgraded accommodations and larger public rooms to attract budget-conscious but travelhungry middle-class passengers.13
United States immigration restrictions also shifted the demographic composition
of North Atlantic steamship passengers. By the 1920s, as many as 80 percent of
transatlantic ship passengers came from the United States.14 Liner enthusiast John
Maxtone-Graham described tourist class as attractive to a diverse range of middle-class
passengers: college students, professors, farmers, clerks, and second-generation U.S.
citizens. “Tourist Third Cabin was a heady, bohemia adventure,” he writes. “More than
any other single marketing device, it established Americans of all classes as the
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predominant ocean travelers, a position they still occupy to this day.”15 These travelers
were attracted to the quality and cost of tourist-class accommodations and public spaces.
They were also, in many cases, seeking brief relief from Prohibition. U.S. passengers
developed a reputation for heavy drinking aboard passenger ships in this period, and ship
lines were happy to oblige. The French Line, for example, taught its employees to learn
the English words “dry martini” and “Manhattan,” and how to direct passengers to the
bar. The line lured potential passengers from the teetotaling nation with copy that
promised escape. “As you sail away,” a French Line brochure read, “far beyond the range
of amendments, and thou-shalt-nots, those dear little iced things begin to appear,
sparkling aloft on their slender crystal stems...Utterly French, utterly harmless—and oh
so gurglingly good!”16
The availability of alcohol also lured U.S. passengers to cruises, especially on
non-U.S. ships. In the early 1930s, for example, Cunard offered “booze cruises” from
New York to Nova Scotia, which one ship waiter described as “whoopie cruises.”17 One
day in early 1932, a ship worker laid off from the U.S. ship Leviathan wrote the New
York Times to lament the cruises scheduled that year on 13 ships from Britain, Italy,
Germany, Sweden, France, and the Netherlands, while U.S. ships sat empty.18 A few days
later, another writer responded; he blamed U.S. shipping laws and high labor costs for the
foreign lines’ advantage. But he pointed to the appeal of alcohol for U.S. passengers.
“They do not, as is sometimes asserted of the cruise ships, ‘drink their heads off’ from the
time the boat leaves port,” he wrote. Instead, he continued, “They find that the presence
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of a legitimate bar on board ship, with the opportunity of enjoying healthful refreshment
with congenial and decent company, adds sometime to life, and takes them away from
restraint and snoopers and all that goes with prohibition.”19

Activities and Entertainment

Ship lines offered more than new accommodations and alcohol to attract tourist
class passengers. Citing “increased demand from middle-class passengers for non-stop
activities,” Lorraine Coons and Alexander Varies characterize the emergence of tourist
class as a shift in shipboard culture: whereas passengers had typically been left to
entertain themselves, ship lines offered an increasing number of entertaining options on
tourist class ships in the interwar period. These included bridge tournaments, treasure
hunts, fencing contests, croquet, ping-pong, shuffleboard, bowling, pillow fights, tug-ofwar, and miniature golf.20 Attributing the rise in shipboard activities to the demands of
middle-class passengers calls to mind anxieties over “the problem of leisure” and
criticisms of intensified leisure activities among social scientists and politicians of the
1920s, ’30s, and ’40s.21 It is just as likely that ship lines offered such amenities to lure a
supply of middle-class passengers traveling for pleasure. Gone were the days, as one New
York Times reporter described it, when passengers “planned their own fun, or sat around
in melancholy aloofness” as they endured an ocean crossing.22
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The new tourist class was a success for ship lines, even if the new passengers and
a shifting shipboard culture risked alienating the lines’ longstanding first-class passengers
(one U.S. traveler complained about the “universal ‘doing something noise’” generated
by new activities aboard ships that offered tourist class accommodations).23 That success
also led lines to pursue these passengers for cruising, especially in the 1920s and ’30s, as
ship lines increasingly looked to seasonal cruising as a means of supplementing their
business during the times of year when transoceanic travel was less popular, typically
winter. Cruising was also a valuable means of generating revenue during the Great
Depression, when dozens of transatlantic liners were sent to the Caribbean. Ships
consumed less fuel while slowly cruising from New York to the Caribbean, and even less
while anchored and idle in an island port.24 Some lines offered even short weekend
cruises out of New York to fill ships with passengers who could not afford longer cruises
or travel abroad. A representative of the Cunard Line told the New York Times that such
trips had the added benefit of promoting more broadly “the idea of the sea as a means of
vacationing.”25
Increased activities and entertainment characterized these cruises, too. An
advertisement for one Hamburg-America cruise in the 1930s promised passengers
“Fun...a Rollicking Lot of It at Sea! Horse races, illustrated travel lectures, talking
pictures, concerts and Tea Dances, sports tournaments, turtle races, bridge and other card
games; keno; amateur theatricals, treasure hunt, ‘Pirates’ Ball’; Country Fair; Swedish
Smörgasbord, a masquerade, a ‘traditional German bierfest’; a ‘Winky Dinner, a
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delightful forest elf affair’ and a farewell dinner and dance.”26 In November 1937, a New
York Times travel writer covering the upcoming winter cruise season described
“amusement aplenty” as the increased popularity of cruising led ships to compete on the
basis of activities and entertainment. The writer noted the addition of cruise hostesses and
cruise directors to post-war ships. He described a flurry of jazz orchestras, classical
bands, swimming pools, shuffleboard, deck tennis, golf lectures, and bridge tournaments
on contemporary cruises. Referencing the period when passengers were left to their own
entertaining devices, he wrote, “Today, however, about the only way to escape high jinks
on a cruise is to lock your cabin door and hang out a quarantine sign.”27 Other cruises
were run almost exclusively for shipboard activity. In January 1931, 250 passengers left
Philadelphia on a cruise devoted to cards. The Times described the trip as a "sixteen-day
floating bridge party, during which [passengers] will be able to play both contract and
auction, day and night, taking time off only for eating and sleeping."28
As described above, the economic diversity of transoceanic passengers and selfgoverning conference regulations supported strict class divisions aboard passenger liners
that offered transportation. The reasons for the dissolution of those divisions aboard
cruise ships is unclear. One passenger line enthusiast attributed the choice to cruise as
single-class vessels as a response to the composition of their customers: U.S. cruise
passengers, he suggested, did not have the same desire for a rigid class segregation as
their European counterparts.29 Others point to the difference in function. MaxtoneGraham argues, “The reason for this social volte-face arose from the contrast between the
26
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two kinds of passage: crossing was business, cruising was pleasure. Liners shuttling
between continents on the North Atlantic sailed on voyages of intent. With no other
means of crossing at their disposal, passengers were of every socioeconomic level.
Companies had to provide appropriate and affordable accommodation for clients of every
rank — a class for every passenger and a passenger for every class.”30 Catherine Cocks
offers an argument similar to Maxtone-Graham’s, writing “cruises were by their design
luxuries; the ships providing them would not serve passengers whose aim was to get from
here to there as cheaply as possible.” But Cocks goes further than Maxtone-Graham and
points out that single-class cruising eliminated the need for duplicate public spaces,
making available second-class spaces for new amenities such as card rooms and
gymnasiums.31 Cocks also argues that single-class operation made it was easier and more
efficient for ships to organize and operate the additional activities and events they offered
on a cruise.32 This decision to operate ships as single-class vessels for cruising meant
they more closely resembled land-based hotels and resorts, which offered
accommodations of varying quality and price but did not restrict guests’ movement or
access to public spaces according to the level of those accommodations.33
Early ship lines that alternated between North Atlantic service and cruising
typically switched to single-class operations by only selling accommodations in higherclass cabins and allowing lower-class accommodations to sit empty. The Canada Pacific
ship Empress of Britain, launched in 1931, had space for 465 first class passengers, 260
in tourist class, and 470 in third on its transatlantic trips between Britain and Canada; its
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capacity for New York-based cruises was just 400.34 A few ship companies made
material changes to their vessels for better cruise operations. In 1929, for example, the
Blue Star Line sent its two-year-old Arandora to a British shipyard for conversion to
cruising. The yard replaced refrigerated cargo space with passenger cabins, and extended
the ship’s superstructure to provide space for a ballroom, garden lounge, gymnasium, and
swimming pool. But such conversions were the exception in this period. As maritime
historian Philip Dawson argues, such ships “have tended to hold far less influence on the
design of modern-day cruise ships than their exploits had in fostering the mystique and
sense of romance which continues to be associated with cruise travel.”35 Whether or not
cruise travel today is, in fact, sold on the basis of mystique and romance, Dawson’s point
is a useful one for understanding the early emergence of cruising less as a process of
technological change and more as a series of decisions on the part of ship owners about
which cabins to sell and what itineraries their ships should follow.
After World War II, competition from airlines would drive changes to the ships
themselves. The British shipbuilding industry, especially, projected a confidence that ship
lines and shipyards could survive the competition from faster and eventually more
affordable air transportation if they were willing to reconceptualize travel by sea. As a
1953 editorial in the Shipbuilder and Marine Engine-Builder argued for readers, “The
days when it was sufficient to feed, bed and get the passenger there in such as comfort as
ship and elements permitted, are passing. If the tourist is to be encouraged to spend his
time afloat, then more than ever will he expect to do so in maximum comfort and be
amused throughout.” Describing the challenges facing ship designers, the editorial
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continued: “To the naval architect will fall the task of squeezing yet more in a given size.
More than ever will sea travel of the future resemble life in a large hotel — an experience
to outmatch much that the air has to offer...The naval architect, with his swimming pools
and cinemas, his modern stairways, and his staterooms which are now lounges-cumbedrooms, is right abreast of the era of the airline which spells glamour afloat.”36
The Shipbuilding editorial did not explicitly promote cruising as a promising
alternative for shipowners, but subsequent ships did reflect the journal’s call for new
accommodations, shipboard amenities, and a more hotel-like approach to ship design and
operation in both passenger liners and ships intended for seasonal cruising. Bruce Peter
characterizes two approaches to European passenger ship building in this post-World
War II period. According to Peter, government-owned ship companies interested in
continuity of employment in shipyards and aboard ships, like the Italia di Navigazione
(Italian Line) and the Compagnie Générale Transatlantique (French Line), continued to
build ships that preserved rigid class distinctions for speedy transatlantic travel. The
Italian Line’s Leonardo da Vinci (1960), for example, was a three-class ship that used the
traditional vertical organization of classes (so rigid that passengers often found
themselves in dead-end hallways).37 The French Line’s France (1962) had enclosed
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promenades and a tourist-class swimming pool under glass: two spaces useful for the
chilly North Atlantic, but less so in warmer waters.38
Other, more “commercially oriented” ship companies, according to Peter,
designed their vessels for dual service in transoceanic transportation and warm-weather
cruising. These Dutch, Scandinavian, and British ships often used design and
technological means to transition between those two functions.39 Holland America’s
Rotterdam (1959), for example, was built with two classes — first and tourist — instead
of three; this decision to offer higher accommodations throughout the ship meant the
entire vessel could be used for both North Atlantic multi-class service and single-class
cruising.40 The organization of classes aboard the Rotterdam simplified the transition
between these two services. While most ships like the da Vinci separated classes
vertically, with first class typically in the middle of the ship, the Rotterdam’s designers
separated the classes horizontally, on alternating full decks. Staircases connecting the
decks of each class wound around one another and were separated by wall panels, so that
these classes were intertwined but self-contained. During cruises, the panels could be
removed to create a single-class ship with accommodations and public spaces that varied
according to their original class arrangement but not so much that they seemed
inappropriate for one-class cruising.41 Other techniques for converting liners for cruising
were integrated into passenger cabins. Two ships of the early 1960s, Canberra and
Oriana, were built as a joint effort between the British P&O and Orient lines for liner
connections between the U.K. and Australia, and for cruising in the Pacific. Each had
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four-berth tourist class cabins with washbasins (in addition to first-class cabins with full
bathrooms) for liner service; during cruising, two of the berths in a tourist-class cabin
could be folded to reveal hidden plumbing and a sliding partition enabled the space to be
quickly converted into a private bathroom for the now-two-berth cruising cabin.42
These techniques helped some dual-purpose ships more seamlessly transition
between multi-class and single-class operation. In 1965, the Italian Home Lines’ new
Oceanic revealed a new technology to help the ship transition between climates and adapt
to daily weather changes. Intended to function in both transatlantic transportation and
cruising, Oceanic featured a larger lido deck with two swimming pools, bars, and a
restaurant beneath a mechanically retractable roof called the Magrodome. The new roof
was envisioned as useful for both cruise and liner operations. The Shipbuilder and
Shipping Record celebrated the Magrodome as giving shipping companies “control over
one important essential to the passengers’ well-being—the weather.” The journal pointed
out that the roof could be used during rainstorms on warm-weather cruises, and would be
“particularly useful on the North Atlantic route, notorious for rapidly changing weather
conditions.”43 Ultimately, the Magrodome protected its passengers from many more
Caribbean rainstorms than North Atlantic chills. After its first crossing from Italy to New
York, Home Lines immediately pivoted the Oceanic to full-time cruising.44
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Conversions

The ships above represented newbuilding, the shipping industry’s term for newlybuilt ships. But in the 1950s and ’60s, ship lines also increasingly transformed existing
vessels for cruising. Such conversions were not new in this period. In 1911, for instance,
Germany’s Hamburg-America Line converted its multiclass liner Deutschland (1900)
into a single-class ship. Shipyard workers extended the vessel’s promenade and sun decks
and added more private bathrooms to passenger cabins. They converted the second-class
lounge into a gymnasium and made the second-class women’s drawing room a shore
excursion office. More significantly, the slower speed of cruising allowed the shipyard to
remove one of the Deutschland’s’ boiler rooms and build a large Social Hall with a dance
floor and musician’s gallery beneath a funnel that once served the boiler. The
Deutschland was also made a more intimate ship, conversion reducing its passenger
capacity from 1,000 to 500.45
Such conversions were typically made to older ships that faced competition from
newer and faster vessels. Ships in the 1950s and ’60s faced competition from air. In the
1960s, Britain’s Royal Mail Lines converted its Andes (1939) for full-time cruising,
enlarging its cocktail lounge, replacing the second-class pool with passenger cabins,
building a 250-person theater in the ship’s former refrigerated cargo space, and installing
air conditioning throughout the ship.46 Other ships were converted from full-time liners
into dual-purpose ships, usually through the addition of new public spaces and amenities.
The 1963 conversion of the Cunard Line’s Saxonia (1954) into the Carmania involved
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construction of a new lido deck, swimming pool, night club, teenager room, hair salon,
and barber shop. Private baths were added to all cabins, and the entire ship was airconditioned. A 40-foot deck buffet was added for outdoor lunch on warm-weather
cruises, and sidescreens were added to the sports deck to encourage use in pleasant
weather.47 The 1965 conversion of the Canada Pacific’s Empress of Britain (1955) into
the Greek Line’s Queen Anna Maria also involved the addition of private bathrooms to
almost all cabins and the full air-conditioning of the entire ship. Its new owners also
added four small outdoor pools, a gymnasium, sauna, more open deck space, and a larger
nightclub. “The refinements now made, especially the addition of the big sports area and
the extremely larger night club,” Shipping World & Shipbuilder predicted, “make her an
ideal North Atlantic and cruising vessel in every way.”48

Miami-Based Cruising

Pleasure cruises out of Florida were offered as early as 1891. The owner of a
network of railroads, hotels, and ships in the state, Henry Plant, offered round-trip
“winter trips” out of Tampa to the Bahamas and Jamaica.49 In the early twentieth century,
Henry Flagler operated ships to carry travelers between hotels he owned in Miami and
Nassau.50 But the vast majority of cruises in the first half of the century departed from
New York and, later, New Orleans, where the Alcoa aluminum company and the United
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Fruit Company offered passenger accommodations about the companies’ cargo ships.51
Advertising passenger space aboard the ships it sent to obtain Caribbean bauxite, Alcoa
told potential passengers that when “you ‘sail Alcoa,’ you travel to this tropical
wonderland in comfort and relaxation. Your ship is modern and self contained. Each
stateroom is outside, and has a private bath. For extra enjoyment you have a tiled,
outdoor swimming pool, planned shipboard entertainment, exciting shore trips and the
finest cuisine.”52
The Clarke Shipping Company’s New Northland (1925) represented one of the
first post-war efforts to establish a year-round, Miami-based Caribbean cruise industry.
Like many Canadian lines of the period, Clarke alternated the New Northland between
Canadian transportation routes and winter cruising out of Florida. After World War II,
when the Canadian government requisitioned the ship for troop transportation,53 Clarke
sold the ship after the war to the Seaway Line for full-time cruising out of Jacksonville,
Florida; just a few years after the war’s end, Seaway then sold the New Northland to the
Dominican Republic’s national Dominican Line, which renamed the ship the Nuevo
Dominicano and established a passenger and cargo route between the country and New
York. The business, however, was unprofitable. The Republic’s president and dictator
Rafael Trujillo turned to Frank Leslie Fraser. A Jamaican banana and citrus plantation
owner, Fraser operated a small fleet of cargo boats that traded between the United States
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and Caribbean islands. This business introduced Fraser to Trujillo, who, in 1950, offered
Fraser the opportunity to charter the Nuevo Dominicano for cruising out of Miami.54
Fraser ran 177-berth cruises from Miami to the Bahamas, Jamaica, and the
Dominican Republic until 1953, when the ship grounded and sank off the coast of Cuba.
Fraser tried his hand at cruising again in 1954 when he purchased two ships, the
Yarmouth and the Evangeline, from the Eastern Steamship Lines. Like the Nuevo
Dominicano, the Yarmouth and Evangeline were each more than 30 years old. Across the
1950s and into the 1960s, cruise ships operating out of South Florida tended to be older
vessels. In 1959, for example, 45-year-old Franca C began offering cruises out of Port
Everglades, in Fort Lauderdale, after having been converted to offer air conditioning and
private bathrooms.55
Older ships provided easy conversion to cruising, but the safety of these
repurposed ships was a growing concern in 1965. On November 12, the Yarmouth Castle
(the former Evangeline) left Miami for the Bahamas with 376 passengers and 176 crew
members. Around 1 a.m. that evening, as the ship sailed toward the islands, a passenger
ran into the ship’s Neptune Bar to warn others of a fire on board; a burned passenger
came into the bar soon after. The fire was first identified in a forward staircase and then
spread quickly through the passenger area in the middle of the ship and the bridge. The
Yarmouth Castle capsized and sank a few hours later. Eighty-eight passengers and two
crew members died.
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That winter, the U.S. Coast Guard investigated the Yarmouth Castle tragedy. The
service was unable to identify the cause of the fire, but it did locate its in origins in a
room on the Castle’s main deck that contained combustible materials including
mattresses, unused bulkhead paneling, and broken chairs. The Coast Guard also described
additional factors that contributed to the growth of the fire and the subsequent loss of
nearly 20 percent of the ship’s human occupants: the fire spread rapidly through the
ship’s ventilation system, the crew failed to use the ship’s alarm or public address system
when it first identified the fire, the sprinkler system was inadequate for a fire of this size,
and fire hydrant pressure was low, in part, because a fire main valve was open and
inadvertently filling the swimming pool as the ship burned. The Coast Guard also
attributed the scope of the disaster to the ship’s condition and materials. Some stateroom
windows and shutters had been poorly maintained and would not open for trapped
passengers. More significant, much of the 1927 ship’s interior was made of wood.
The Yarmouth Castle tragedy was not an isolated incident. Fires aboard other
cruise ships in the period contributed to growing concerns about the repurposing of older
ships for cruising. In December 1963, 128 people died in a fire aboard the Lakonia, a 34year-old ship then on a Christmas cruise between the U.K. and Canary Islands. In April
1966, several people died in a fire on a cruise from Miami to Aruba aboard the 16-yearold Viking Princess. Those fortunate to survive recounted harrowing experiences that
threatened to undermine the appeal of a cruise vacation on older ships. "We were scared
to death," a Viking Princess passenger told the New York Times. "We were just squeezed
in the lifeboats. We lost everything, clothes, jewels, cameras, everything."56
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These incidents led the Maritime Safety Committee of the Intergovernmental
Maritime Consultative Organization in 1966 to amend the 1960 Safety of Life at Sea
Convention (SOLAS) to include additional fire protection standards such as restrictions
on the use of combustible materials The U.S. Congress went further in 1968; it
prohibited domestic and foreign ships with overnight accommodations for more than 50
passengers from departing from U.S. ports if those ships did not comply with the new
SOLAS standards.57
The loss of life aboard repurposed cruise ships and the new standards and
legislation that followed stimulated the construction of new purpose-built cruise ships
and encouraged cruise lines to promote those ships as “new” and “safe.” As Norwegian
Caribbean promoted in the advertisement that opens this chapter, “These new ships are so
impressively new that travel agents around North America are sending their clients here
to board them and enjoy their cruises in record numbers…[The Starward] is also built
completely to the highest standards of maritime construction. In other words, there is
nothing safer afloat.”58

Car Ferries and Norwegian Caribbean Line

Repurposed passenger liners were the ships used for most Miami-based cruises in
the 1950s and early ’60s. In the mid and late 1960s, companies like Norwegian added
its maiden Caribbean voyage in January, 1965, some complained that the 17,600-ton ship listed severely to
port, that there was no hot water, that the air-conditioning hadn't worked, that there were roaches in the
cabins and that plumbing was backed up."
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Israeli and European car ferries to this fleet. The first was the Bilu. Liners may have been
called floating hotels (and later cruise ships would be described as resorts at sea), but carand passenger-carrying ferries represented a new category of ship. The New York Times
and several shipbuilding journals described the Bilu as a “‘motel’ ship.”59 Time magazine
called it a “boatel.” In both cases, what distinguished the Bilu and similar ships of the
period was the ability of ship passengers to travel by sea, with their automobiles, for
touring their destination. "The increasingly motorized word is increasingly taken with the
idea of driving itself through foreign countries in the family car,” Time told its readers.60
The Bilu was built in 1964 and operated in summer as a ferry between Haifa,
Israel, Nice, and Naples for Israel Car Ferries, as part of the private, Geneva-based
Somerfin SA group; for two winters, it also offered three- and four-day cruises between
Miami and the Bahamas. The ship was fully air-conditioned and included a swimming
pool, nightclub, shopping arcade, library, beauty salon and barber. When it arrived in
Miami in 1964, to music from the Miami Beach High School band, the president of the
ship’s U.S.-based agent argued the Bilu represented “the future of cruise transportation.”
“There is no reason,” he told a reporter for the Times, “why a tourist should not take his
car with him, live on the ship and have the use of his automobile for sightseeing
ashore.”61
The ship was one of a number of car and passenger ferries constructed in the
1960s, mainly for European waters.62 The earliest car ferries appeared in the 1930s in
Europe, but the increase in post-World War II car ownership prompted ship liners,
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designers, and shipyards in Britain, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Norway to expand the
fleet of ships able to carry automobiles and their owners.63 Publications covering these
ships often noted the affordable cost of passage. Writing that a family of four and their
car could travel aboard the Bilu between Naples and Haifa for $350, Time magazine
revealed that the "Secret of this bargain-basement luxury is...that all food is served buffet
style and its cost is not included in the fare; a passenger may eat and drink as lightly as
his budget or digestion permits.” Maritime historians Philip Dawson and Bruce Peter
argue that self-service cafeterias such as the Bilu’s, as well as bars, casinos and tax-free
shops, were onboard means of generating revenue to help keep passage prices low — a
model that later full-time cruise ships would exploit even more fully.64
In its first season, the Bilu was one of seven ships offering such short cruises from
South Florida to the Bahamas: the Yarmouth Steamship Company’s Ariadne and Costa’s
Anna C. sailed from Port Everglades; the Peninsular & Occidental Steamship Company’s
Florida, Eastern Steamship Company’s Bahama Star, and Yarmouth’s eponymous
Yarmouth and Yarmouth Castle all sailed out of Miami.65 Individually, the ships differed
from one another; collectively, they represented a distinct category of economic products:
three- and four-day Bahamanian cruises. In a piece on the growing popularity of such
experiences, the Times that winter described the cruise in terms that captured the
transitional character of the passenger ship in this period. “The main attraction of short
cruises seems to be the ease of visiting a foreign land at little expense and trouble,” the
Times reporter argued. At the same time, he concluded, “Much of the fun of a cruise
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comes from being aboard the ship herself. Entertainment varies from vessel to vessel, but,
in general, there are parties, orchestras for dancing, duty-free shopping, sunning,
swimming (on those ships having swimming pools), deck games and superior dining.”66
The Bilu had successful winter seasons in 1964 and 1965. That success led
Somerfin to order a second, slightly larger car ferry. The Nili joined the Bilu in Miamibased cruising to the Bahamas in December 1965. The Nili first sailed with Frank
Frasers’ sons, Frank and Lew, as agents operating under the name Pan American
Steamship Company. Like the Bili, the Nili was successful and approached the winter of
1966-67 fully booked. But Somerfin, the Swiss company that actually owned the Nili,
was in financial trouble and risked losing the ship (along with the Bilu) to the Israeli
government, which held the second mortgage on the ship. This news led the Frasers to
cancel their charter with Somerfin.67 An Israeli businessman, Ted Arison, was willing to
take the chance the Frasers would not, and bought the Frasers’ winter and spring
bookings for thirty-five cents on the dollar. But that fall, as the Frasers had feared, the
Israeli government seized the Nili when Somerfin failed. Arison was left with months of
cruise passenger bookings but no ship with which to operate them.68
At the same time, across the Atlantic, a Norwegian shipping line faced the
opposite problem: it had a ship but no passengers. The ship was the Sunward. Norwegian
shipping firm Kloster Rederi commissioned the ship to transport British tourists and their
cars between Southampton and Gibraltar in summer, with additional trips to Casablanca
in the winter. The Sunward was originally designed to carry 558 passengers, 140 cars,
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and six buses.69 And though a car ferry did not face the same competition from airplanes
as a transoceanic liner did, its designers felt compelled to articulate a distinction between
the experiences of travel by air versus sea. In making an argument for travel by sea (and
by the Starward specifically), the managing direct of Klosters Sunward Ferries, C.
Barclay, mused in a 1966 shipbuilding journal of the traveler that, “While he or she will
put up readily with close density seating on airplanes, with lack of elbow room, with
swollen feet propped up on the overnight case and with aching knees resting against his
chin; on board he insists in having a comfortable private cabin, with chintz curtains, lots
of baggage space, good ventilation, piped music, and literally acres of public rooms.” In
further arguing for travel by sea, Barclay asked, “Should one generalise by describing the
air passenger as a resigned fatalist, and the traveller by sea as a sybarite?”70
The single-class, fully air-conditioned ship designed for those seagoing sybarites
included two decks of passenger cabins, a 100-person cinema, teenager room, disco, and
shopping area. Passengers could eat in either an a la carte restaurant or enjoy a
Scandinavian smorgasbord in the ship’s main dining room. The boat deck also included a
Motorists Club with large road maps where passengers could socialize over conversations
about their upcoming road trips. According to Barclay, the Sunward’s winter business
necessitated such “ample” public space, even though he believed they would be little
used in summer or whenever the ship reached the Spanish coast.71
If the design of the Sunward’s public spaces reflected the ship’s intended service
for both cold and warm waters, the design of its cabins embodied the anticipated
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experiences of its passengers. This was the shipbuilders’ most significant effort to
materially tailor the ship to its passengers. The yard, Norway’s A/S Bergens Mekaniski
Verksteder, built a mock cabin and asked yard engineers, decorators, and sales staff to
test the cabin’s amenities before furniture was installed. Then, according to Barclay, “the
owners and the designer were invited to share the cabin with their wives, bringing with
them two or three large suitcases, their coats and umbrellas, cameras and books, to carry
out a dress rehearsal of the process of unpacking, changing, preparing for bed and
spending an hour or two on the berths. Husbands were ordered to shave and go through
the motions of washing before dressing and packing their kit. Wives were asked to remake beds before leaving.”72 These user tests informed 33 modifications to the cabins,
mainly in the location of cabin features such as towel racks, lamps, and mirrors. Such
tests, for Barclay, helped distinguish the design of passenger ships from that of cargo
ships or transportation technologies such as airplanes. “To some extent the design of
passenger ships is a subjective exercise in naval architecture, the criterion being
passenger reaction rather than the pursuit of maximum deadweight,” he wrote.
“Architectural skill is therefore secondary to psychology.”73
Construction of the Sunward car and passenger ferry was complete by the summer
of 1966, but the ship only sailed between Britain and Gibraltar for several months that
year. Conflict between Spain and Britain over the status of Gibraltar led to the closing of
the border between the territory and the nation; at the same time, concern over the flow of
British pounds out of the country led the government to limit British tourists’ overseas
spending to 50 pounds. These two developments left Klosters Sunward Ferries with few
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passengers.74 When Arison read about the plight of the Sunward, he contacted Klosters
and invited the Norwegian shipowner to Miami in November 1966. The two established
an agreement under which Klosters would retain ownership of the ship and supply its
maritime labor force, while Arison would handle marketing, sales, and concessions. The
next month, the Sunward arrived in Miami for its first cruises from the then-unfinished
port of Miami on Dodge Island.

The Last Liner

Cruising was increasingly overtaking transportation in passenger shipping in the
1960s, but Cunard made one last effort to maintain its transoceanic business. The
conceptualization, design, and construction of the last ship built for North Atlantic
crossings, the Queen Elizabeth 2, reflected both the speed with which airlines overtook
the shipping companies in transoceanic transportation in this period and ship lines’
technical and experiential considerations for cruising.
Cunard was not exactly caught off guard by airline competition. In the 1950s and
’60s, the company responded to the competition with an advertising campaign that
argued “Getting There Is Half the Fun.”75 Unable to compete with airlines in speed,
Cunard’s campaign instead highlighted the leisurely nature of a slower ocean crossing
and also articulated a conception of the ship itself as a destination. A 1953 Cunard poster,
for example, promised potential passengers "Days and nights of enchanted
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relaxation...laughter, music, sparkling companionship...and the sheer wizardry of master
chefs...make your voyage a brilliant holiday in itself."76
The company faced additional challenges in the late 1950s, when Cunard’s largest
liners, the Queen Mary (80,000 gross tons) and the Queen Elizabeth (83,000), were
nearing the end of their service lives, the company. Both Cunard and the British
government remained committed to North Atlantic service. In 1959, the British
government established a committee to study Cunard’s proposal and consider whether the
project justified a government loan. This committee recommended a three-class ship,
nicknamed the Q3, in the model of Cunard’s existing liners. It went further and insisted
that the new ship only operate on the North Atlantic route and never be used for cruising.
Cunard agreed, and in 1960 the government agreed to 18-million pound load for a larger,
75,000-tons, 2,270-passenger liner.77
Financial support from the government, however, was not enough to overcome
the rapid increase in competition from airlines. The percentage of transatlantic traffic
handled by airlines increased from 34 percent in 1952 to 58 percent in 1959; after
peaking in 1957, the total number of sea passengers began to decline even as ship lines
launched new vessels, creating greater supply and competition for what was clearly a
dwindling demand. Not long after securing the government’s financial backing, Cunard
cancelled its plans for the Q3.78
The company, however, was unwilling to completely abandon its North Atlantic
business nor its plans to replace the Queen Mary and Queen Elizabeth. Instead it set
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about designing and building a smaller dual-purpose ship for liner and cruise service.
Cunard believed that a demand for transatlantic ocean crossings still existed, and would
continue in the future, but the company no longer believed this demand to be year-round.
Business and leisure travelers might enjoy the slower transit of a sea crossing in summer,
but in winter, the company observed, speed was paramount and business travelers
especially preferred a seven-hour flight to a five-day ocean crossing.79
Ceding winter transportation to the airlines had one benefit for Cunard. North
Atlantic winter weather required more ship power than summer crossings and cruising. A
dual-purpose ship crossing the Atlantic in summer and cruising in winter, therefore,
required less fuel and smaller machinery, reducing energy costs and freeing space for
other revenue-generating opportunities. A smaller ship was also better suited to cruising
as it would have less draft, allowing it to enter warm-weather ports that tended to be
shallower than New York or Liverpool and eliminating the need for ship tenders to carry
passengers between the ship and a port dock.
Cunard announced plans to build the Q4 (the future Queen Elizabeth 2) in 1963.
The company’s initial approval of a three-class vessel suggested a traditional approach to
passenger ship design, but Cunard’s approach to ship operations reflected a new
conception of the company’s product and its potential market. “We must try to see what
ships really have to offer in the air age,” Philip Bates, Cunard’s managing director, told
the press in 1965. “On the passenger side we have to subordinate our natural interest in
ships as such and realize that we are in the travel and hotel business.”80 The company
reorganized and added a hotel division to oversee entertainment, catering, and passenger
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services. It hired hotel managers and sent stewards and pursers for a year of hotel
training. The wife of the company’s chairperson and its naval architect, both members of
a committee overseeing interior design, spent two years studying hotels in Europe and the
United States. In its 1965 annual report, Cunard articulated a new vision for its business.
“We regard the passenger ship no longer simply as a means of transport, but even more
as a floating resort in which the public take a holiday...” the company wrote. “Instead of
trading in a contracting market—that of surface transport of passengers in the jet air age,
we shall find ourselves instead in a growth industry, the leisure industry.”81
Cunard’s emphasis on hotel operations and the leisure industry intensified during
the construction of the Q4. In 1966, when the shipyard building the vessel postponed its
delivery of the ship from May 1968 to November 1968, the company used the
opportunity to evaluate its plans for a strict three-class organization. Based on a survey of
84,000 U.S. residents, Cunard abandoned its plans for three-class accommodations and
instead pivoted to a largely open ship with first- and tourist-accommodations on the
North Atlantic route.82
The Queen Elizabeth 2 was delivered in 1969. Popular books and articles on
passenger ships tend to focus on the engines, interior design, and shipboard amenities of
larger passenger ships like the QE2, but several authors have also noted new operations
aboard the Cunard ship, especially in the area of food service. Whereas older ships had
multiple dining rooms across a ship, and sometimes with multiple kitchens or galleries,
the designers of the Queen Elizabeth 2 clustered all the ship’s food preparation and
service spaces into one area of the ship, “an integrated catering complex,” according to
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Philip Dawson, “organised around the central nucleus of a single gallery and its related
pantries, bars, serveries, bakery, larders and so on.”83 Hinting to a Taylorist approach to
catering, Neil Potter and Jack Frost wrote in 1969, “Extending the full 104 feet breadth of
the ship, the passenger kitchen affords direct access to the two restaurants and grill room.
This kitchen will serve some 8000 meals a day. Many new ideas, including the principles
of time and motion study and method study have been taken into account in the design.
This is on the open plan and the chef de cuisine from this office has an overall view of the
whole of the kitchen area.”84
The appearance of a larger passenger liner captured the attention of the
architectural press as well, which treated the dual-purpose ship as a novelty in a rapidly
changing industry. Commenting on the size of the ship, a critic for Architectural Review
wrote “The large one-off luxury liner is widely regarded as an archaism.”85 But Cunard’s
ship was, to this critic, a success at providing and organizing passenger spaces. Market
research suggested that the passengers desired both cabins and public rooms with
windows and views. The ship’s designers located all public rooms in the superstructure,
which gave the rooms wide windows that overlooked the ocean. The designers also
placed cabins along the ship’s shell across multiple decks. This stacking eliminated the
promenade decks that typically ran along most passenger ships, but the QE2 designers
offered such open space on a series of protected, cascading decks at the rear of the ship.
As the critic noted, “the new ship emerges as a cellular mantle of passenger spaces—
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cabins, public volumes and open decks—moulded over, around and behind a long,
narrow core of machinery, circulations, cargo and crew space.”86
Another writer credited Cunard with tackling “one of the most complex and
dynamic problems in the history of shipowning.” That problem, as the Architects’
Journal author described it, captured the tension between transportation and leisure that
ship owners and shipyards faced in the 1960s. Cunard’s challenge, he wrote, was to build
“a piece of hardware which could earn its living by exploiting changes in world travel
patterns rather than ossifying in the middle of them. The fast intercontinental packet thus
had to be able to double perfectly as a floating resort and perhaps gain as a global tourer.
To this end her designers had to resolve the conundrum of providing high technical
performance, usually meaning larger and powerful engines, and at the same time great
volumes of architectural space, the basis of both flexibility and luxury. Hitherto
environmental space has always been sacrificed in reconciling these two requirements.
QE2 may have achieved a remarkable between them.”87 This critic was especially
enamored by the kind of experience produced by the gathering of all public rooms in the
ship’s superstructure, and by the smooth and easy connection among them. This
superstructure was a much more self-contained environment when compared to earlier
ships that offered passengers open promenade decks around the ship and access to public
rooms by indoor arteries. Instead, the QE2 wove a single promenade around and through
its public rooms. The produced “a complete metropolitan environment,” according to the
Architects’ Journal critic. “To walk aft from the Britannia Restaurant,” he continued,
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“past the theatre and towards the Double Room is to experience progressive change in a
continuous internal landscape rather than a distinct sequence of spaces.”88
Covering the May 1969 arrival of the QE2 in New York City, a writer for the New
York Times mentioned a few of the changes to passenger shipping embodied by the new
vessel. He noted the addition of hotel management to the ship, pointing out that “they
don’t say steward or chief purser anymore.” The reporter also seemed a bit wistful about
the new organization of public rooms and spaces in the QE2’s superstructure. “[T]hey do
not have a promenade deck, either,” he wrote, “on a ship geared for determined
gayety.”89

Hoteliers and Royal Caribbean Cruise Line

Many of the earliest cruise owners and operators in Miami — the Frasers, Kloster,
and Arison — all had some experience in shipping. This was perhaps unsurprising in the
late 1960s, as the freight and passenger trade for more than a century had treated the two
operations as related but distinct operations within the shipping industry. But they would
be joined in this period by new entrepreneurs who brought different professional
backgrounds and experiences to the cruise industry. These were individuals from the
hotel world, who saw the operation of a cruise vessel less as the operation of a ship and
more as the running of a floating hotel. One of the earliest was Sanford Chobol, owner of
two Miami Beach hotels. In 1968, Chobol’s Commodore Cruise Line began offering
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week-long cruises on the Boheme, a Swedish car ferry, that Commodore advertised as
“The Happy Ship.”90
While working as the general manager for Commodore, Ed Stephans (formerly
manager of Yarmouth Cruise Lines), launched plans for his own cruise line. Stephans’
professional training and experience in the hospitality industry reflected burgeoning
interest in passenger ships as experiential consumer spaces more akin to hotels and
resorts than to transportation technologies. A veteran of the Korean War, Stephans had
used the G.I. Bill to attend hotel school. Before working for cruise companies, he
advanced his career in Miami hotels, working as a bell captain, valet, accountant, and
general manager; he also taught evening courses in hotel management at a Miami
vocational school. Recognizing the financial success of ships repurposed for Miamibased Caribbean cruising such as Commodore’s Boheme and Norwegian’s Sunward,
Stephans believed that ships built especially for that market could further maximize the
possible gains to made from cruising.91 An efficient Caribbean cruise ship, to Stephens,
would be lightweight to save fuel and shallow enough to enter ports without needing
ferries to carry passengers from ship to shore. Perhaps more significantly, Stephans
believed that ships could be built with smaller passenger cabins and larger public (and
revenue-generating) spaces such as shops and bars.92
Stephans took his vision for “propelled hotels” to Norway in 1967, while on a
work trip for Commodore.93 There he partnered with two Norwegian shipping
companies, I.M. Skaugen and Anders Wilhelmsen & Company. Skaugen specialized in
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bulk cargo and tankers but was interested in reentering a passenger business it had
abandoned; Wilhelmsen was flush with capital after the closing of the Suez Canal during
the Six-Day War in June 1967 and a charter to supply Japanese oil refineries both
boosted demand for the company’s tanker service. In 1968, Stephans and the two
Norwegian shipping companies placed an order for a 700-passenger ship with the Finnish
shipyard Wärtsilä, to be delivered October 1970, with an option for a second ship to be
delivered in July 1971. The new cruise company (formally named Royal Caribbean
Cruise Line in January 1969) planned to run these two ships on seven-day cruises from
Miami. But even before the first ship was delivered, Stephans expressed a desire for a
third ship that could be used on 14-day cruises. Wärtsilä offered Royal Caribbean the
option for a third ship that could be delivered by the end of 1972. To raise the capital for
a third ship, Royal Caribbean reached out to a third Norwegian shipping company,
Gotaas-Larsen, to join Skaugen and Wilhelmsen as owners of the young cruise enterprise.
Gotaas-Larsen was already active in Miami-based cruising, having purchased Eastern
Steamship and its two repurposed cruise ships in July 1969. The company agreed to join
Royal Caribbean in exchange for a one-third stake in ownership. Royal Caribbean wanted
Gotaas-Larsens’ investment, but it did not want the company’s ships. Reflecting the
line’s desire to promote purpose-built cruise ships, Royal Caribbean stipulated that any
further expansion into cruising happen within that company, permitting Gotaas-Larsen to
only replace, but not expand, Eastern’s fleet.94
When Wärtsilä delivered Royal Caribbean’s first ship, the Song of Norway, in
1970, the ships’ designers, crew, and shipbuilding journals described a vessel tailored to
both the Caribbean climate and what they understood to be the tastes and preferences of
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the lines’ target American passengers. “Particular attention has been paid to the capacity
of the air conditioning plant,” the journal Shipbuilding and Shipping Record wrote,
“which is designed to maintain American cruise passengers in the degree of comfort they
expect in tropical waters—that is to say, several degrees cooler and drier than Europeans
demand in similar circumstances.”95 Describing the Song of Norway’s interior color
scheme, ship captain Aage Linsad noted, “The colors and other things that might shock
many Europeans will probably be considered natural and stimulating for Americans.”96
Invoking the kind of escape and immersion characteristic of U.S. theme parks and
casinos from the 1950s to the present, the ship’s Danish designer, Tage Wandborg, later
told maritime historian Philip Dawson that the exterior of purpose-built cruise ships
should “engender the kind of feel-good factor one gets when driving in a beautiful sports
car or lounging on a big yacht.” But, Wandborg argued, “Inside, however, a completely
different philosophy governs the design. Unlike liner or ferry travel, cruising is about
relaxation, nostalgia, and possibly, over-indulgence. Thus, to be successful, cruise-ship
interiors require to be filled with what might be called ‘eye-candy’ to at least distract or,
ideally, to captivate and enchant the passengers.”97
That design philosophy and the vision of the cruise product it represented would
spread over the next decade, as Miami-based cruising in the 1970s grew faster than
economic forecasts had predicted. The launch of the Song of Norway also represented a
near-complete and total shift in passenger shipping from transportation to leisure. In that
95
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decade, Norwegian Caribbean bought and converted the former liner France for cruising
as the Normandie. Cunard undertook a $4-million interior rebuild of the QE2 for
cruising. And in 1972 Ted Arison relaunched the former Canada Pacific ship Empress of
Canada as the Mardi Gras: the first vessel of the new Carnival Cruise Lines.
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Chapter Four: Producing Services, Producing the Serviced: The Development of
Mass Hospitality

In May 1970, Paul J.C. Friedlander, a travel columnist for the New York Times,
recounted an experience he once had aboard a passenger ship. “I vividly remember
strolling the deck of a great ocean liner with her captain, who suddenly broke off in
midsentence a funny story he was telling,” Friedlander wrote. “I turned to catch the next
words and they were directed, politely but firmly, to a passing deck steward, calling his
attention to a tea-service tray that had been abandoned, with its cups and dishes, beneath
a deck chair.”1
Friedlander was reminded of the captain’s “tedious attention to detail” on a visit
to Michigan State University’s School of Hotel, Restaurant and Institutional
Management. The school was one of a dozen universities that used a combination of
classroom instruction and “practical experience” to train a new generation of travel
managers and executives as attentive to the particularities of service as Friedlander’s ship
captain was. During the columnist’s visit to Michigan State, he observed students in a
food chemistry class compare the taste of oranges straight out of the refrigerator to that of
oranges at room temperature. In another class, Food and Beverage Management, he
watched six students present a proposal for a dormitory cafe. In Dimensions of Tourism,
Friedlander listened as the instructor and students lamented the poor quality of statistics
coming out of the International Union of Official Travel Organizations.
The coursework in the Michigan State program likely amused and may have even
surprised the readers of Friedlander’s travel column, but its work was not unique in this
1
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period. Far from representing a new direction in college-level education, the program
instead reflected seven decades of efforts to define, refine, research, and reproduce mass
hospitality services in the United States. It was these services that ship lines adopted as
they transitioned from transportation providers to experience producers in the 1960s.
When Cunard, in its 1965 annual report, announced that its new Queen Elizabeth would
be designed and operated more like a resort than a transportation technology, the
company was not making a rhetorical statement but instead articulating a new mode of
operation designed to seamlessly comfort, gratify, and entertain thousands of
idiosyncratic passengers.
This chapter presents a history of the hospitality industry’s efforts to enact mass
service across those seven decades, largely in the operation of hotels and food
establishments. These efforts included the establishment and advocacy of industry
associations; the creation of college-level programs in hospitality management; and the
pursuit of standardized and simplified practices that attempted to identify operational
efficiencies (and inefficiencies) in the provision of individualized service for consumers.
This, however, was not a straightforward expansion of industrial values and
principles from the factory, farm, and house to the hotel and restaurant. Manufacturing,
agriculture, and domestic production and reproduction all preexisted the standardization
and simplification of those activities. I argue in this chapter that such efforts in the world
of hospitality produced mass service where none had existed before, and that the mass
but individual comforts, pleasures, and gratifications generated by services broadly, and
by the hospitality industry specifically, emerged via an ongoing entanglement of
standardizing impulses and idiosyncratic hotel guests and restaurant customers. This
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history begins with early-twentieth-century efforts to offer affordable and profitable hotel
accommodations to growing number of middle-class travelers, especially salespeople and
tourists. Woven into this story are initiatives by industry associations and the federal
government to help hotels and restaurant identify more economically beneficial
operations, and also drives to establish college-level programs in hotel and restaurant
management. For much of this period, academic research to support these industries took
place in established disciplines that predated the appearance of hospitality management
programs; that changed by the 1960s, with the emergence of hospitality itself as a
recognized area of academic research.
This chapter builds on the small but robust body of scholarship on the history of
hotels. This work has convincingly elaborated the multiple roles hotels served, especially
United States hotels. A.K Sandalov-Stausz, for example, has argued that nineteenthcentury U.S. hotels enabled the mobility that characterized American society in this
period.2 Molly Berger’s study of urban “luxury” hotels of the nineteenth and early
twentieth century demonstrated the cultural role of large prestige hotels and the
technologies they celebrated.3 Emphasizing the architecture of post-World War II hotels,
Annabel Jane Wharton has argued that the Modern form of Hilton hotels and the
amenities they offered were one means of extending American culture to Western Europe
and decolonized cities as an anticommunist Cold War project.4 These works are varied in
geography, time period, and emphasis, but each takes the hotel form itself as the primary
unit of analysis. My chapter adds to this body of work by offering a broader and more
2
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diverse frame for understanding the production of hospitality.5 A focus on hospitality
offers a multidimensional examination of a totalizing subjective experience made up of
clerks who smile, waiters who try to avoid embarrassing less-experienced diners, and
hotel room doors whose clearance is great enough that a newspaper can be silently slid
underneath. The work performed across this period — by hotel owners and operators,
colleges and universities, and the federal government — did not resemble the more
traditional sciences of the twentieth century. But these actors all strove to deploy
technoscientific practices to create mass hospitality in this period, and their efforts
conditioned consumers to expect a particular kind of service, in hotels and restaurants and
beyond, one that seemed to attend to their individual wants and needs and that was geared
toward their gratification and comfort. These actors were producing a technical
apparatus, to borrow Giorgio Agamben’s frame (which he borrowed from Foucault), that
in turn produced its subjects.6 Hotel and food services produced the serviced individual,
and when this condition had become so totalizing as to become commoditized, it paved
the way for a more experiential and emotional pivot within hospitality in the 1960s. It
was a pivot the cruise industry was poised to exploit.
5
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A Standard of Service

The growing size and scope of large luxury hotels in the second half of the
nineteenth century captured popular attention. In 1897, writer Jesse Lynch Williams drew
on his own studies of large hotels to describe for readers of Scribner’s Magazine the
“machinery that makes the commodity called hotel accommodation.”7 Williams began
his piece by listing the vast number of specialized workers who produced a guest’s
single-night stay in a typical “great hotel.” These included a room-clerk, key-clerk, bellboy, head-porter, trunk-porter, elevator boys, chamber-maids, hall-maids, a housekeeper,
laundresses, coal stokers, painters, musicians, a tinsmith, a decorator, a printer,
comptrollers, plumbers, furniture-movers, pillow-makers, floor-scrubbers, clock-winders,
bakers, butchers, waiters, silver cleaners, chefs, and a man who did nothing but open
oysters all day long. The caption of one illustration described the variety of kitchen plans
one would find across luxury hotels, but it noted that “in their workings they were all
practically alike, in that every man performed but one thing.”8
Williams’ use of machine metaphors and his description of narrow occupational
niches suggests that large luxury hotels represented the extension of industrial principles
to the provision of hotel accommodation. This was not, however, a division of labor, but
rather an assemblage of labor that produced a particular form of accommodation and
service. Different from the production of a material good, a process that could be reduced
to incremental steps, the production of hotel service involved instead a selection of steps
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according to the pleasurable qualities they generated, among them clean rooms,
entertainment, warmth, polished silver, and oysters.
The author also compared the running of a large hotel to the operation of railroads
and department stores, though he linked the three not through their character as service
providers but as “big thing[s]” whose success was dependent on attention to “little
things.”9 Such attention took the form of systems, and Williams was particularly awed by
three hotel systems: checks, accounting, and material reuse. The first, “a system for
stopping leakage,” constituted a checks system whereby every action was checked or
documented: the chef, for example, was required to countersign kitchen requests sent to a
storeroom, and chambermaids who needed clean linens had to first turnover an equal
number of dirty pieces. Williams described a process for requesting a glass of milk that
included four employees who produced four separate documents that were later collated
and reviewed by the auditing department.10
Such systems helped identify instances of theft or waste, but they also produced
vast amounts of data that Williams argued were necessary for the particularities of hotel
operations. Its departments were managed as independent sources of costs and revenue,
and daily, detailed tracking of those costs and revenues was key to “locating
extravagance.” Williams speculated that hotels might be the only enterprises besides
banks that could generate balance sheets every 24 hours. Hotels could determine and
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compare, for example, how much coal was used in the cooking ranges, fireplaces,
bakeries, and laundries. They were able to determine that adding lima beans to employee
meals added $400 in costs, but that cutting watercress garnishes cut $75 in weekly
expenses. Such bookkeeping would also alert management when, say, the revenue
dropped in the billiards room, and that data would inform the decision to upgrade the
room, reduce its services and labor, or eliminate it entirely.
Williams argued that the profitability of a high-cost enterprise like a luxury hotel
depended on such vigilance. “It is very possible that you do not fancy Hungarian
orchestras that play Faust while you eat oysters, and perhaps the over-gorgeous effects
seem vulgar to you,” Williams granted his readers. “But that is not the point. They are
costly just the same, and for the total market value of the commodities you are given, or
given the use of, you pay an astonishingly small amount at the modern hotel.”11 The
hotels Williams studied sought to identify sources of waste, areas worthy of investment,
and economical use of materials. One hotel saved celery scraps to feed geese on its
private farm. Others sold their used grease, and downcycled guests’ towels into
employees towels and then finally into scrubbing rags. Food left on a serving dish was
incorporated into employee meals; one New York hotel sold the food left on diners’
plates to refuse buyers in Hoboken, New Jersey. Williams defended the “comparatively
small figure” of $1,200 the hotel charged the men by pointing out that every week these
men returned any silverware they found. That would be an otherwise costly task for the
hotel to perform, with dishscrapers already struggling to keep pace with dishwashers.
Contemporary observers of large urban hotels of the early twentieth century like
Williams expressed enthusiasm for the broader systems that incorporated those buildings,
11
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arrangements, and technologies. Some of these writers were attracted to the ways hotels
managed a complex flow of goods and people. One author for the Architectural Record,
writing about New York hotels in 1902, described “a novel device for noiselessly and
automatically removing used china, linen, etc. from the dining-rooms, so that the waiter
does not have to leave the room, thus largely increasing the time of his attendance at the
table.” This conveyor was “an endless chain of shelves moving very slowly,” which
carried dirty dining room goods to cleaners below and delivered new linens and dishes.12
This author also described plans for a new hotel that would offer direct access to a
subway underground, enabling guests to arrive and depart without needing to step
outside. Others commented on the complex organization of labor that characterized large
hotels. A writer for the business periodical World’s Work described the modern hotel as
“a vast machine of well-regulated activity” producing “organized luxury.” Impressed by
the luxuries of new hotels (including one with “a gorgeous avenue of Oriental fabrics,
lapis lazuli and gold”13) and their technologies (among them a mechanical dipper that
boiled eggs), the writer argued that the organization and management of labor was the
most important element of good hotel operations. He wrote, “[I]t is not the size, the
construction, nor the furnishing of the modern hotel that makes it is a success. It is the
fact that the institution has a system — that the armies are completely and capably
officered, and that behind these officers, at a little corner desk, in a quiet, unnoticed nook,
sits the commander-in-chief to whom all officers report — the manager of the ‘modern
hotel’.”14
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The variety of labor, organization of workers, and attention to the movement of
people and materials that these authors observed in hotels reflected the broader interest in
efficient production (whether industrial or domestic) that characterized the early
twentieth century in the United States.15 Many writers invoked the metaphor of the
machine or the factory to describe hotel operations. Hotel operators did, too. But those
operators carefully distinguished their product from the output of a machine or factory.
Lisa Pfueller Davidson describes larger hotels of the period as embodying a “tension
between modern business methods immersed in the ideal of efficiency and the ofteninefficient variety based on guest needs.”16 Operators of the largest hotels in the early
twentieth century, however, did not identify such tension as a problem; rather, they
embraced a negotiation between variety, diversity, standardization, and simplification as
productive of service. Despite hotel operators’ own descriptions of their work as the
application of standardization, simplification, and other means of achieving so-called
“efficiency” in a service product, these operators were instead creating that product, on a
mass scale, via standardization, simplification, and efficient operations.
Such a “negotiation” was in fact the way the hotel industry described its work in
the early twentieth century. L.M. Boomer, president of the high-end Waldorf-Astoria
group of hotels, made such an argument in a 1923 article for System magazine, “How We
Fitted Ford’s Principles to Our Business.” Boomer’s goal was to promote the widespread
adoption of Fordist practices by demonstrating their applicability to a product as
seemingly idiosyncratic as customer service in hotel accommodations. “Let those
business men who feel that Simplification is not for them because they are forced to meet
15
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the whims and varied needs of many customers consider the hotel business,” Boomer
wrote. “A hotel combines under one roof the most vexing problems of the retailer who
must keep in stock perishable products from every country, of the manufacturer of
thousands of craftsmanship products, and of the concern which sells personal service.”17
And if such a complex enterprise could adopt Fordist principles, Boomer argued, than
any business could.
This isn’t to say Boomer denied the particularities of hotel operations when
compared with other businesses. His argument was grounded in those particularities:
Boomer wanted to convince System readers that the successful application of Fordism to
any business operation required study of those operations and the identification of areas
appropriate for standardization and simplification. He argued, for instance, that guests
would not accept penitentiary-like uniformity across rooms and that hotels should offer a
variety of accommodations. And hotels could not vertically integrate to control the
production of their supplies. Though the twelve restaurants of the Waldorf-Astoria hotels
served 30,000 meals every day, the variety of foodstuffs they offered would require the
chain to own Wyoming cattle ranches, New Jersey peach orchards, Jamaican sugar
plantations, and Russian fish markets. The cigar shops in Waldorf-Astoria hotels also
sold a total volume of cigars that equaled a factory’s output and would seemingly justify
the ownership and operation of a cigar factory, but the character of hotel cigar sales
required a variety of cigar brands, and not just a high quantity.
Boomer identified other areas, however, in which the hotel could obtain some
control over its supplies and subsequently reduce the costs of those goods and services.
The company performed its own upholstery work and furniture repair. It made its own ice
17
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cream and chocolate candy. The Waldorf-Astoria purchased plane white china that it
decorated in-house; it also eliminated the individual monograms unique to each
individual hotel from this decoration so that china could be used across the company’s
chain. Such simplification also realized cost savings in other areas. The Waldorf-Astoria
adopted a single linen pattern for all its hotels, eliminated 20 shapes from its glassware,
and adopted standard uniforms for maids and waitresses. The company also chose single
styles of stationary, cleaning supplies, soaps, baking powder, olive oil, coffee, and canned
goods. Boomer told readers that the company conducted exhaustive studies and as a
result “profitability simplified” more than 200 items in its hotels. “In thinking of
Simplification, remember that you are both a buyer and a seller,” Boomer wrote. “If you
really cannot adopt a policy of Simplification on the things you sell, adopt it on the things
you buy. Don't buy 15 varieties of bolts, if you can, by study, make one kind of bolt
satisfy the 15 uses.”18
Rather than distinguish hotel and service operations as distinct from other
businesses and enterprises, particularly industrial manufacturing, Boomer instead argued
for their similarities via the pursuit of standardization, simplification, and cost savings.
Though service industries had particular concerns and considerations that distinguished it
from other industries, Boomer wrote, "It is exactly the Ford principles that make possible
a business so complex and diversified as a large hotel business must be.”19
Art historian Annabel Jane Wharton argues that Boomer in this article is
describing “the appearance of individual attention” in hotels. She writes, “Boomer
acknowledged the necessity of masking the homogeneity of the product,” she writes, “at
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the same time he promoted new homogenizing technologies.”20 But the reproduction of
such dualities — between the homogeneous and the heterogeneous, or between
Davidson’s “modern business methods” and the “variety of guest needs” — risks
overlooking hotel operators’ own interests in extolling the benefits of Fordism and
comparing their operations to those of their counterparts in industrial manufacturing.
More significantly, such dualities reproduces and naturalize a form of hotel
accommodation and customer service that seemingly preceded Fordism (and
standardization more broadly), as opposed to a service that was established through such
practices. Tweaking Boomer’s own comment about the centrality of Fordist principles to
hotels as complex and diversified as they “must be,” Fordist principles made
economically possible the complexity and diversity of hotels as their owners wished them
to be.

Federal Support for Simplification in Service

Boomer and the hotel industry, of course, were not alone in their pursuit and
adoption of new streamlined operations. In the early 1920s, Harvey Firestone, Thomas
Edison, and John T. Dorrance all publicly celebrated the benefits of standardization and
simplification in the rubber, electricity, and soup industries.21 They had the strong
support of the federal government, which in this period was making a deep and ultimately
successful effort to promote specifications, simplification, and standardization in as many
industries as possible. Herbert Hoover was its champion. Building off his success as U.S.
20
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Food Administrator during and after World War I, Hoover became Secretary of
Commerce in 1921 and used the department’s Bureau of Standards to study, develop, and
promote specifications, simplification, and standards to identify and eliminate “waste”
across industries, lower business expenses, and promote a higher “standard of living.”22
As part of this work, the Bureau established a Division of Simplified Practice. Describing
the Bureau’s goals in 1924, Hoover wrote, “[o]ur industrial machine is far from perfect.
The wastes due to unemployment during depressions; to speculation and overproduction
during booms; to labor turnover and labor conflicts; to intermittent failure of
transportation of supplies, of fuel, and of power; to excessive seasonal operation; to lack
of simplification and standardization in many of our commonly used commodities; to loss
in our processes and materials—all of these combine to represent a huge deduction from
the goods and services we might all enjoy if we could but eliminate these wastes.”23
According to this logic, all industries could benefit from standardization and
simplification, even those seemingly defined by idiosyncrasy or variety. In a 1924
booklet promoting its efforts, the Bureau acknowledged “Commodities which are
affected by style, art, design, or true expression of individuality are not generally
susceptible to simplification.” But even the producers of such commodities could benefit
from a reduction in types. The Bureau described a hat manufacturer who made 90% of
his business in only seven hat styles and 10 hat colors, and a shoe manufacturer that
reduced its available styles from 2,500 to 100 and saw an increase in sales.24
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The Division went further, arguing that simplification was not exclusively a
“manufacturing problem.”25 It cited Boomer’s own statistics as evidence that the
principles could be applied to the service industry. To further support diverse businesses,
both in manufacturing and service, the Division of Simplification established a process
by which industry representatives could enlist the division’s assistance in developing
industry-wise simplified practices. In 1923, the American Hotel Association (AHA) and
American Vitrified China Manufacturers’ (AVCM) did just that and requested the
Department of Commerce’s support in developing recommendations for simplifying the
number and kind of dining china for hotels.
The process involved two steps. On May 28, 1923, representatives from the AHA,
AVCM, and DOC met in Washington, D.C., to consider 700 samples of china
representing 200 variations. The Bureau of Standards also conducted tests of china in the
agency’s new laboratory spaces. A writer visiting these spaces in 1923 for Business
magazine described them “a great national laboratory for business.”26 In his article, “The
Life of a Saucer,” Clinton W. Gilbert described the tests Bureau investigators used to
evaluate china for the hotel industry. The investigators compared china made in the
United States with china made abroad, especially the glaze that wore as a dish was
repeatedly washed. They used a lead ball on a string to evaluate durability. "The
swinging ball,” Gilbert described, “is the mechanical equivalent of the waiter or
dishwasher in a hotel stacking plates together and chipping their edges by rough
handling.”27 Bureau investigators concluded that U.S. china chipped less, but that
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European glazes wore more slowly. They also found that flatter dishes chipped less than
dishes with high edges.
The Bureau of Standards issued its Simplified Practice Recommendation for
Hotel Chinaware in 1924. This was only the Bureau’s fifth practice recommendation, and
it followed recommendations for paving bricks, mattress springs, metal lathes, and
asphalt. The Bureau recommended 23 pieces of hotel china, in three weights. In a
resolution, the Vitrified China Manufacturers’ Association and the American Hotel
Association offered appreciation for the “constructive cooperation of the division of
simplified practice, of the Department of Commerce, in lending its assistance to [the
associations’] effort to eliminate waste through the reduction of variety in hotel
chinaware.”28

Historicizing Service with a Smile

Lawrence Busch argues that the development and adoption of specifications,
simplification, and standardization initiated and championed by Hoover and the
Department of Commerce in the 1920s disproportionately benefited large businesses at
the expense of small enterprises. Large firms were better positioned to invest in new
plants and equipment to produce new standard products; large businesses whose products
already confirmed with new standards could quickly scale. The design of the
development process itself tended to privilege the concerns of the largest businesses and
industry associations, such as the American Hotel Association and the Vitrified China
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Manufacturers’ Association. These groups had cultivated relationships with Hoover and
government officials, and could afford to send representatives to Washington to
participate in debate and discussion over proposed standards.29
In the hotel industry, these firms included the large, urban luxury hotels, but also
a new form of hotel business organization: the hotel chain. These new chains emerged
alongside growing numbers of middle-class tourists in this period, and also expanding
numbers of traveling salespeople who used hotel spaces to meet potential customers and
demonstrate their products.30 This period also saw the growth of large regional and
national trade shows and conventions, which both drove and were made possible by
increased access to more affordable hotel accommodations.31
Historians of hotels generally credit E.M. Statler with the application of this form
of ownership to the hotel industry. Born in 1863, Statler began work at age 13 as a
bellhop in a West Virginia hotel. He advanced to clerk positions and later to
bookkeeping, where he added successful revenue-generating amenities to the hotel
including a railroad ticket office and a coffee shop. Statler also operated a restaurant in
Buffalo, New York, and, in 1899, won a contract to build a temporary, 2,000-room hotel
in Buffalo for the 1901 Pan-American Exhibition. He followed this by building and
operating a second temporary hotel for the 1904 St. Louis Pan-American Exhibition. This
29
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“Inside Inn” was built within the fairgrounds, and Statler advertised the hotel by
promoting its efficient location. “Think of the saving of time,” one ad read. “All your
time for the objects for which you came.”32
In 1908, Statler returned to Buffalo and opened a permanent 300-room hotel.
Contemporary observers and later historians described the arrangement of the hotel as
one of its innovations. Every room had a single door so that it could be used as a single
unit; doors between rooms allowed them to be converted to suites. Most noteworthy,
Statler’s hotel included a bathroom in every room; his architects placed these back-toback, so that every two bathrooms could be serviced by a shared plumbing shaft. The
hotel owner created a slogan to sell his new amenities: “A room and a bath for a buck and
a half.”33 Statler himself touted the comforting services his hotels offered guests, such as
a gap beneath the door large enough for staff to silently deliver a newspaper; the option to
have Sunday breakfast in guests’ rooms, where they could remain in pajamas and
languidly read that paper; and a second wake-up call five minutes after the first (an early
version of the snooze button).34 Molly Berger equates Statler’s commercial hospitality
with Henry Ford’s automobiles, describing the former as “standardized service on a
mass-produced scale within a highly calibrated and reproducible environment.”35 But
unlike Ford’s business, Berger further argues, “Statler’s enterprise offered a standardized
product supported by standardized procedures that, nonetheless, needed to address
individualized personal need.”36
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Other historians similarly credit Statler with achieving a successful negotiation of
simplification, standardization, and the particularities of service provision in the hotel
industry. Lisa Pfueller Davidson describes Statler’s skill at resolving tensions “between
creating a homelike versus a businesslike environment.”37 Such readings, however, risk
reproducing Statler’s own claims that his hotels provided good, affordable service when
he was defining and producing what counted as good affordable service, and expanding
its availability. In publications and interviews, Statler often described his approach to
hotel keeping as one that successfully responded to the vagaries of the individual human
dispositions of guests rotating through a hotel. “Get down to bed rock [sic], and you will
find that a hotel is not selling rooms or meals,” Statler wrote a 1907 article, “Golden
Rules of Hotel Keeping.” “It is selling satisfaction,” he continued. “It is handling human
nature with the brakes off, handling people when they are free from the obligations of
business or the limitations of home life, when they expect to have their comforts cared for
automatically, their whims gratified instantly.”38
But Statler wasn’t responding to “human nature with the brakes off” — he was
producing it through a commercial hospitality that provided satisfaction, automatic
comforts, and instant gratification to growing numbers of middle-class travelers. In
addition to the efficient amenities and services described above, Stater’s hotels strove to
produce a service that was as affective as it was architectural, technological, and
standardized. He demanded that bell hops and elevator operators learn guests’ names. He
warned waiters not to correct a guest who mispronounced a French dish. And demanding
the emotional labor that Arlie Hochschild would identify in flight attendants and bill
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collectors almost 80 years later, Statler always wanted his employees to provide service
with a smile.39 “A natural smile beats all the artificial decoration in the world,” he wrote
in the 1907 article. “I can train and educate an ordinary fellow of good, amiable
disposition,” he continued, “but I can’t train a grouch. No one can.”40
Others in the hotel and food industries shared Statler’s concern for the perceived
character and behavior of hospitality employees. In a 1925 500-page handbook hotel
management, L.M. Boomer (then a part of the Boomer-Dupont hotel group) described in
great detail the job duties and ideal characteristics of multiple employee categories. Of
cigar and newsstand clerks he wrote, “Every clerk should be cheerful and courteous. The
clerk who is listless, discourteous, or grouchy is doing this department and himself an
injustice and is only wasting his time.”41 Boomer advised the woman who staffed candy
shop and tearoom employees to “cultivate an air of pleasant sincerity” and to attend to
their diet and hygiene. “Good health is the first step to good nature,” he wrote these
women, “and that is an important asset in your position.” He also advised them to avoid
eating food with strong odors, such as onions. “In fact, to sum it all up, avoid everything
to which our most fastidious customers could possibly take exception.”42
Trade publications also emphasized the importance of hotel employees’ character.
"The good hotel manager is he who can select men and women fitted by nature with a
'hotel disposition,' and who understands how to discipline, instruct and train those under
him,” editors of Hotel World argued in a July 1921 editorial. “We seldom enter a large
hotel that we do not see employees who should not be in hotel service. They are oxen
39
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trying to race and greyhounds trying to plow.” “Fit,” for Statler and his peers, was crucial
for the production of a particular form of service. But behind these claims were also
economic and political goals of resisting labor organizing within the hotel industry. In the
same July 1921 editorial, Hotel World described the potential of even hotel bell-hops
[sic] to become millionaires, contingent on two things: proper education, and the
elimination of tips. “There is no better recipe for destroying the ethics and loyalty of an
uneducated lad then to feed him on tips,” the editors wrote. Making explicit and
unfavorable comparisons to local labor leaders, the editors wrote that like bellhops, “The
grafting union leaders in Chicago, a dozen of whom have been indicted, have been
receiving ten-thousand-dollar 'tips' for 'services rendered.’” The journal argued that hotel
managers should study Chicago’s new Tivoli Theater, where ushers provided "the most
intelligent, the most courteous and polite service we have ever seen in any hotel of
theatre, service that is actually delightful and charming, dignified but not cold and not
fawning,” all while being prohibited from receiving tips.43
Statler was the most visible proponent of these qualities. Remembering guests’
names, preventing their embarrassment, and smiling were three small parts in the larger
service provision that constituted and defined the “Statler Ideal.” “Service is a difficult
quality to lay your hands on,” the hotel owner wrote in a 1917 article, “How We Practice
Business Good Manners. “I shall not try to define it,” he continued. “I shall simply tell
some of the things we do in our effort to provide it for our guests.” But in practice, Statler
was defining a particular form of service that would come to characterize United States
commercial hospitality. In the same article, Statler offered that “good service, after all, is
nothing but many little things each well done.” Statler’s innovation wasn’t limited to
43
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simplification or standardization, but rather to the bigger project of attending to “many
little things” and executing them in a way that put them in reach of the growing numbers
of U.S. travelers.44

Educating Hospitality Managers

Contemporary observers and historians have both credited Statler the hotel owner
with the development and popularization of a relatively affordable and reproducible
hospitality product. And especially as United States tourism grew through expanded
access to automobiles, the amenities and services that Statler offered across his chain
shaped guests’ expectations for hotels more broadly. In a cheeky essay for Harper’s
Monthly on “The Hotel Guest,” writer Harrison Rhodes lamented the intrusion of
demanding guests in the U.S. countryside, writing “no bird’s-eye view of the hotel guest
can omit the sight of him and his womankind in strange masks and hideous wrappings
approaching Ye Olde Inn and demanding rooms with a bath.”45 But Statler also
influenced the development of the hospitality field through his work as a philanthropist,
when he became one of the early financial supporters of a new program in hotel
management at Cornell University.
A variety of factors drove efforts to establish higher education training in hotel
management. One was the establishment of new trade organizations to represent service
industries, including the American Hotel Association in 1917 and the National Restaurant
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Association in 1919.46 Another was a shortage of labor, especially from Europe, which
had been a critical source of workers for U.S. hotels prior to World War I. The world’s
first hotel training program, the École Hôtelière de Lausanne, was established in
Switzerland in 1893. Formed by an association of hotel owners and operators, the school
emphasized technical skills and hotel operations.47 Other technical training programs and
apprenticeship systems developed in Germany, France, and Italy.48 Through World War
I, the students and apprentices trained in these schools and systems found employment in
U.S. hotels and helped train their colleagues and their subordinates. In his 1925
handbook, Boomer wrote, “so long as a sufficient supply of foreign-trained employees
was available to fill the positions requiring skill peculiar to the business, and an abundant
labor supply to fill the unskilled positions was landing at our ports of entry every year,
the hotel business did not have to concern itself greatly with where and how to get
competent help.”49 Following World War I, however, the same regulations that curtailed
ship lines’ immigration business reduced the availability of European-trained hotel
employees.50 Boomer cited these immigration restrictions as one reason for the lack of
“competent help,” especially among the “skilled” (or trained and experienced)
employees; but he identified two other reasons why U.S. hotels needed training
programs: the fact that the “unskilled” still immigrating to the U.S. were “from different
racial stocks,” and the large growth of the hotel industry. The project of developing
higher education programs in hotel management was a project of training a new
professional class of hotel managers who could oversee the training of white American
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and western European hotel employees, and the operation of larger and more functionally
complex hotels.51
The earliest efforts to form a systematic program of hotel training was, as with the
work of the Bureau of Simplification, a collaboration between the AHA and the federal
government. In February 1917, the federal government passed the Vocational Education
Act, known as the Smith-Hughes Act. This act established a Federal Board for
Vocational Education, charged with identifying possibilities for vocational training in
industry, agriculture, and domestic work. The act also provided funding to support the
creation and operation of state and local vocational education programs. Around the same
time, the AHA established a National Hotel Institute and Research Bureau made up of 21
hotel owners and operators, including Statler and Boomer. A smaller subcommittee of
nine requested the assistance of the Board for Vocational Education (BVE), which agreed
to study the possibility of vocational education for the hotel industry, at the government’s
expense, with the cooperation of hotels that opened themselves to examination.52
In a 1921 report on the survey’s findings and the board’s recommendations, BVE
representative L.S. Hawkins offered several arguments to justify federal support for the
hotel industry. Prohibition, Hawkins argued, had reduced the large share of income that
hotels and restaurants derived from alcohol sales; identifying better operational and
managerial procedures would help hotels realize savings in the services they continued to
offer. Echoing contemporary observers of hotels, he also cited their increasing
complexity. "The modern hotel is a highly complex organization,” Hawkins wrote,
“involving great elaboration of all the old and simple home making arts, modern industry
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and industrial appliances, commercial organization and business methods, and even in
some instances, extensive agricultural enterprises.”53 Like the hotel owners and operators
described above, Hawkins argued that such a complex enterprise required trained
managers able to oversee independent and specialized operational divisions.
Perhaps most significant, for Hawkins, was the increasing social and economic
role of hotels and restaurants in the United States, and the growing demand for the
services they provided. Hawkins noted that more people were using hotels, and more
people were taking meals in restaurants; the fact that most towns included at least one
hotel and one restaurant further made these national industries. “All this means that to a
greater and greater extent, hotels and restaurants are becoming entrusted with the health
and comfort of the nation, in so far as food and shelter are concerned,” Hawkins wrote.
He continued (likely to the delight of the hotel industry), “The question of the training of
those who are in service of these places then is of increasing national concern. It is safe to
say that no other single business is of more vital concern to the welfare and comfort of
the American public than is the hotel and restaurant business.”54
Representatives for the Board for Vocational Education visited multiple hotels to
categorize the labor they observed within them, describe the key characteristics and tasks
of those roles, and identify possible training opportunities for each. The Board’s report
included detailed discussions of departments in housekeeping, the front office, house
service, cash, auditing, comptrolling, stewarding, engineering, kitchen, and dining room.
The agency further offered a hierarchical organization of hotel labor, with managers and
assistant managers at the top; department heads overseeing the operational areas listed
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above; “skilled workers, such as waiters, waitresses, chambermaids, cooks, storekeepers,
clerks, etc.”; and “semi-skilled and unskilled workers, such as houseman, bus boys, bellmen, porters, etc.”55
The Board recommended vocational training for the first two categories of hotel
employees, managers and department heads. It suggested that the AHA offer such
training with a 200-to-300 bed hotel that could become a model for vocational education,
with instruction that was “practical and based on the best hotel experience.”56 The Board
suggested that a university campus would be an ideal site for such a hotel, but it also
explicitly distinguished the hotel training that would be offered there from the education
provided by the larger institution. “Such a school would need to be organized on a
commercial basis,” Hawkins wrote, “...it would need to be a hotel with a school attached,
rather than a school with a hotel attached.”57 The Board recommend training programs
that ranged in length from three months to two years, further distinguishing hotel training
from more traditional higher education and its broader curricular offerings. “This
practical hotel school, even though located upon a university campus, should not be
confused with the idea of a four year college course, leading to a degree, such a course
being probably more general in its nature,” Hawkins wrote.58
The hotel industry embraced the BVE’s call for a university-based training hotel.
College campuses were seen as especially suitable sites for formal hotel training, as they
housed and fed students, faculty, and visitors. In 1919, a member of the New York State
Hotel Association’s education committee, John McFarlane Howie of the Hotel Touraine
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(an independent Boston hotel), made such a claim to the Association’s president. Howie
had participated in a conference at Cornell University to determine the use of new state
appropriations for Cornell Agricultural College. In his letter to the Association, Howie
argued for a new chair of home economics that would oversee hotel education. He
offered as evidence “the fact that the machinery necessary for giving young men and
women the necessary knowledge to equip them for hotel-keepers is functioning already in
large and generous measure” on college campuses.59 Howie characterized dormitories as
model hotels attentive to furniture, hygiene, aesthetics, and food; he believed home
economics students could use such spaces as training sites in accounting and
housekeeping. Howie also envisioned a research program that would produce valuable
information for the entire hotel industry. Citing his own hotel’s research on the efficiency
of a new cooking range, Howie lamented, “I must experiment alone and give any of my
fellow hotel-keepers the benefit of my experiment — made at my cost — when it should
have been made in the atmosphere of an experimental laboratory.”60
The following year, an article in Hotel Monthly reiterated the call for higher
education hotel training facilities. In the piece, “A Hotel on Every University Campus,”
the journal argued a “scientifically equipped and operated” hotel would benefit students,
faculty, and college visitors. It also departed from the machine metaphor used among
other commenters in describing such hotels not as factories, but as "wholesale homes
officered by intelligent people specially trained.”61 The proposed training for those
intelligent people represented the breadth of operations the industry believed were central
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to the sound operation of a hotel. "Subjects hotel people should be familiar with"
included accounting, architecture, banking, banquet service, beverages, buying, china,
chemistry of foods, color harmonies, community kitchen, cookery, dairy foods, dietetics,
dining rooms, domestic science, electricity, engineering, experience, the farm, fire
protection, floor clerk, flowers, foods, fuel economies, furniture and fixtures, garbage,
garages, groceries, help, home economics, hospitality, housekeepers, hygiene,
illumination, inspectors, insurance, interpreters, kitchens, law, leftovers, mail, marketing,
mechanical devices, music, pastry, plumbing, pneumatics, porters, public comfort
conveniences, publicity, refrigeration, repairs, room clerks, social centers, stewards,
systems, telephones, transportation, travel, vacuum cleaning, ventilation, and vermin.62
It’s not clear whether the author of the Hotel Monthly piece believed such broad
training of hotel management was possible. But the writer was articulating the diversity
and variety of elements that constituted hotel service in this period, which in turn seemed
to warrant formal education and training. Howie’s letter to the president of the New York
State Hotel Association, too, suggested higher education programs in hotel management
as a process of institutionalizing hotel service and establishing its character. “Men and
women graduated from such schools would add tremendously to the imponderable values
which enter into the makeup of a great modern hotel,” he wrote. “When I speak of
imponderable values I mean the word — service — which in all of its intricacies is a
purely imponderable values. Services rendered but cannot be grasped,- [sic] they can only
be felt, and young men and women graduated from such a school as I hope to see them
graduated from, will carry into the hotel profession a very much finer conception of
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services than has heretofore been obtained in hotels either here or in any other land.”63
Howie and his peers were not only identifying a new professional occupation, but also
enacting a new form of service, one best controlled by trained managers.64

The First College-Level Hotel Program

Cornell was not the only institution of higher education considered for hotel
training. In 1921, the Western Hotel Reporter of San Francisco described a new food
research laboratory at Stanford University, created on the recommendation of Stanford
graduate Herbert Hoover, that could be expanded to offer more comprehensive hotel
training. “Here is a modern, powerful institution, selected on account of its particularly
fine scientific and laboratory equipment, capable of accommodating vast numbers of
students and ideally situated climatically and otherwise,” the Reporter wrote. “It seems
reasonable to believe that the work at Stanford...might be extended to include all
departments of the hotel business.”65
Cornell’s established prominence as a school of home economics and institutional
management, however, as well as its proximity to New York City, contributed to its
emergence as the first hotel management program. Howie collaborated with the head of
Cornell’s home economics department, Flora Rose, to convince the American Hotel
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Association to endorse and financially support a hotel education program at Cornell.66
After the New York state legislature refused to support the program, the AHA agree in
1921 to raise $25,000 for the program.67 To oversee the program, Cornell hired Howard
Meek, a former Yale mathematics instructor, director of a vocational program in hotel
operations at Boston University, and the summer manager of a Maine hotel.68 The
university enrolled its first cohort of hotel management students in the fall of 1922.
Debates over the appropriate curriculum for training future hotel managers
characterized the Cornell program’s early years. One of the first was over the distinction
of “hotel management” as a distinct course of study separate from the agriculture
college’s programs in service fields. The AHA was initially attracted to Cornell in part
because of the agriculture school’s existing coursework in institutional management. But
in August 1923, the AHA’s educational counsel, L.S. Hawkins, complained to Meek
about the lack of such a designation in new Cornell’s coursework. “I am unable to
understand why, if the College of Agriculture insists upon maintaining a Department of
Institutional Management in the School of Home Economics rather than a Department of
Hotel Management,” Hawkins wrote Meek, “they should expect the American Hotel
Association to pay for the courses in Institutional Management which are taken by the
hotel students. I do not care to get into a controversy about this matter.”69 Despite this
complaint, the AHA did support the program and in 1931, Cornell broke off the courses
in hotel management as a new Department of Hotel Administration.70
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A larger debate concerned the trajectory of hotel management training and the
content of Cornell’s hotel management curriculum, both of which reflected the interests
and influence of hotel chain operators. Seemingly all parties involved with the launch of
the Cornell program argued for a mixture of university training during the traditional
academic year and professional experience in the summer months. In a March 1923 letter
to Meek on hotel placements for Cornell students, the AHA’s educational counsel, L.S.
Hawkins wrote, “The question of whether it would be better to have the men get their
practice work before taking college work in some phase of the industry is the same old
question of whether laboratory work should precede lecture or lecture precede laboratory
work, and it gets about the same answer — namely, they should have both.”71 In the
summer of 1923, the program’s first, 90% of Cornell hotel management students found
placements in chain hotels.72
As for the curriculum itself, Howie advocated for practical instruction in hotel
operations within the framework of a broader liberal education. “Hotel keeping is only
extended housekeeping,” the journal Hotel World quoted Howie in 1921. “It is a business
of scrubbing floors, cleaning carpets, cooking food and attending to the creature comforts
of those who reside within its walls.” At the same time, Howie believed that situating
such training in an institute of higher education would make the field more attractive to
candidates of seemingly high moral character who might otherwise have been turned
away by the nature of hotel work, especially before Prohibition. Characterizing Howie’s
argument, Hotel World wrote “the associations a college alone can give, furnish that
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higher cultural and spiritual training necessary to succeed in most professions.”73 Flora
Rose and John Wiley, publisher of Hotel Monthly, shared Howie’s vision.74
Meek and other members of the AHA’s education committee, however, preferred
a more specialized curriculum that emphasized management and, especially, accounting.
Ingram has characterized these different approaches as a conflict between independent
hotel operators — operators such as Howie, who comprised the majority of AHA
membership — and the owners and operators of hotel chains, who made up the bulk of
the AHA’s education committee. According to Ingram, this represented a conflict
between the two forms of hotel operation. Independent hotels tended to be smaller and
manage employees through personal relationships. Such a managerial relationship,
however, was not possible in larger and chain hotels. Ingram argues that the
heterogeneity of the independents (in terms of size, geography, age, and quality) hindered
their ability to establish a cohesive educational strategy for “lower-level” employees. The
success of the chains in securing their vision for the Cornell curriculum reflected the
shared interests of that operational category, and helped establish the professional
distinction between hotel managers and the people they managed.75

Refining Hospitality

The earliest efforts to establish formal hotel training programs also called for
parallel research agendas. In its 1921 report, the Federal Board for Vocational Education
described several industry challenges that could be resolved through research; among
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these was the reduction of losses among hotel services such as flower and cigar shops,
and the standardization of accounting and estimating practices.76 Cornell and the AHA
also envisioned a research agenda for the university’s new hotel management program.
But research at Cornell was light in the department’s first decades. At the urging of the
AHA, the home economics department in 1924 undertook a comparative examination of
cooking fuels, testing coal alongside gas and electricity.77 In a 1936 report on the
program, Meek described a single research project: the collection of financial data from
416 hotels, which the program analyzed, compared to prior years, and made available to
AHA members. Meek argued in this report that the program needed greater financial
support to undertake a more robust research program.78 At that time, and largely for the
next several decades, teaching was the predominant activity within the hotel department.
Research related to the service industry did occur, but not under the auspices of the hotel
program. In 1960, for example, the Vendo Company of Kansas City requested that the
program undertake research on the “introduction of vending machines designed to serve
complete meals.” In his response to the Vendo Company, Meek described the proposed
research project as “analogous to the stint” Cornell’s Industrial and Labor Relations
school undertook for American Airlines a few years earlier.79
Like Cornell, other colleges and universities that added hotel programs to their
curriculum articulated research possibilities for the industry that were difficult to realize
in practice. In 1928, Michigan State College launched a hotel course of study. The drive,
according to a participant in early conversations about the program, was to produce a
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reliable source of labor for the state’s summer hotels. H. William Klare was vicepresident of the Hotels Statler company and Director of Education for the Michigan Hotel
Association. Recalling the formation of the Michigan State program in 1936, Klare
argued Michigan’s lakes and landscapes made the state “one of the country’s favored
summer playgrounds.” But the properties that attracted tourists made labor difficult to
find and keep. “This grand isolation of Michigan which puts us on the vacation terminal,
takes us off the beaten path of the movement of hotel labor,” Klare wrote. “In such a
situation there must develop then a true appreciation of training and an insistent desire to
see its accomplishment.”80
Like the Cornell program, Michigan State’s combined academic year coursework
with three summers of hotel employment. In contrast to Cornell, Michigan State
emphasized the “practical” nature of its education, with coursework in food,
housekeeping, engineering, maintenance, accounting, and hotel administration. Early in
its history the college also articulated its desire to serve the industry through outreach and
the scientific study of hospitality. Michigan State offered three- and four-day “short
courses” for hotel employees and managers. It also expressed an early desire to expand
its extension services to the hotel industry. “The home of the farmer, his wife’s
organization of her housework, the educational wants of the citizens of the small towns,
have been duly regarded on their own ground,” Klare wrote, “so there exists a method, a
procedure, an experience that can be drawn on and applied to the hotel field in Michigan”
By 1936, the state offered several extension “sorties” in hotel work, but Klare believed
more were possible if organizations of hotel greeters, stewards, chefs, and housekeepers
stressed their need for such courses. As evidence of their utility, Klare wrote: “One of the
80
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finest and most scientific series of talks I have ever read on the subject ‘Flower
Arrangements in a Hotel’ was given in one of these extension sallies two years ago in
Detroit.”81
Klare also described the potential for research in hospitality at Michigan State
that, like the extension services, required the articulation of need from the hotel industry.
The school had prepared surveys and studies, but “the full use of research into things
appertaining to the hotel business has not as yet been made.” And also like Cornell, the
existing research that did pertain to the hotel industry was conducted outside the program.
Klare described a resort hotel owner who visited a hotel trade show in New York where
he gained “insight into the life history of vermin,” never knowing that he could have
more easily consulted a Michigan State entomologist. Other departments at the school
already produced knowledge relevant to the industry, according to Kline. “Hotels can
benefit much through the research information already gathered about linens, foods,
glass, washing compounds, soaps, cleaners, and other materials used in hotels,” he wrote.
“It remains for hotelmen to outline what they really want in research so that the
Education Committee can bring their suggestions before the college heads.”82
The number of hotel management programs grew in the 1930s and ’40s. By 1947,
the University of Denver, University of Illinois, Mississippi State College, Penn State,
New Hampshire State College, Oklahoma A&M College, San Francisco Junior College,
and State College of Washington had joined Cornell and Michigan State in offering hotel
management training. In a 1947 letter to Cornell’s office of admissions, Meek also
described a restaurant management course at the University of Chicago, a program in
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“hotel technologies” at the New York State Institute of Applied Arts and Science, and an
interest in establishing hotel schools at the University of Florida and Georgia Tech.83
These programs emphasized teaching over research, but they were nonetheless
establishing and defining through that teaching a field of service that would later be
subject to research as “hospitality.” One example was a menu planning workshop at
Cornell in the spring of 1947. Offered over seven Saturdays by Alice Eaton, a food
consultant from the Boston baking company H.A. Johnson, the workshop’s content
negotiated the practicalities of food service and training with the increasingly broad and
diverse service products available to U.S. consumers following World War II — products
reproduced and optimized by people like Eaton. “The pattern of living in changing
rapidly in this country,” she wrote her students. “Restaurants and hotel managers have a
greater responsibility toward the public than ever before.”84
Eaton’s approach to the workshop emphasized the importance of experience in
menu planning. “This is not going to be a text book course,” she warned students. “It will
be practical and down-to-earth. You will get out of it exactly what you put into it.85 Eaton
encouraged them to start building personal databases of menus and articles on new
kitchen equipment, time-saving methods, and “unusual food combinations.” She
suggested they establish their own filing system to organize this content according to
meal categories such as breakfast, buffet service, Washington’s birthday, “out doors,”
and “Men’s Favorites.”
The seven-week menu planning course also articulated a taxonomy of food
experiences. In one of the first meetings, Eaton asked her students a series of questions to
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develop a comprehensive list of restaurant types. These included “What type of a place
would a woman who had been shopping eat in?”, “Where would you eat if you are on the
road to a football game and in a hurry?”, and “What type of restaurant would you select if
you were entertaining some one whom you wanted to impress?” 86 The questions
generated a list of 33 types of eating places, including cafeterias, tea rooms, automats,
college dining halls, school lunches, soda fountains, clubs, sandwich shops, department
store dining rooms, catering establishments, hospitals, children’s nurseries, railroad
dining cars, air lines, summer camps, dude ranches, night clubs, office buildings,
luncheonettes, and steamship lines.
In planning menus, Eaton negotiated the vast array of consumer experiences and
expectations with restaurants’ desire to manage and shape those expectations. Eaton’s
taxonomy of breakfast reflected that negotiation. “I am not going to give you so called
‘typical’ breakfast menus,” she told her students. “There is not such a thing.” At the same
time, she divided the meal into six subcategories according to customer “patterns.” These
included the “‘Quickie’ or Train Catcher’s special” (coffee and doughnuts), “Basic 7
breakfast” (citrus juice, cereal, whole wheat toast), “Breakfast-the best meal of the day”
(half a grapefruit, scrambled eggs, sausage, and buttered muffins), and the “Calorie
watcher” (sliced oranges, whole wheat toast with no butter, and black coffee).
Eaton also offered two breakfast categories that supported more leisurely use of
time. The first was the “sleepy head breakfast.” This was a late breakfast for resort hotels,
where some guests did not want to wake before the typical breakfast ended at 9am, but
where kitchens by that time must turn to lunch preparations. She suggested for these
meals, between 9 and 10am, fruit juice, cereal, and muffins, but no short order foods.
86
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The other category elaborated a new dining experience. “In metropolitan areas it
is customary to sleep late on Sunday morning and eat first meal of the day from 1012:30,” she wrote. “People want a little more than a breakfast but not a heavy dinner. A
meal called ‘brunch’ has come into being.”87 Eaton suggested these emerging brunchers
be served broiled grapefruit, grilled sausages with apple rings, scrambled eggs, and
popovers with butter.

Hospitality Research

Though hotel management programs struggled to develop research programs that
mirrored the academic research happening in other college departments, Cornell and the
industry did identify practical ways to experiment and test hotel operations. Hotel
companies such as Statler developed model rooms and experimental spaces to evaluate
hotel room layouts, bedmaking procedures, and recipes. And In 1950, Cornell opened the
Statler Inn on its campus. The Inn was designed as a site where Cornell students could
gain experience in the daily operation of a hotel.
In 1960, Cornell more successfully articulated hospitality management as a
distinct academic discipline with the launch of the Cornell Hotel and Restaurant
Administration Quarterly.88 “It will be the purpose of the Quarterly,” Meek wrote in an
editorial for the journal’s first issue, “without impingement on the commercial trade
press, to provide a forum for serious discussion by all interested and competent parties of
the problems and progress of the hotel industry; to report without abridgment the
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operational ideas of leaders in the field; and to bring to all hoteliers the results of
investigations and studies by Cornellians and other researchers.” Launched with the
support of the Statler Foundation, Meek described a publication that would allow Cornell
“to share its teaching material with hoteldom at large.”89
Content in the first issue of the Quarterly reflected Cornell’s intent to reach
hospitality practitioners, even as the university explicitly distinguished its work from that
of trade publications. Articles included “Improvements in Dishwashing,” “Recipes and
Standardization,” “Food Mixtures and Staphylococcus,” and “The Temperamental
Potato.” Most of the content in this issue centered on institutional food production, and
especially the techniques, technologies, and systems that could help organizations
negotiate cost and customers pleasure in mass food service.
The early issues of the Quarterly reflected two additional changes in the field of
hospitality management. The first was a bibliography of books and articles from 1959
whose breadth reflected Cornell’s vision of the broad scope of hotel, restaurant, and mass
feeding industries at that time. A sampling of these entries reveals a range of service
operations far greater than those described in 1897 by the writer for Scribner’s. Though it
did include on entry for “fish (oysters),” the bibliography included entries for accident
prevention, air conditioning, airline catering, automation, baked products, buffets, color,
convenience foods, credit cards, drive-ins, food acceptance, food additives, food mixes,
food poisoning, frozen foods, ice carving, motels, packaging, plastics, playgrounds,
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radiation, sound-proofing, supermarkets, and swimming pools (“The care of diving
boards”).90
The second was an article by Charles Horroworth, the executive vice president of
the AHA. Horroworth’s piece, “Research: The Key to Successful Operation in the
Golden Sixties,” captured the state of hospitality research at that period, outlined the
AHA’s research priorities, and described the particular character of hospitality service.
Much of the research in the industry to that point had been statistical in nature, either in
market research and in accounting. Horroworth argued for further work in these areas,
especially in the expenses associated with linen, china, glassware, water, steam, and
electricity. He also described AHA interest in the burgeoning area of “motivation
research.” This field, Horroworth wrote, could identify “what kind of atmosphere guests
prefer for sleeping, breakfast, luncheon, cocktails, dinner and evening. Thus the creation
of the proper atmosphere to please people at these particular times would eliminate much
of the guesswork from room design and lighting.”91
Perhaps most significant was Horroworth’s explicit caution over the widespread
adoption of new technologies, especially automation and self-service, within the industry.
In doing so, he characterized hospitality in a way that mirrored the earlier descriptions of
Boomer and Statler. Horroworth described for his readers an imaginary visit to a hotel in
1965, five years in the future. A guest would drive up to a convenient motorist entrance,
where a recorded voice welcomed him and a baggage tag appeared from a wall panel. He
entered the hotel through a “‘doorless’ door” of air, and used his credit card to retrieve a
90
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room key and establish a hotel account. A self-service elevator and a moving floor took
the guest effortlessly to his room, where he was pleased to see a television, bedside light
control, adjustable mattress, and a pneumatic tube system for placing room service
orders.
But not all was well in this hotel of the near-future. This imagined guest was
disappointed when his meal was delivered by an automatic dumbwaiter in the middle of
the table. The guest was correct in assuming that the food was prepared and served
“without benefit of the human touch.” The experience stimulated in the guest a “longing
for some small sign that this hotel is staffed by people.”92
Horroworth articulated for his readers a vision of service that could not be
reduced to automation or self-service, even when those technologies were available and
seemingly lucrative for hotels and restaurants. “Automatic assembly lines, modern data
processing equipment, conveyor systems and pneumatic tube delivery all have their
places and may well provide life-saving solutions to industry problems,” he wrote. “But
considerable research will be needed to learn how all these new developments may be
applied to our job of feeding people and housing people.”93
Another, single-page article mirrored Horroworth’s articulation of a new concern
for experience in hospitality products. This was a report on recent visits from architects to
Cornell’s annual workshops on hotel management, among them Morris Lapidus, the
architect of Miami Beach hotels including the Fountainbleu and the Eden Roc. The
Quarterly summarized Lapidus’ remarks before the Cornell faculty and students. The
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architect of resort hotels argued that “The well-designed hotel of the 1960’s should meet
the emotional needs of the guest as well as provide for his physical needs.”
Summarizing the architect’s remarks, the Quarterly continued: “A person away
from home for whatever reason, Mr. Lapidus pointed out, unconsciously expects a new
experience, an emotional lift. People want to return to a hotel, not simply because of its
physical comfort, but because of the atmosphere. Architects and interior decorators must
seek to create an atmosphere that will make the guest emotionally comfortable.”
Lapidus was not the first architect to emphasize atmosphere and emotional
comfort in hotel design and operations. Seashore, mountain, and tropical resorts,
especially, had long been concerned with the experiential dimensions of their allinclusive and immersive environments. But his presence at the Cornell workshop
reflected a shift in hospitality management and operations that paralleled Statler’s earlier
in the century: while Statler and his peers deployed standardization and simplification to
construct mass hotel service, the service designers and operators of the 1960s and
forward would draw on similar efforts to enact mass experiential service. In the 1970s,
Carnival Cruise Line would approach Lapidus’ firm to design the interiors of its first
ships.
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Chapter Five: A “Magnificent $100 Million Floating Pleasure Complex,” or, the
Complete Servicescape

The Carnival Corporation is the largest cruise company in the world. In 2018, its
Carnival Cruise Line served 22% of the world’s 26 million cruise passengers. The
company’s eight other lines carried an additional 25% of those passengers, meaning
nearly half of the cruise passengers in the world sailed on ships owned by the Carnival
Corporation.1 But the company had a much more modest origin. It launched with a single
ship. And a used one at that.
In 1972, Ted Arison started Carnival with the former Canadian Pacific ship
Empress of Canada. Renamed the Mardi Gras, it first sailed out of Miami on March 11,
1972. This inaugural trip included a writer for the Travel Agent industry publication.
Documenting the experience for his travel agent readers, Theodore Handelman described
a ship that clearly had a former life on the ocean. “Since the ship was originally in
transatlantic service, it has luxury features not usually found on Miami-based cruise
ships,” Handelman wrote. These included both indoor and outdoor pools, five indoor and
outdoor promenade decks, a sports deck with an enclosed room, and “an unusually large
proportion of inside rooms, again due to the original configuration of the ship for
transatlantic multiclass service.” Handleman also noted that the Mardi Gras retained the
Empress’ original “English-Canadian look, very different from the typical sleek new
Miami cruise ship.” This included a color palette of browns and maroons.2
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Handelman approached the cruise with the critical eye of a travel agent
considering whether to promote the Mardi Gras to his clients. He noticed that all of the
rooms had been air conditioned and fitted with private baths. Handelman enjoyed the
meats and soups and almost all of the fish dishes served on the ship, though he found that
the coffee was rarely fresh. A strolling accordionist added “a festive touch” to dinner
service. Surveying the entertainment options, Handleman enjoyed both the ship’s
magician and a singer from “the islands.” Room service was good, though his cabin’s 24hour call system didn’t seem to work. Handelman attributed the ship’s few failings to the
trip’s inaugural status. Overall, he felt, “what came through quite clearly on this initial
voyage was the evident desire of everyone on the ship’s staff to please the passengers.”3
This chapter concludes the dissertation through an examination of several key
moments in the history of Miami-based cruising in the 1970s and early 1980s. These
episodes are typically represented by the launch of new ships among the major cruise
lines, but they also include infrastructural expansion, itinerary shifts, and the
development of privately managed cruise destinations. In doing so, these episodes and
this chapter tie together the multiple historical strands of the previous four chapters.
Rapid growth and expansion in the cruise industry in the 1970s and early ’80s
represented the full development of a servicescape that was simultaneously
environmental, infrastructural, technical, atmospheric, and interpersonal. It was one
designed, organized, and operated to comfort, gratify, and, as Handelman noted, please
the passengers of mass-market cruises. It in turn produced those pleased passengers who,
by the 1980s, much preferred the managed experience of the shipboard cruise to the ports
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a cruise ship visited.

From Ship to Shore and Back

At the time the Mardi Gras launched, cruise lines defined their products largely
through the destinations the ship would visit. Ports and land-based activities, for example,
dominated the 1969 Cruise Roundup and Forecast from the travel agent publication
Travel Weekly. The special issue included stories on the dining scene in Kingston,
Jamaica; Hawaiian sugar mill tours; the “old world allure” of Nassau; and Trinidad’s
rainy season. Advertisements and features focused almost exclusively on upcoming
cruise itineraries, from Eastern Steamship Lines’ three-day Caribbean trips out of Miami
to the Norwegian American Line’s 92-day cruise around the world. A story on Home
Lines trips leaving New York City described the company’s “Linger Longer Cruises,”
which offered passengers more time in ports of call.4
The Mardi Gras was just one of several new cruise ships to appear in Miami at the
start of the 1970s. Having already added a copy of the Sunward, the Starward, to its fleet
in 1968, Norwegian Caribbean’s owners launched the Skyward in 1969 and the
Southward in 1971. Though the line’s first ship had been built for North Atlantic ferry
service, Norwegian’s rapidly growing fleet was increasingly designed for warm-weather
cruising. As one shipbuilding journal described, “Klosters, like so many other cruise liner
operations, concentrate on Caribbean operations, finding the U.S. market for this venue
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almost insatiable.”5 While the Starward had been constructed with a two-deck, full-length
car deck, like the Sunward, the Skyward was built with passenger cabins and a cinema in
this space (the Starward’s garage was later modified to include the same functions).6 The
Skyward also represented one of the earliest efforts to position the cruise ship as not just
a comfortable and enjoyable means of traveling among multiple Caribbean ports, but as a
destination in its own right. A comparison of travel brochures for the Skyward in 1970
and 1973 reveals the subtle shifts in emphasis this involved. “Skyward is a hotel at sea,” a
1970 brochure told potential passengers, “with everything you might wish—a theater for
late-run movies, gift shops, hairdressers, so much to entertain you and give you all the joy
of a great cruise.” This promotional material listed the “entertainment galore” that was
available on the Skyward, including shopping arcades, the topside Tropicana Bar, shows
in the Paradise Club Lounge, a midnight buffet, and late-night-into-early-morning
dancing in the Pot O’ Gold room.7 A brochure for the same ship in 1973, in contrast,
swaps the more passive listing of ship activities and amenities with a spatial and
situational bombardment of those same offerings. Describing the Skyward now as a
resort, the brochure offered a whirlwind tour of a possible day aboard the ship:
There's a swimming pool an arms-length away from a tall rum punch. There's a
sunny deck a hop-and-skip away from a massage room and sauna. There's a skeet
shoot an elevator away from a movie theatre and a shopping arcade.
The sun goes down and the night life comes up. There's a Captain's Cocktail Party
a limbo away from a Bahamanian Goombay. There's a Masquerade Ball a mask
away from another midnight buffet. And isn't this your night to break the bank in
the Monte Carlo Room?
5
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Hinting at the immersive potential of a Norwegian Caribbean cruise, the brochure
tells potential passengers, “You may know how to live on land. But it takes the
Norwegians to show you how to live at sea.”8
Other Miami-based lines expanded as well. Royal Caribbean became a fleet of
three when the Nordic Prince and the Sun Viking (both newbuilds) joined the Song of
Norway in 1971 and 1972. In contrast, Cunard worked to quickly adapt its existing fleet
even further to cruising. In 1972, the company sent the three-year-old, dual-purpose
Queen Elizabeth 2 to a Southampton shipyard, Vosper-Thornycroft, for modifications
that Cunard believed would better suit the ship for its role in cruising. This involved the
addition of new cabins that increased the ship’s passenger capacity. The shipyard also
enlarged the QE2’s dining rooms to accommodate all passengers in a single seating.
Two-seat dinners were common on transoceanic liners, where time was less a concern;
while cruising, however, passengers’ desire to spend more time in a port of call led
Cunard to extend the ship’s dining rooms and add a third to more quickly serve all
passengers in a single seating. The shipyard also added three new bars to the ship and it
replaced the tourist-class library with a casino.9
While Miami-based lines such as Norwegian and Royal Caribbean sailed on
young or new vessels, Carnival entered the market with a much older ship. The company
emerged after a financial dispute between Ted Arison, the Miami agent for Norwegian,
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and the company’s owners severed the relationship between the two.10 Arison first
attempted to start a new line by purchasing Cunard’s dual-purpose Carmania and
Franconia, but after representatives for Arison visited the ships and found their condition
underwhelming (one cruise enthusiast described their interiors as “gloomy”),11 Arison
turned to a recently retired ship from the Canadian Pacific line.
The Empress of Canada had launched in 1961 as a dual-purpose ship for summer
service between the U.K. and Canada winter cruising. Its amenities and style reflected
more the former service than the latter. Most but not all of the tourist class cabins had
private bathrooms. Interior design drew on the political and natural history of Canada.
“The character and style of the period of Frontenac has set the motif of decoration which
gives reason for the free use of the Fleur-de-Lis in carpet and curtain and design and for
the blue and gold of the colour effects,” the journal Shipbuilder and Marine Engine
Builder wrote of the first-class dining room, which was inspired by the 17th-century
governor of New France. “Contrasting colours of carmine, grey and light blue are used
for the banquette and chair coverings and for certain sections of ceiling.”12 The touristclass dining room used a color palette of green and crimson, inspired by the era of Guy
Carleton, a 17th-century “colonial character of some repute.”13 Cow-hide panels featuring
Canadian ranch brands decorated the Banff Club, and the St. Lawrence Club far featured
the armorial bearings of families that had estates on that river. The ship’s main public
space, the Canada Room, was dominated by a seven-foot hardwood and metal panel in
the shape of the country, “wholly covered in low-relief carving to a pattern of wild fowl,
10
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prairie animals and the inhabitants of lake and river.”14 The ship did include several
features for use in cruising, such as a portable pool that could be brought out to the lido
deck, and lido furnishings that were “all gay in character and colour and greatly add[ed]
to the holiday atmosphere.”15 But as with other dual-purpose ships described in Chapter
3, little differentiated the Empress of Canada in its separate roles as a passenger liner and
a cruise ship beyond itinerary. A brochure for a 1963 61-day cruise of the Mediterranean
emphasized the trip’s destination while promising passengers “comfort undreamed of
when Aesop spun his fables.”16 Comfort — in the form of air conditioning, stabilizers,
and decks of public space — was one of the qualities the line sold, and the elements that
produced that comfort did not change across its functions.
Carnival initially reproduced Canadian Pacific’s emphasis on destinations and
ship comforts in its promotion of cruising. The line’s earliest brochure — for a 7-day
cruise to San Juan, Montego Bay, and St. Thomas — described the ship’s appearance as
marking "The Golden Era of Caribbean Cruising.” Carnival promised passengers “[t]he
biggest, fastest, most beautiful ship from Miami. The greatest entertainment and the most
Romantic Islands and Colorful Ports.” The Mardi Gras was the line’s only ship at the
time, but the company marketed it as part of a new “Golden Fleet.”17 Carnival printed a
daily program for its passengers, Carnival Capers, and a copy of from May 1972 reveals
that the ship offered activities similar to those found on the passenger liners that preceded
14
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it. Guests were invited to participate in bridge, ping-pong, and bingo tournaments. A “Mr.
Z” offered magic lessons. The final night featured a crazy hat and costume masquerade.18
But like Norwegian, Carnival quickly pivoted to a cruise concept that increasingly
emphasized the ship as the focus of a cruise. In the fall of 1973, the line abandoned the
“Golden Fleet” concept for a new “Fun Ship” campaign. As the sales and marketing
executive responsible for the new campaign, Bob Dickinson, later recalled, less than one
percent of the U.S. public had been on a cruise at the time. “By focusing on the ship
rather than the ports of call,” Dickinson wrote, “Carnival was forced to communicate to
the public what the experience of the ship and cruising on her was all about. Therefore
the story of what a vacationer could expect on board was a salable one.”19
A 1974 brochure for the Mardi Gras’ seven-day cruises to Nassau, San Juan and
St. Thomas reflected the shift in emphasis. Every image in the brochure but one were
photographs of the ship, its interiors, and the activities it offered. The advertisement did
include a description of each port, but it offered the most seductive description of the ship
itself and the experience passengers could have aboard it. “Go ahead. This is your chance
to live a little, just as you like it!” the brochure read. “You have everything to work with
on Mardi Gras. She’s a spacious floating country club with three swimming pools, sports
decks, promenades galore, duty-free shops, clubby little night spots, a theater, grand
ballroom, four bands, all star shows—and a festive atmosphere. There’s something
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happening every minute of every day, even at six in the morning if you’re up that early—
or that late…”20
Contemporary reflections on passenger shipping suggest two related reasons for
this pivot: the increasing cost of passenger shipping and the need to generate greater
onboard revenue. In 1971, Cunard’s deputy chairman, Stormont Mancroft, appeared
before the Royal Society for the Encouragement of Arts, Manufactures, and Commerce
and delivered a lecture, “Can Ocean Travel Survive?” Mancroft focused on the
challenges that large traditional lines like Cunard faced, but his analysis and predictions
anticipated the character of the contemporary and future cruise industry. “The Jet,” he
argued before the Society, “is not the only villain of the piece.”21 He attributed the
decline in passenger shipping to the closing of the Suez Canal, the rising cost of fuel oil,
increasing labor and insurance expenses, and, for European lines especially, the breakup
of European empires that slowed passenger flows between the continent and its former
colonies. “Where else can we go for honey?” Mancroft asked the crowd. His answer was
cruising. “I believe that the passenger liner is no longer in competition with the air, but is
complementary to it,” Mancroft said. “The real competition is with other forms of
leisure.”22
Mancroft described a “boom” in cruising that left some Caribbean ports bursting
with tourists, and he argued that the cruise market had international potential. He
cautioned, however, that “the cruise market, though it makes a notable and increasing
contribution to the future of the passenger liner, is volatile...Only new and custom-built
20
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liners are making much money. Competition is intense, and close attention must be paid
by the market men to time-tables, sailing dates, fares, standards of entertainment aboard,
cuisine and service. There is certainly no quick buck to be made in this market.”23
Mancroft predicted that successfully transitioning to cruising involved more than
a change in itinerary and destination. It also necessitated changes to the ships themselves
and the traditionally high crew-to-passenger ratio found on passenger vessels. One way to
do this was to increase the number of passenger cabins, as Cunard later did on the Queen
Elizabeth 2. Another was a change in operations and cabin organization. “I also believe,”
Mancroft said,” that ships may have to be sold like hotels and not by cabin numbers, and
those cabins will become more uniform in size. Cafeteria catering and dormitory
accommodation will grow. There are even those who think that passengers may one day
be asked to make their own beds.”24 Mancroft also envisioned ships built “flush-decked
from stem to stern, on aircraft carrier or tanker basis, to secure the maximum deck
space.”25
Mancroft admitted he might be stretching a bit, and in terms of bed making he
was. But his anticipation of standardized cabins and boxy passengers ships was correct.
When a member of the audience pushed back against Mancroft’s call for standard cabins,
describing such a ship as a “TWA hotel,” Mancroft acknowledged and reciprocated the
questioner’s nostalgia for idiosyncratic cabins as “one of the charms of travelling by sea.”
But, he warned, “there are too many varieties of cabin to make for efficient
administration.” He continued: “from the point of view of pure economy in building the
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ship, marketing, maintaining and keeping it clean, the few cabins of different shape and
size there are, the better.”26
That same year, an anonymous writer for the Shipbuilding and Shipping Record
echoed Mancroft’s call for more standardized cabins, but for reasons more cultural than
economic. In an editorial, “Cruise liners—a question of taste,” the writer attributed
shifting cabin design trends to the preference of U.S. passengers for personal space. “One
aspect of American life which has a good influence on cruise liner accommodation,” the
anonymous author wrote, “is the insistence on private ‘facilities’ and non-sharing of
cabins with strangers.” In an observation that reflected American patterns of hotel design,
he wrote: “Nowadays it is rare to have multi-berth cabins, the majority being two-berth
with shower and toilet en suite. This has allowed for a standarisation of fittings and
fixtures and, of course, with all cabins being virtually the same, placing of passengers
who previously insisted on reserving a particular favourite cabin, is not now such a
problem.”27
Another significant trend of the early 1970s was a shift in cruise itineraries and
the number of ports visited. The cause was the 1973 oil embargo by members of OPEC.
A December 1973 New York Times article explored the impact of the embargo on the
U.S. tourist industry and found that gas shortages were impacting Las Vegas hotels,
Colonial Williamsburg, sports fishing boats, and ski resorts. As for cruise lines, according
to the Times reporter, “Many companies are considering changing itineraries. Or slowing
down.”28 Royal Caribbean’s marketing director, Rod McLeod, told the newspaper,
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“We’re going through the Caribbean in a straighter line.” The company’s 14-day cruise
on the Nordic Prince swapped its Montego Bay stop, on the western end of Jamaica, for
the closer Port Antonio, on the island’s east side. It also eliminated a visit to Nassau,
reducing the ship’s itinerary from nine to eight stops. Passengers, according to McLeod,
didn’t seem to mind the additional time on the ship. When asked about their reaction, he
told the Times, “This is going to sound like a con job, but nine ports of call in 14 days
was very hectic.”29

A Year-Round Carnival

Across the rest of the 1970s and into the early 1980s, Royal Caribbean,
Norwegian, and Carnival grew their fleets through a combination of newbuilding and
conversions. And these ships increasingly realized Mancroft’s predictions of standardized
cabins and flush-decked ships. Royal Caribbean’s first vessel, the Song of Norway, was
an early example of this model. When it launched in 1970, the Shipbuilding and Shipping
Record praised both its repeating rows of square cabins and the variety that existed across
such repetition. “In the planning state, great attention was paid to both standardisation
and flexibility of use,” the journal wrote. “Despite the fact that the staterooms...do not
vary much in size or general standard, a wide selection of fare prices for the 870
passengers has been achieved by pricing according to such criteria as natural or artificial
light, location on board, and the like. A prospective cruising passenger can thus choose
between 12 different price levels, although the vessel as a whole is a one-class ship.”30
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Like Norwegian and Carnival, Royal Caribbean’s marketing emphasis shifted
from its cruise ships’ destinations to the ship itself across the early 1970s. One of the
line’s first brochures for the Song of Norway — a 1970 advertisement for seven-day
cruises out of Miami to San Juan, St. Thomas, and Nassau — included photographs of
Caribbean forests, horse-drawn carriages, dancers, colonial buildings, and the kinds of
crafts passengers could buy when in port. Six years later, Royal Caribbean used similar
imagery to entice passengers in a full-page booklet, but it also included a two-page
spread with an illustration of the Song of Norway and call-outs that pointed to all the
activities aboard, including films in the South Pacific Lounge, dancing in the My Fair
Lady lounge, and dinner in The King and I Dining Room. “There’s more to do on our
island,” the booklet now argued, “than many of the islands we visit.”31
Carnival, too, intensified its emphasis on the centrality of a cruise ship to the
cruise experience as it grew its fleet of Fun Ships. The company’s first additions were
repurposed ships. In 1975, Carnival purchased the Empress of Britain, a former Canadian
Pacific ship like the Empress of Canada. Ted Arison hired the firm of Miami Beach
architect Morris Lapidus to redesign the interior of the ship. Lapidus was then nearing the
end of his career, having earned both fame and criticism for his exuberant designs for
retail stores and hotels. Lapidus had never before worked on a ship, though during World
War a New York-based shipfitting company asked the architect to design a “postwar
luxury ship” so that troop transporting Liberty Ships could be repurposed for leisure
activity. Lapidus drew on his experience in retail architecture in envisioning new
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passenger ships. “I decided that just as I had opened up storefronts with wide expanses of
glass, I would open up the interior of the public spaces in a ship to a vista of sea and sky,”
he later wrote. “If people were going to take a cruise, they wanted plenty of sea and sky,
so why not sell them what they wanted?”32 In an article on his vision for post-War World
II cruise ships, Lapidus also described a disagreement with a colleague about the size of
cruise ship cabins. His colleague argued that cabins should be large enough to entice
passengers to stay in them and not crowd public space. Lapidus disagreed, invoking a
cultural argument that did not determine but instead reflected the growing influence of
the U.S. market on cruise ship design. “In my opinion,” he wrote, “if there is to be
anything particularly American in our designs, they should reflect the American's
gregarious nature. It may be true that Europeans and certain members of the social
register prefer to keep themselves, but the popularity of multitudinous Boards of Trades,
Chambers of Commerce, local Kiwanas [sic], and so forth, indicate that the American
likes to be among people.”33
The shipfitting company never moved ahead with Lapidus’ plans, but the architect
later shared his drawings with Ted Arison. When Arison was searching for Carnival’s
first ship, he sent Lapidus to England to inspect Cunard’s Franconia and Carmania; the
architect argued to Arison that the ships were “too old for conversion,” and Arison sent
Lapidus to Italy to evaluate the Empress of Canada. Arison later hired Lapidus’ firm to
remodel the Empress of Britain for its conversion into Carnival’s Carnivale. A young
architect at Lapidus firm, Joseph Farcus, handled much of the interior redesign of the
Empress of Britain. In his own words, the biggest change to the second Empress was the
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creation of a tiered theater for live entertainment. When the conversion was complete,
Arison invited Farcus on the Carnivale’s first cruise; Arison’s reaction to the invitation
captures the uncertain character of cruises in the mid 1970s, even as cruise lines were
increasingly attempting to define the experience, both materially and discursively. “My
first thought before accepting his invitation was, ‘Do I want to do this? What am I going
to do aboard for a week? It’s going to be boring,” Farcus later wrote of the moment.
“Despite my trepidations I accepted his offer. That cruise would change my life. I had
fun. It was enjoyable from A to Z. There was no boredom. There was plenty to do, even
on that old and antiquated ship.”34
Carnival’s advertising strove to project an experience of A to Z enjoyment, for
multiple interests. The company’s message was not simply that Carnival ships offered
plenty to do, but rather that they seemed designed for multiple types of passengers. A
1976 booklet on the Mardi Gras and Carnivale, for example, offered sample on-board
itineraries for “the athletic” (including morning exercises, ping-pong, visits to the sauna,
a message, and swimming) and for “the less energetic” (for whom Carnivale offered
shopping, films, a beauty salon, and a barber shop).35 An emphasis on the diversity of onboard activities and amenities increasingly made the cruise a vacation experience
seemingly suitable for multiple “types,” even within the same traveling party.
Norwegian, too, pursued conversion in the 1970s. In 1977, the line purchased the
former Cunard ship Adventurer to replace its first ship, the Starward. Cunard had
launched the Adventurer in 1971 as its first purpose-built cruise ship. At 14,000 gross
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tons, and with room for 800 passengers, the ship was much smaller than Cunard’s liners
and dual-purpose ships, such as the QE2. Cunard’s attempt was to design and operate a
more economical ship, but the size grated one writer for the Shipbuilding and Shipping
Record, who in a 1971 review of the ship wrote, “There is little scope on a ship of
Adventurer’s size to provide a feeling of spaciousness either in the indoor or open
decks.”36 And though the small ship was built for Caribbean cruising and the islands’
shallow ports, it mirrored in many ways the company’s existing liners. In that same
review, the Shipbuilding author criticized the designers of the ship’s public spaces. The
design firm that had experience in banks, offices, and department stores, but not
passenger vessels. “The result, it must be said, is disappointing, principally because they
have produced what could be a termed a ‘vertical’ ship,” the author wrote. This criticism
was grounded in the ease and pleasures of movement that could be found on other cruise
ships, and which was reflected in emerging cruise line marketing materials that offered
narrative accounts of an imagined passengers’ movement across the ship and across
activities. The writer continued: “One of the benefits bestowed on the interior designer by
a ship’s basic parameters is that a series of public rooms can be so arranged on one level
that the passengers is able to ‘progress’ from one area to another on the same level, with
mood changes, sharp or subtle, introduced by the designer. This attitude has been ignored
on Adventurer. To ring the changes of atmosphere, the passenger has to range over four
deck levels, with two lifts serving 800 passengers, or use the stairs.”37
Norwegian had more success with the small ship, which it renamed the Sunward
II. The company deployed the Sunward II on a new three- and four-day cruise package:
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Bahamarama. Norwegian promised Sunward II passengers that Bahamarama was “a
whole new cruise experience.”38 In addition to stops in Nassau, Sunward II cruises also
stopped at a new private island in the Bahamas. Norwegian leased the undeveloped Great
Stirrup Cay from private owners and spent $100,000 adding barbeque pits, a bar, a
bandshell, showers, and a storage shed for snorkel equipment. A Cruise Travel review of
the island assured readers that “All these have pretty thatched roofs and they blend in
with the palm trees and shrub vegetation so as to be hardly noticeable as anything new.”39
Such a negotiation between the untouched and the built-up was an important one for
Norwegian. An employee who claimed credit for the idea later told the New York Times
of the tension, “We didn’t want to make it too fancy. We didn’t want to lose the
Robinson Crusoe aspect. But Americans like white porcelain toilets.”40 The result,
according to Cruise Travel, was “the beach party to end all beach parties,” composed
only of the Sunward II’s passengers and its front-of-house staff.41
Norwegian added to its fleet again in 1979, when it purchased the French Line’s
France for conversion to cruising. Built in 1962, the 1,000-foot, 2,000-passenger France
was the longest passenger liner in the world, but dwindling passenger interest and high
operational costs (especially in wages and fuel) led the French Line to withdraw the ship
from service in 1974.42 Norwegian purchased the France for $18 million, and spent
another $80 million refitting the ship for cruising. One of the largest spatial changes was
the extension of four decks to provide greater access to the outdoors than was necessary
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on a transatlantic liner. The conversion also involved the elimination of duplicate public
rooms that had been designed for the France’s two-class transatlantic crossings. The firstclass smoking room and main lounge were converted into the Club Internationale and
Checkers Cabaret Lounge; the tourist-class smoking room became a casino and the
tourist-class main lounge was opened to a new lido deck with an indoor-outdoor bar.43
This new deck was an expanded outdoor space that included a new open-air swimming
pool, replacing one that had been built under glass. The pool had underwater windows
that offered swimmers views to a new disco one deck below, A Club Called Dazzles; the
aft deck above the pool was made into a new outdoor restaurant, and another pool was
installed on a new sun deck atop the ship. The ship’s enclosed first-class promenades on
the port and starboard side were converted into new streetscapes, Fifth Avenue and the
Champ Elysees, lined with shops, bars, and cafes.
Converting the France into a new cruise liner, the Norway, also required more
technical changes both to the ship and the infrastructure that served it. The France had
been designed for speed, and was capable of achieving 31 knots. Slower Caribbean
cruising meant the ship needed only half its power capabilities; conversion closed one of
the ship’s two engine rooms and removed two of its four propellers. Cruising, especially
out of Miami, also required greater maneuverability than transatlantic crossings. The new
Norway featured five bow and stern thrusters that allowed it to make a tight 180-degree
turn after it entered Biscayne Bay, where it would dock at two of the Miami passenger
terminal’s diamond-shape nodes (carpet patterns on board the refitted ship helped orient
passengers according to this fore and aft docking, with blue-toned carpets used in the
front half of the ship, and pink-toned carpets used in the back).
43
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Bringing the Norway to Miami also required infrastructural changes to the Miami
harbor and port. These had been occurring across the 1970s. In 1968, the U.S. Congress
approved the Army Corps’ recommendation to deepen the harbor’s main channel and
turning basin from 30 to 36 feet, with the Corps arguing (in part), that “Present cruiseship traffic is generally restricted to the smaller Bahama-type vessels.”44 The work was
completed by 1975. By that the Port of Miami had also added three new cruise berths to
accommodate the growing number of ships and passengers sailing from the port.45 In
1979, eight cruise lines and 20 ships were overwhelming the port facilities, and the
department launched plans for a ninth berth. In addition, the port expanded the entrance
to the harbor to accommodate the Norway, and hired a Danish ship research laboratory to
model the Norway’s entry into Biscayne Bay. “The tests have conclusively confirmed
that the...dredging and widening of the Port of Miami’s outer approach channel will allow
pilots to guide the 1,035-foot S/S Norway safely into harbor,” the head of the Biscayne
Bay pilots association assured the public in 1979.46
One contemporary observer and liner enthusiast described the conversion of the
ship into the Norway as a $100-million wager that "France's red, black and white
elephant can be transformed into a sleek, blue Nordic Florida bonanza.”47 When it was
finished, in 1980, Norwegian had the world’s largest full-time cruise ship. It had a staff of
800, with more than three-quarters working in passenger-facing services: 183 in the hotel
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department, 272 in food, and 80 in booze, and 74 in the cruise department, including
three cruise directors, four hostesses, 18 entertainers, 35 musicians, and two DJs.48
The line actively promoted and operated the ship as a destination. A 1981 booklet
promoting the new Norway included 19 pages of text, images, and deck plans that
described the ship’s activities, shops, restaurants, and cabins; it included only two
describing the ship’s destinations.49 Daily schedules from an August 1981 cruise listed
abundant activities that overlapped, giving passengers multiple options for entertainment
in addition to the regular shopping, swimming, sunbathing, eating, drinking, saunas, and
massages that were available throughout the day. These included shuffleboard,
horseshoes, ping-pong, an exercise class, swimnastics, a backgammon lesson, a dance
class, an aerobic dance class, an arts and craft class, an “NFL Football Special” featuring
NFL players, snorkeling instructions, a cosmetics seminar, a bridge tournament,
passenger talent show practice, a talk about shopping in St. Thomas, jackpot bingo, a tour
of the ship’s galley, a speed reading workshop, a teen party, a fashion show featuring
clothing available for purchase in the ship’s shops, a honeymooners champagne party, an
astrology lecture, children’s masquerade, trapshooting, and a lecture “Karate: What It Is,
What It Isn’t.”50 The variety of activities was designed to cultivate a totalizing
experience. “On board,” the Norwegian booklet promised passengers, “you’ll discover a
vacation experience—a ship that has been gloriously opened to sun, sea, and sky to give
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you a feeling of being totally entertained day and night.” The Norway, according to its
owners, was a “magnificent $100 million floating pleasure complex.”51
Norwegian’s cruise product included more than just a vast array of amenities and
activities. The company’s advertising included some of the earliest, if not the earliest,
invocations of cruise ship size as a selling point. An early promotional booklet touted the
ship’s 12 decks, its three football-fields length, and its status as the largest cruise ship in
the world. The line also positioned its attractions against any a passenger might find on
land. This new “playground of the Caribbean,” the line argued, had “more attractions on
board than most any other port of call or resort.”52

A New Song for America

Growing passenger demand for cruising in the late 1970s led Royal Caribbean to
pursue a newbuild vessel. In December 1979, the line signed a contract with Finland’s
Wärtsilä shipyard for a vessel capable of carrying 1,575 passengers. This was fewer than
could be accommodated on Norwegian’s Norway, but it was double the capacity of any
one of Royal Caribbean’s existing vessels; as the largest purpose-built cruise ship to date,
it would also serve as a model of size and efficiency for the ships that followed. More
significant, this new ship, Song of America, reflected considerations of environment,
infrastructure, amenities, and hotel operations. It embodied the multiple histories teased
out in this dissertation’s previous chapters and represented the most complex and
totalizing cruise ship servicescape at that time.
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Wärtsilä and Royal Caribbean collaborated on market research and design studies
to determine the size and organization of the Song of America. The shipbuilder outlined
multiple design objectives as it began. These included the goals of doubling the capacity
of Royal Caribbean’s previous ships “in order to achieve the economy-of-scale effect,”
determining ship dimensions according to “available building, port and docking
facilities,” and offering “almost doubled areas for outdoor activities, sunbathing, jogging
and games, with large pool area on the top deck, good facilities for serving outdoor meals
and beverages, promenade around the ship and plenty of unobstructed deck space.”
Realizing Mancroft’s earlier prediction of more standardized hotel-like cabins, Wärtsilä
also determined to keep cabin variation to a minimum.53
Wärtsilä built mock cabins early in the design process to study and adjust room
layouts and amenities. The final ship included three groups of cabins: larger deluxe
cabins high in the ship’s superstructure, and 130-square-foot two-person cabins on lower
forward decks, distinguished as either outside or inside cabins. Prefabricated in
Wärtsilä’s shipyard, the cabin’s bathrooms concentrated the electrical and plumbing
infrastructure toward hallways and ceilings for ease of operations and maintenance (an
organization very much like that of Statler’s early twentieth-century hotels).
“Maintenance of toilets has been fasciliated by collecting all service items in piping
shafts behind the toilet units,” Wärtsilä wrote of its design. “Access to the shafts is
through a door in the corridor, which minimizes the need of maintenance inside the
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cabins. The wiring and piping in the cabin compartments are concentrated in the corridor
sections above the ceiling panels, to provide easy access for service.”54
This design may have offered easier service and maintenance, but it wasn’t
invisible to passengers. On a “shakedown cruise” in 1982, writers for The Motor Ship
magazine noted that the prefabricated bathrooms “are raised slightly above cabin level,
which has necessitated ‘watch your step’ notices on the inside of the compartment door.”
Of the cabins themselves, the writers found the space “a little restrictive.” But
reproducing for readers the goals of the shipbuilder and Royal Caribbean, the authors
argued that “the object of a cruise is not to stay in a cabin all day!”55
The Song of America provided passengers with 25% more open deck space than
and of Royal Caribbean’s other ships. These open spaces included a sports deck; a 500meter promenade around the ship’s superstructure; and a two-level deck on top of the
ship with a cafe, two pools, and an elevated sun deck for “really serious sunbathing.”56
Entertainment and dining spaces included the Madame Butterfly dining room, Oklahoma
cocktail and party lounge, Guys and Dolls lounge, Can Can main lounge, and a Viking
Crown Lounge that circled the ship’s funnel and offered panoramic views of the ship and
the sea.
Wärtsilä’s organized passenger cabins, public spaces, and the ship’s storerooms
and workrooms (“a vast service backup,” as The Motor Ship described it) according to
what the company and the shipping press described as “an economy of scale
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philosophy.”57 The shipbuilder arranged all these spaces around a central service
infrastructure meant to smooth the flow of materials across the ship, both during loading
and while operating as a cruise. This infrastructure included a service corridor on the
ship’s lower C deck, which ran almost the entire length of the vessel. Two vertical shafts
— one fore and one aft, and each with two elevators — ran from this deck to the top of
the Song of America’s superstructure. This system quickly moved food, drink, hotel
stores, linens, and garbage around the ship. Wärtsilä also situated bars as close as
possible to these shafts. It also located all food storage areas on the C deck, from where it
could be quickly transferred to the ship’s bakery, main galley, or crew kitchen.
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(Figure 25: Flow studies for catering services (top), hotel stores and linens (middle), and garbage
(bottom) aboard the Song of America. Wärtsilä Song of America, Cruise Liner for Royal Caribbean
Cruises Inc., Box Royal Caribbean International: Sovereign of Seas/Song of America/Fleet
Menus/Snapshots, Laurence Miller Collection, Wolfsonian-Florida International University, Miami,
Florida)

The shipyard characterized this infrastructure as a labor-saving one, but the
system also allowed the Song of America to load provisions, every other week, in a short
four-hour period while it was docked in the Port of Miami. Key to an “economy of scale”
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ship was its ability to move goods and people as quickly as possible while in port.
Wärtsilä achieved the latter by loading passengers through a single foyer midships, which
included staircases on either ends and passenger elevators that paralleled the two service
elevator shafts. The Motor Ship writers were impressed with a foyer “designed to handle
a large intake in a short turnaround time.”58 The journal congratulated Wärtsilä and Royal
Caribbean for building a large passenger ship with such efficiencies in mind. “There is no
doubt,” its review of the ship concluded, “that Song of America’s most important claim
to fame is the lengths to which both owner and builder have gone to ensure the ship is run
on the most economical lines possible.” 59
Both Royal Caribbean and the cruise trade press drew on Song of America’s
operations in its marketing and analysis of the ship. The cruise line’s advertising
described the ship as offering a “relaxed but efficient manner.”60 The July/August 1983
edition of Cruise Travel named the Song of America the magazine’s “ship of the month,”
and described it as “beautifully new, well-managed, with open deck space that seems to
stretch forever.”61
The boosterish article went on to praise the front-of-the-house staff aboard Song
of America. This crew included a mix of Royal Caribbean veterans from the Song of
Norway, Sun Viking, and Nordic Prince, as well as new hires from European hotels who
had been trained on the ship’s inaugural trip from Finland to the United States. It also
included a description of the activities aboard the ship, a list that, by 1982, had become
almost de rigueur for U.S.-based mass market cruise ships.
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“As with all RCCL ships, entertainment and passenger activities are available
virtually non-stop,” Cruise Travel teased its readers. “A typical day’s events could
include exercise classes and informal games on deck, along with doubles shuffleboard
and table tennis tournaments, complimentary dance and aerobics classes, fun and games
with prizes at poolside, first-run movies, backgammon, horse racing, bridge tournaments,
cash bingo, skeet shooting, basketball free throw tournaments, ice carving
demonstrations, followed by pre-dinner easy listening and dance music, a gala show, plus
move late night reveling!”
And if Song of America’s passengers tired of the free activities, Cruise Travel
pointed out, “There’s also the largest casino you’ll find aboard any RCCL ship; it has 64
one-arm bandits.”62

Sailing Toward the Perfect Day

At the start of the 1980s, as multiple cruise liners were expanding their Europeanbuilt fleets, the U.S Maritime Administration, a unit within the Department of Commerce,
contracted a consulting firm to study the cruise industry. The goal was to assess the
possibilities for U.S.-built and operated ships to offer cruises between the nation’s ports,
especially in Hawaii and Alaska. The 145-page report analyzed cruise passenger
demographics, cruise lengths, and ports of departure. But the firm, Washington, D.C.based Centaur Associates, also noted a recent change in itineraries for seven-day cruises.
The report stated that cruise lines were reducing the number of ports of call on week-long
cruises in order to travel more slowly, conserve fuel, and reduce operating costs. While
62
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such cruises had typically included five destinations with nights spent at sea, more cruises
were then visiting only three ports and offering two days at sea.
Centaur’s description of the trend, and passengers’ responses to it, was buried in
the middle of its report. The company’s analysis, however, reveals the success of cruise
lines both in positioning their ships as cruise destinations, and in enacting the character of
a cruise as one emerging from the ship itself. “Industry sources report that the scheduling
change has had no negative effect on sales,” Centaur wrote for the Maritime
Administration. “While destination has been important to the seven day Caribbean
passenger, traditionally the cruise itself has been the primary focus. This fact plus
advertising/marketing efforts stressing the ambience of a ship and the ‘romance at sea’
aspect of cruising has made the itinerary transition successful.”63
Passengers may have been lured by ambience and romance aboard mass-market
cruise ships, but they were also increasingly enamored with the service product it
produced. Seven years after Centaur presented its report to the Maritime Administration,
the New York Times reported on the growing tendency of cruise lines to operate their own
private destinations. The article described the new Premier Cruise Lines’ facilities on the
Bahamas’ Salt Cay. The cruise line outfitted the island with electricity, toilets, jogging
paths, a golf course, and several hundred hammocks.
More extensive was a new facility Royal Caribbean built on a peninsula on
Haiti’s north coast. The cruise line spent $2 million on the space, Labadee, which the
Times described as “an immaculate 260-acre enclave that suggests a small American
national park or perhaps something out of the mind of a Disney designer.”64 A review in
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Cruise Travel praised the isolation of Labadee, and pointed out that though it wasn’t
technically an island, it was cut off from the rest of Haiti by “impenetrable” mountains.65
At Labadee, the Columbus Cove beach offered swimming, windsurfing, sailing, and
beach biking. Nellie’s Beach, Barefoot Beach, and Hideaway Beach were all sites for
snorkelers of varying experience. Drinks were available at the Dragon’s Breath Pub, and
could be purchased with fake doubloons that passengers bought for $1 each. Labadee had
two open-air dining halls, and a Native Bazaar were Royal Caribbean customers could
purchase Haitian souvenirs. "No frenetic Port-au-Prince Iron Market, it is immaculate,
airy and convenient,” Cruise Travel consoled its readers. “The inevitable bargaining is
done in a spirited but ever-so-friendly manner."66 A spokesperson for Royal Caribbean
described Labadee as “a microcosm of the Caribbean without things a passenger might
find distasteful.”67
The popularity of privately-managed cruise destinations may have drawn from
passengers’ distaste for some of the more frenetic aspects of Caribbean ports, but it also
reflected the success of cruise lines in making more appealing the controlled on-board
environment of the ship. Jo Kling, a New York-based cruise specialist and former
employee of Holland America Line, told the Times, that “What the passengers appreciate
most...is the service on the ship, the food, the accommodations and the entertainment, the
things that the cruise line can control and prefect.” Kling said that passenger reviews
frequently rated lowest those elements of a cruise that existed beyond the purview of the
cruise line. She cited as examples cab drivers and bus drivers and the “attitude” of shop
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owners. “By arranging a totally controlled island,” she said, “the cruise lines are able to
deliver an experience that is up to the standards of what people are getting on the ship.68
“Let's face it,” Kling continued, “a big number of people traveling are looking for
safe experiences that are a little like back home. They're not so much looking for fantasy
as familiarity. They're looking for something in a setting that is just a little bit different,
so they feel they've been somewhere. But they don't want any of the discomforts. That's
what makes this special island concept so palatable.”69
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